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Competition, Power, and Testosterone: How Winning and Losing Affect Men’s 
Empathic Accuracy and Aggression 
 
John G. Vongas, PhD 
 
Concordia University, 2015  
 
 This thesis investigates the effects of winning and losing on men’s testosterone 
and how these hormonal changes impact their emotion recognition ability or ‘empathic 
accuracy’ (Study 1) and their aggression (Study 2).  It also explores how men’s 
personalized power motivation – their drive to influence other people for self-
aggrandizing purposes – moderates the relationships between the competitive outcomes 
they experienced and their accuracy and aggression.  In Study 1, 84 males competed in 
dyads on a spatial-cognitive task that allegedly gauged their leadership potential, future 
earnings, and likelihood of career success after which they interpreted people’s 
emotional expressions from static photographs.  Results showed that winners’ 
testosterone decreased while that of losers increased.  Second, winners were more 
capable of accurately inferring others’ emotions compared to losers and this ability 
improved with increasing personalized power.  Third, testosterone change mediated the 
relationship between competitive outcomes and empathic accuracy, with post-
competitive increases in testosterone relating to increases in accuracy.  In Study 2, 72 
males competed again in dyads after which they participated in two sequential tasks that 
measured their unprovoked (‘proactive’) and provoked (‘reactive’) aggression. As in 
Study 1, losers experienced a post-competitive testosterone increase, whereas winners 
experienced a decrease.  However, neither competitive outcome nor testosterone change 
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had a significant effect on proactive and reactive aggression.  Moreover, as men’s 
personalized power increased, winners aggressed more proactively than losers, whereas 
losers aggressed more reactively than winners.  Collectively, these are the first studies 
to explore how winning and losing interact with men’s personalized power motivation 
to affect various empathic responses. This research is important because we know little 
about what happens to behaviours and cognitions in the aftermath of a status-based 
contest.  Given that competition is encouraged in many organizations and the workplace 
is a social setting in which zero-sum games are played out each day, findings from this 
research could assist managers in fostering healthier competitive work climates.  
Finally, among the myriad of future avenues worth pursuing, I particularly recommend 
that scholars look into how competition, personalized power, and endocrine changes 
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“Mutation and selection, the great “constructors” which make genealogical trees grow upward, 
have chosen, of all unlikely things, the rough and spiny shoot of intra-specific competition and 
aggression to bear the blossoms of personal friendship and love.” 
− Nobel Prize winner Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression (1966, p. 48). 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Among the countless examples of human social life, the rivalry taking place between men 
competing for status excites the collective imagination like few others.  Whether we are 
witnessing a current debate between Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama or one between Bill 
Gates and Steve Jobs from a bygone era, most people will agree that male competition arouses 
our senses far more than male cooperation.  We are so enthralled by the competition itself and 
what it produces – glory and fame for winners, heartbreak and shame for losers – that we often 
overlook what happens to competitors’ thoughts and behaviours once the competition is over.  
Nearly 50 years ago, ethologist and Nobel laureate Konrad Lorenz discussed how competition 
for social rank and power among members of the same species produces aggressive behaviour 
that is vital for their survival and reproduction.  He used examples of behaviour from the animal 
kingdom to draw parallels with human behaviour, and provided evidence showing that the most 
aggressive social animals can also be the most caring and affiliative.  Lorenz’s paradoxical 
observation was centered largely on nonhumans, yet the idea of how intense male-male 
competition and its outcomes might affect one’s empathy and aggression toward others was 
hatched.   
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 No one can doubt that humans are an aggressive species with a long history mired in 
violence (Pinker, 2011).  However, we are also a gregarious species and virtually all of our 
actions including our thoughts, attitudes, desires, and feelings are either directed toward or 
produced in response to others (Batson, 1990; Decety, 2007).  It is not astonishing, therefore, that 
a person’s ability to understand others and experience their thoughts and feelings in relation to 
oneself, i.e., to empathize with others, is tantamount in developing and maintaining genuine 
relationships.  To be empathic is to enter another’s world and to reciprocate with an appropriate 
emotion (Freire, 2007; Rogers, 1975), and failing to recognize and identify with others’ feelings 
is a hallmark of psychopathy and narcissism (Blair, 1995; Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006).   
 Fortunately, most people are able to shift their attentional focus from themselves toward 
others, and there are numerous instances in everyday life where empathy plays a critical role.  
One example is the workplace because it constitutes an area where all of our basic processes, 
including our emotions, are expressed daily (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1995; Weiss, 2002a).  
Empathy has been characterized as “the sine qua non of all social effectiveness in working life” 
(Goleman, Boyatzis, & McKee, 2002, p. 63), and its investigation in the workplace has received 
some attention.  Organizational research over the last 30 years has suggested that empathy as a 
personality trait is instrumental to leadership and mentoring (Bass, 1985; Luthans & Avolio, 
2003; Ragins, 1997), decision making and negotiation (Detert, Treviño, & Sweitzer; 2008; 
Fenton-O’Creevey, Soane, Nicholson, & Willman, 2011; Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 
2008; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Vecchio, 1981), cooperation and trust (McAllister, 1995; Settoon 
& Mossholder, 2002; Sheppard & Sherman, 1998), and organizational citizenship behaviours 
(Brief & Motowidlo, 1986; Joireman, Kamdar, Daniels, & Duell, 2006; Kamdar, McAllister, & 
Turban, 2006; Rioux & Penner, 2001), to name just a few areas.  Each of these streams has 
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touted the positive effects of empathic expressions in a number of relational contexts involving, 
for example, managers and their subordinates, marketers and their customers, and healthcare 
workers and their patients.  
Management scholars (Sutton, 2007) and industrial-organizational psychologists (Babiak 
& Hare, 2006) have also documented cases where people express little or no empathy vis-à-vis 
their work colleagues.  For instance, Sutton (2007) explained how unempathic individuals 
deliberately focus their aggression on less powerful coworkers and, consequently, undermine 
their self-esteem and self-worth.  Over time, these individuals poison the work environment and 
provoke qualified employees to quit.  Due to their effect in decreasing morale and productivity, 
Sutton advocated that rules be implemented to identify and screen out such toxic persons before 
a civilized workplace can be restored.  Similarly, Babiak and Hare (2006) portrayed the 
corporate psychopath as someone who is incapable of empathy, guilt, or loyalty to anyone but 
themselves.  These callous and “opportunistic corporate bullies” (Babiak & Hare, 2006, p. 188) 
attack powerless targets by consistently ignoring their rights and emotions and, when they are 
finished deriving utility from each one, they move on to their next victim.   
Collectively, the literature on empathy in the workplace has provided a fairly intuitive 
notion, namely that being empathic leads to beneficial outcomes while being unempathic 
produces harmful ones (with some exceptions, see Gino & Pierce, 2009, 2010; Vorauer, 2006).  
Thus, it has treated empathy lopsidedly as a trait, with the vast majority of studies investigating 
the effects of individual differences in trait empathy on a given dependent variable rather than 
treating empathic states as dependent variables that merit their own attention (e.g., Dutton & 
Heaphy, 2003; Mahsud, Yukl, & Prussia, 2010).  Since empathy is an emotional capacity, and 
emotions are hybrid phenomena that consist of fluctuating states around an enduring trait-like 
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mean level for each person (Larsen, Diener, & Lucas, 2002), it behooves researchers to study not 
only what external factors cause it to change, but also how this change subsequently affects the 
individual experiencing it.  This is important because emotional states influence behaviours that 
have important work implications (Ashkanasy & Daus, 2002; Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996) and 
making inferences about emotional states necessitates that researchers use state manipulations 
and proper experimental, not correlational, designs (Larsen et al., 2002).   
Second, the literature has also been silent in exploring social contexts that affect people’s 
empathic states.  Émile Durkheim (1938) and Max Weber (1947) noted long ago that the social 
environment is a constellation of persons whose actions produce an effect on any given 
individual.  Since then, researchers have reported that a large class of human emotions – 
including fear, anger, sadness, guilt, and shame – resulted from either real, anticipated, imagined, 
or recollected outcomes of power and status relations (Kemper 1978, 1991; Kemper & Collins, 
1990; Plutchik, 1980).  Therefore, if socially-induced status gains and losses are capable of 
generating these emotions, then including empathy in this pantheon of emotional responses 
seems warranted, especially given its centrality to interpersonal relationships in the workplace.   
 Finally, many scholars have long acknowledged the integral link between social 
interactions, emotions, and physiology (e.g., Becker & Cropanzano, 2010; Ekman, Davidson, & 
Friesen, 1990; Gross, 1998; Heaphy & Dutton, 2008; Ilies, Arvey, & Bouchard, 2006; Leach & 
Tiedens, 2004; Weiss, 2002b).  However, empirical models that speak to the biosocial nature of 
empathy have yet to be tested.  One hormone that is of interest to social scientists given its close 
association with social behaviour is testosterone (Carré, 2010), and an important body of 
empirical work dealing with men’s attempts to reach favourable positions within a social 
hierarchy comes from studies investigating how competitive contests between men result in 
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corresponding testosterone changes (in sociology, see Booth, Granger, Mazur, & Kivlighan, 
2006; Mazur, 1985; Mazur & Booth, 1998; in psychology, see Archer, 2006, 2009; Carré, 
Putnam, & McCormick, 2009; Maner, Miller, Schmidt, & Eckel, 2008; Schultheiss, Campbell, & 
McClelland, 1999; and in social endocrinology, see Liening, Mehta, & Josephs, 2012; Mehta, 
Jones, & Josephs, 2008). 
This thesis addresses the above gaps and its objective is three-fold.  First, using two 
laboratory experiments, it explores how a competitive rivalry between men in which social status 
is either won or lost differentially affects their accuracy in inferring others’ emotions (a cognitive 
response) and their aggression toward third parties (a behavioural response).  Second, it 
examines whether a change in rivals’ testosterone following competition mediates the 
relationship between their experienced outcome (win, loss) and each of their empathic and 
aggressive responses.  Third, and finally, it investigates whether rivals’ desire to influence other 
people (or their implicit power motivation) moderates the relationship between the competitive 
outcomes they experience and their subsequent responses.  Following the above logic and using 
Andrew Hayes’s (2013) conditional process model, this thesis will therefore determine: 1) 
whether there are direct effects of men’s winning and losing status on their empathic accuracy 
and aggression, 2) whether changes in their testosterone levels mediate these direct effects, and 
3) whether their implicit power motivation moderates the direct effects. 
Two major contributions stem from this work.  More broadly, it clarifies our understanding 
of how empathic accuracy and aggressive behaviour differ as a function of people’s propensity 
for power following social status gain or loss.  This classic person-situation interaction is often 
witnessed in occupations marked by clear winners and losers, the former being rewarded with 
material (e.g., financial bonus, office upgrade) and symbolic status symbols (e.g., occupational 
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title, preferred parking).  Examples of these jobs include those in sales, financial asset trading, 
negotiation, litigation, and perhaps even academia.  The workplace in these occupational 
domains is often characterized as a social arena where zero-sum games occur daily, and where 
both men and women acquire status through promotions or other notable achievements and 
accolades.  It is also a place where they lose status through failure to meet their goals (e.g., sales 
targets), poor job evaluations, demotions, layoffs.  According to O’Leary-Kelly, Griffin, and 
Glew (1996), personal achievement and strenuous competition are values that North American 
organizations consider fundamental to their culture, and which may contribute to a degradation 
in civil workplace behaviour and a rise in aggressive behaviour.  Thus, looking into how 
emotionally charged competitive situations interact with men’s psychophysiology will help us to 
better understand and anticipate organizational behaviour.   
More specifically, this research is pioneering in three empirical respects.  First, it clarifies 
the literature’s mixed findings on the relationship between competitive outcomes and aggression 
by introducing power motivation.  My findings show not only that winners and losers aggress in 
different ways as their power motivation increases, but also that their aggression becomes 
noteworthy only at high levels of power.  Second, power motivation also differentiates winners 
from losers in their ability to accurately infer how others are feeling, a novel finding that has 
important implications in the workplace.  Given that managers are high-power individuals, such 
findings can help predict how they might respond after having won or lost status.  Lastly, and 
perhaps surprisingly, it shows that fluctuating male testosterone levels triggered by wins and 
losses affect men’s empathic accuracy, but not their aggression.  As such, it is one of the first 
studies to demonstrate that testosterone is more prone to affect a cognitive ability rather than a 
behaviour with which it is believed to be so intimately associated.  Therefore, by measuring a 
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range of cognitive and behavioural empathic outcomes emanating from a status contest and 
believed to be intricately associated with androgen changes, empirical evidence is provided to 
contradict what many believed was written in stone, namely that testosterone and aggression go 
hand in hand.  By doing so, this work dispels some of the bad reputation surrounding 
testosterone and, more importantly, shows that hormone-behaviour “if-then” associations may be 






2.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 Two assumptions must be highlighted before the focal constructs of interest are discussed.  
First, it is assumed that achieving higher social status is a value shared by most individuals and, 
second, that each will respond with a desire to emerge victoriously when competing with 
someone else.  While status usually translates to more benefits for those possessing it, there are 
instances in which some people shun dominance battles for high-status positions because they 
lack either motivation for power and influence (Schultheiss, Dargel, & Rohde, 2003) or 
dispositional dominance (van Honk et al., 1999; Josephs, Sellers, Newman, & Mehta, 2006).  
Others might also be content with their current level of status or have enough self-esteem that 
precludes them from warranting more.  Nevertheless, given that personal achievement and 
strenuous competition are cornerstones of North American culture (O’Leary-Kelly et al., 1996; 
Trice & Beyer, 1993), the basic assumption here is that all participants will strive to be 
competitive if given the opportunity.  Since it is argued that status competitions will impact one’s 
empathic responses, let us first understand what is meant by empathy. 
 
2.1. What is Empathy? Multiple Meanings for a Complex Phenomenon 
 Derived from the Greek empatheia (en(m) = “in” and pathos = “feeling”), empathy was 
coined in English by Titchener (1909) to refer to the tendency of art observers and aesthetics 
philosophers to project themselves “into” that which they observe, typically some physical object 
of beauty.  Merriam Webster defines empathy as “the action or the capacity of understanding, 
being aware of, being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and 
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experience of another without having them fully communicated in an objectively explicit 
manner” (Empathy, 2014).  Although the word has been around since Aristotle (Rhetoric, 
1386a22-28), it was confused for a long time with sympathy, in part because the latter garnered 
much attention from David Hume (1739/2000), Adam Smith (1759/2009), and Charles Darwin 
(1872/1998).  It was only until recently that Wispé (1986) clarified this obfuscation and, 
according to her, sympathy referred to the awareness of another’s suffering as something to be 
assuaged while empathy referred to “the attempt of one self-aware self to understand the 
subjective experiences of another self” (p. 314).  Thus, whereas sympathy is a way of relating 
with others (“feeling for”), empathy is a way of understanding others (“feeling with”). 
In spite of this confusion, the study of empathy has nevertheless spawned a tradition of 
inquiry across fields, including psychology (Batson, 1990, 1991, 1998; Davis, 1994; Dymond, 
1949; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987; Hoffman, 1982), philosophy and 
ethics (Bowden, 1997; Held, 2006; Stueber, 2006), morality and justice (Fuller, 1992; Hoffman, 
2000; Vetlesen, 1994), psychoanalysis (Sharma, 1993; Lichtenberg, Bornstein, & Silver, 1984), 
economics (Fontaine, 1997; Kirman & Teschl, 2010; Stark & Falk, 1998), and neuroscience 
(Baron-Cohen, 2003, 2011; Decety, 2007; Preston & de Waal, 2002).  As one might expect, the 
definitions of empathy varied according to the discipline one subscribed to, with psychologists 
defining empathy in micro terms that deal primarily with intraindividual processes, and 
economists defining it in macro terms that treat empathy on a broader societal level (e.g., game 
theory, welfare economics).  Table 1 highlights the ten most prevalent definitions of empathy in 





Ten Most Cited Definitions of Empathy in the Biological and Social Sciences (1949-2011)  
Author(s) Definition Focus 
Dymond 
(1949) 
“…transposing of oneself into the thinking, feeling and acting of another 
and so structuring the world as he does.” (p. 127) 
Cognitive 
Hogan (1969) “…constructing for oneself another person’s mental state” (p. 308) Cognitive 
Stotland (1969) “…reacting emotionally because he perceives that another is experiencing 




“…responsiveness to another’s emotional experience.” (p. 526) Affective 
Hoffman 
(1981) 
“…affective response appropriate to someone else’s situation rather than 




“…emotional matching and the vicarious experiencing of a range of 
emotions consistent with those of others.” (p. 91) 
Affective 
Batson et al. 
(1995) 
“…other-oriented feelings congruent with the perceived welfare of 
another individual.” (p. 621) 
Affective 
Davis (1994) “…include the processes taking place within the observer and the 





“…ability to identify what someone else is thinking or feeling and to 
respond to their thoughts and feelings with an appropriate emotion.” (p. 
16) 
Both 
de Waal (2008) “…the capacity to be affected by and share the emotional state of another, 
assess the reasons for the other’s state, and identify with the other, adopting 






From these definitions, it becomes clear that psychologists first conceptualized empathy as 
a cognitive process (e.g., role taking, accuracy in perception) before describing it in affective 
terms (e.g., other-oriented feelings of concern or compassion) and, over time, researchers moved 
away from this balkanization and began approaching empathy as a multifaceted construct.  Davis 
(1983, 1994, 2006) was the first to define empathy as a sequence of interrelated constructs that 
included antecedents (e.g., person, situation), processes (e.g., simple to advanced cognitive 
mechanisms), and outcomes (e.g., both intra- and interpersonal).  According to him, an empathic 
episode begins each time an observer is exposed to a target in a particular situation.  The 
observer is not only a biological being that possesses an innate capacity for empathizing, but also 
a socialized being whose culture reinforces a myriad of empathy-related values and attitudes that 
become aroused in specific contexts.  The observer then engages in some form of cognitive 
processing that enables him or her to generate an empathic response, and this processing varies 
in terms of its complexity, ranging from unconscious processes like motor mimicry, to simple 
cognitive processes such as classical conditioning, and eventually to more advanced cognitive 
processes like perspective taking.  Finally, these cognitive processes result in outcomes that can 
be interpersonal or directed toward the target (e.g., aggression, helping), as well as intrapersonal 
or residing within the target and involving either little emotion (e.g., empathic accuracy) or much 
of it (e.g., personal distress).  Hence, Davis’s (1994, 2006) conceptualization of empathy is one 
that encompasses a spectrum of empathy-related constructs, and researchers wishing to study 
empathy may choose to focus on any one of these components.   
This thesis follows Davis’s approach to empathy, and the two studies featured here address 
one nonaffective or cognitive intrapersonal outcome (empathic accuracy) and two interpersonal 
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behavioural outcomes (proactive and reactive aggression), each of which is described in greater 
detail in the sections below.  
 
2.2. What is this Person Feeling? A Primer on Empathic Accuracy 
According to psychologist William Ickes (1997), a pioneer in the development of methods 
used to gauge people’s empathy during dyadic interactions, empathic accuracy is the measure of 
one’s skill in empathic inference or, simply put, everyday mind reading.  Specifically, it is “a 
form of complex psychological inference in which observation, memory, knowledge, and 
reasoning are combined to yield insights into the thoughts and feelings of others” (Ickes, 1997, p. 
2).  The study of emotional display is a descriptive enterprise with a long history (Keltner & 
Lerner, 2010) and decoding studies in which observers make inferences about emotion from 
nonverbal displays are well known (Ekman, 1993; Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1982; 
Matsumoto, Keltner, Shiota, O’Sullivan, & Frank, 2008).   
This ability to accurately infer others’ emotions and mental states predicts not only 
successful negotiations (Elfenbein, Foo, White, Tan, & Aik, 2007) and leadership effectiveness 
(Bell & Hall, 1954; Rubin, Munz, & Bommer, 2005), but also happier marriages (Noller, 
Feeney, Bonnell, & Callan, 1994), social adjustment in children and adults (Gleason, Jensen-
Campbell, & Ickes, 2009), and lower cardiovascular activation during social interactions 
(Levenson & Ruef, 1992).  This cognitive ability to decipher people’s emotional expressions has 
been shown to be related to aggressive tendencies since having poor accuracy could lead some 
observers to overstep their boundaries and wrongfully provoke targets.  The next section digs 
deeper into a behavioural dimension of empathy that is a polar opposite of helping, and 
differentiates between its two types.  
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2.3. The Two Faces of Aggression: Proactive versus Reactive Aggression 
Aggression is defined as “any form of behaviour directed toward the goal of harming or 
injuring another living being who is motivated to avoid such treatment” (Baron & Richardson, 
1994, p. 7).  In recent years, psychologists have further classified aggressive behaviour into two 
types, proactive and reactive, which correspond to distinct behaviours (Carré, McCormick, & 
Hariri, 2011; Poulin & Boivin, 2000). 
Proactive aggression, also referred to as instrumental aggression, occurs without direct 
provocation and is a goal-oriented offensive behaviour aimed at acquiring valued resources by 
dominating others and securing a social position.  It is generally believed to manifest itself in the 
absence of heightened physiological arousal, and individuals exercising this type of aggression 
are informally described as being cold-blooded.  An example would be a schoolyard bully who 
strides over and strikes a vulnerable child to steal his lunch (Dodge & Coie, 1987).  In contrast, 
reactive aggression, referred to as hostile aggression, is a defensive response whenever an 
individual either perceives or directly experiences overt provocation.  Commonly known as hot-
blooded aggressors, these individuals retaliate with anger and impulsivity.  Contrary to its 
proactive counterpart, reactive aggression is accompanied by high levels of physiological 
arousal, and one example is the victimized child who takes a stand against the bully and fights 
back.  Clearly, each of these examples includes an element of power to actively aggress or to 
retaliate.  However, power connotes something much more complex than what our everyday use 
of the term would suggest.  As we will see next, an individual’s motivation for power affects a 





2.4. Power Motivation: A Desire for Status and Impact 
 Power as a key feature of human affairs has a long history in scholarly thought.  Many 
Western thinkers have written about power in social interactions, dating to Plato who described 
the rise of the despotic man after the fall of the ideal state (The Republic of Plato, Chapter 32, 
VIII. 562 A-IX. 576B).  In later ages, scholars like Machiavelli, Hobbes, Nietzsche, and Adler 
reckoned that striving for power lay at the base of man’s nature and the origins of society 
(Winter, 1973, 1992a). 
 Derived from the Latin root potere and the Old French verb povoir, “to be able,” the term 
power has been the subject of many definitions according to a given intellectual stream, much 
like empathy.  In sociology, power has been described variously as “the probability that one 
actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance” (Weber, 1947, p. 152), or “the production of effects despite possible resistance” 
(Schmalt & Heckhausen, 2008, p. 204).  In organizational psychology, power has been defined 
as “the ability to provide or withhold valued resources or administer punishments” (Anderson & 
Berdahl, 2002, p. 1362), or concomitantly as “the ability to control resources, own or others’, 
without social interference” (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003, p. 454).  Thus, whereas 
sociologists are chiefly concerned with existing power relationships that contribute to the 
maintenance and consolidation of social hierarchies, psychologists and organizational scholars 
tend to be more interested in the ways in which a person having power makes decisions that 
ultimately determine the outcomes of another person (Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner, Gruenfeld, 
& Anderson, 2003; Schmalt & Heckhausen, 2008).   
 Seeking power is therefore thought to be one of many reasons, or motives, that explains 
human behaviour.  According to Winter (1973, 1992a), a motive involves several components.  
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First, it is a way of explaining behaviours that cannot be explained by external factors alone.  
Hence, a motive relates one’s immediate behaviour to a more general disposition or tendency.  
Second, implied in the motive is the actual act that fulfills the goal’s accomplishment.  Third, 
from a person’s motive, it becomes possible to make inferences or predictions about his or her 
future behaviour.  Finally, a motive enables a person to adjust his or her behaviour according to 
the context encountered, and to persevere until his or her goal is reached.   
 Veroff (1957) was one of the first to define the power motive, or n Power, as “that 
disposition, directing behaviour toward satisfactions contingent upon the control of the means of 
influencing another person” (p. 1).  Later in his book The Power Motive, Winter (1973) defined 
it as an enduring inclination that individuals feel for the degree to which they have impact on 
others or even society at large.  This impact has to do with either “establishing, maintaining, or 
restoring prestige in the eyes of the world” (p. 69) through direct, forceful, and unrestrained 
actions that can be negative (attacks, sexual exploitation) and positive behaviours (helping, 
counseling) that arouse others’ feelings, as well as explicit concerns about one’s reputation.  
Individuals’ n Power is determined by many factors including one’s life experiences in asserting 
dominance over others, parental childrearing styles, and familial genetics, in addition to 
physiological factors like testosterone (McClelland, 1987; Stanton & Schultheiss, 2009). 
 Individuals possessing a strong power motive experience the prospect of exercising their 
impact as hedonic and rewarding in itself, whereas those having a weak one derive little such 
pleasure.  Accordingly, the former have a greater propensity than the latter to identify and exploit 
opportunities that will enable them to achieve impact on others.  High-power motivated people, 
therefore, tend to gravitate toward occupations allowing them to exercise this need, such as 
teaching, social work, and journalism (Winter, 1973; Winter & Stewart, 1978), management 
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(Chusmir & Parker, 1984; McClelland & Burnham, 1976), entrepreneurship (Hornaday & 
Bunker, 1970; Wainer & Rubin, 1969), and politics (House, Spangler, & Woycke, 1991; Winter, 
1987).  Compared to their lower-power motivated counterparts, those high in n Power are more 
likely to prefer highly competitive sports where they can showcase their athletic prowess, are 
seen as being more influential and persuasive to others in discussion groups, and report a greater 
frequency of precocious sexual relations (for a review of the behavioural correlates of high 
power motivation, see Schmalt & Heckhausen, 2008).  Since its inception, the power motive has 
been conceptualized as a desire not only to control, influence, or impress others, but also to 
receive acclaim and social status recognition (Fodor, 2010).   
 As we will see, our motives are present even when we are not aware of them.  More 
importantly, this unawareness does not signify that they have no effect on our behaviours.  
 
2.4.1. Not all motives are the same: Implicit versus explicit motives 
 More than 25 years ago, McClelland, Koestner, and Weinberger (1989) revealed that two 
types of motives coexisted.  On one hand, they described implicit motives as being largely 
inaccessible to introspection, meaning that they operate outside people’s conscious awareness 
but nonetheless influence their thoughts and behaviours.  On the other hand, they characterized 
explicit motives as being reflective of people’s self-image and these are assessed by conscious 
self-report measures.  Over time, findings have confirmed that these two motives do not correlate 
with one another and that each predicts different types of behaviours (Brunstein, 2008; Kehr, 
2004; Schultheiss, Yankova, Dirlikov, & Schad, 2009; Vongas, Schattke, Al Hajj, Aldon, & 
Oppenheimer, 2014).  For instance, implicit motives are better suited to predict spontaneous 
behaviour and behavioural trends over time, whereas explicit motives are better able to predict 
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deliberate choices.  McClelland (1980) referred to the former set of behaviours as “operant” 
behaviours and to the latter as “respondent” behaviours.  Operant behaviours are those that a 
person generates without premeditation and they involve repeated preferences for specific 
experiences over lengthy time periods.  They are activated by implicit motives which result from 
incentives experienced in doing something that is pleasurable in and of itself (e.g., interesting 
and challenging task).  Respondent behaviours, however, are brought on by environmental 
incentives (e.g., rewards and expectations), and are believed to be directly influenced by a 
person’s conscious thought.  For this reason, explicit motives are thought to be expressed in 
respondent behaviours (Brunstein, 2008). 
 According to McClelland et al. (1989), the two motives are independent of each other 
because they emerge from different types of incentives that were acquired at different stages in a 
person’s development.  Implicit motives were shaped by a person’s affective experiences with 
“natural” incentives (e.g., having impact on others) early in life when conceptualization of 
language was minimal.  Studies on implicit power motivation have found that high-powered 
individuals are more likely to rouse other people’s attention through their risky choices and 
behaviours (McClelland & Watson, 1973), to have a greater likelihood of ascending to upper 
managerial corporate levels (McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982), and to pursue more successful 
career paths (McClelland & Franz, 1992). 
 As such, this thesis focuses on whether individuals who differ in implicit power motivation 
– not in the explicit or more self-aware kind – will experience differing levels of empathic 
accuracy and aggression after a status win or loss.  And, just as motives are not all the same, 




2.4.2. Not all implicit power is the same: Personalized versus socialized power 
 An important development in implicit power motivation came about when McClelland and 
his colleagues conceptualized it as being made up of two separate desires that correspond to 
distinct types of influence (McClelland, 1970; McClelland, Wanner, & Vanneman, 1972; 
McClelland & Wilsnack, 1972).  One stemmed from a need to sway others for self-serving 
purposes, and was given the name personalized power (or p Power).  People having a high 
personalized power motive are driven by decisions serving their own interests at the expense of 
others’ welfare (Magee & Langner, 2008).  Studies have shown that these people engage in risky 
and impulsive behaviours (e.g., gambling, substance abuse), negotiate in an exploitative manner, 
and signal their status through conspicuous consumption (Hofer, Busch, Bond, Campos, Li, & 
Law, 2010).  McClelland (1970) pithily described p Power as follows: 
…[p Power] is turned toward seeking to win out over active adversaries.  Life 
tends to be seen as a “zero-sum game” in which “if I win, you lose” or “I lose, if 
you win.”  The imagery is that of the “law of the jungle” in which the strongest 
survive by destroying their adversaries. (p. 36) 
 
 The second conceptualization corresponds with a desire to influence others not through 
one’s dominance, but rather through prosocial acts and behaviours directed for others’ benefit 
and, as such, was coined socialized power (or s Power).  Individuals in organizations who hold 
leadership positions and who have a high socialized power motive are thought to be empire 
builders because they “are able to create high morale and expand the organizations they head” 
(McClelland & Burnham, 1976, p. 109).  Unlike those with high p Power, these individuals 
sacrifice their own self-interests for the welfare of the organizations they serve and, for this 
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reason, this type of power is generally viewed more favourably.  In spite of the substantial body 
of research dealing with the power motive, few studies have segregated it into its two types.   
 Chusmir and Parker (1984) and Chusmir (1986) found that managerial and non-managerial 
and professional women had significantly higher s Power needs than their male colleagues, and 
reasoned that women were socialized to place the welfare of others ahead of their own, and that 
this social expectation crossed over to shape women’s greater nurturing management style.  
More recently, Magee and Langner (2008) went beyond looking at gender differences and 
studied how people who are motivated by either p or s Power differ in their decisions and actions 
when exercising their influence.  The authors set up two role-playing scenarios, each designed to 
trigger one of two power motives.  One was a simulation of the Cuban Missile Crisis (p Power 
activation) wherein participants were asked to help US President Kennedy draft a reply to Soviet 
leader Khrushchev.  As predicted, participants scoring higher on p Power deliberated less about 
the consequential policy response and were more likely to escalate the conflict than those lower 
on p Power.  The other role play required participants to act as US Food and Drug 
Administration decision-makers, a position having the ability to affect people’s wellbeing (s 
Power activation) by either approving or rejecting a new drug that prevents fatal blood clots.  
Again, as predicted, those scoring higher on s Power were significantly more likely to approve 
and introduce the drug to market than were participants lower in s Power, a decision that 
translates to more lives saved.   
 Motivational processes, such as power, are not the only ones studied when it comes to 
determining what causes behaviour and decision making.  When it comes to men, most people 
would concur that few other hormones define the essence of masculinity like testosterone.  Let us 
now turn the discussion to testosterone and its role in social behaviour. 
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2.5. Testosterone and Social Behaviour  
2.5.1. The biology of testosterone 
Testosterone is a 19-carbon molecule derived from cholesterol and acts as a precursor to 
17-estradiol, commonly known as estrogen and found predominantly in women (Winters, 
2004).  In men, testosterone is produced almost entirely by the testes which synthesize 12-14 
milligrams per day.  Approximately 95% of total male testosterone is manufactured in the 
testicular Leydig cells, with the remaining 5% being produced by the adrenal glands (Weinbauer, 
Luetjens, Simoni, & Nieschlag, 2010).  Although it circulates in the bloodstream of both sexes, 
with eight to 10 times more so in men, approximately 97% of the total concentration found in the 
body produces no observable effects because it is bound to two proteins which render it inactive: 
albumin and sex hormone-binding globulin.  However, the freely circulating 3% is believed to be 
partly responsible for aggression (Archer, 2006; Van Vugt, De Cremer, & Janssen, 2007), social 
dominance (Mazur & Booth, 1998; Rada, Kellner, & Winslow, 1976), and power motivation 
(Schultheiss, 2007; Schultheiss et al., 2003; Schultheiss & Rohde, 2002).  This free form is 
present in saliva, and the vast majority of studies over the last 40 years stem from salivary 
samples (Baxendale & James, 1984; Dabbs, 1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1992, 1993; Dawes, 1974; 
Lipson & Ellison, 1989; Navazesh, 1993; Schultheiss, Schiepe, & Rawolle, 2012).   
There are many advantages to measuring hormones when studying behaviour.  First, 
hormonal changes match the ebb and flow of social behaviour (Dabbs, 1992).  Humans make 
instantaneous decisions about whether they like or dislike other persons, but the majority of their 
daily interactions do not have such an instant quality about them.  Their anxiety increases slowly 
as they approach a novel social setting, and their anticipation of a conflict and its effects may last 
for several hours, days, or even weeks.  Hormone measures are thus conceptually appealing 
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when studying behaviour.  Second, such measures are robust because their slower nature 
compared to neuronal action potentials prevents them from being affected by fast-moving error 
signals.  Third, participants come into contact with simple equipment and provide samples that 
are easily stored for analysis.  Finally, data collection is facilitated because technological 
advances allow participants to carry out their duties with little restriction. 
All men possess baseline testosterone levels that are attributable to genetic and 
environmental factors (Bernstein, Rose, & Gordon, 1974; Meikle, Stringham, Bishop, & West, 
1988; Weinbauer et al., 2010).  These levels are influenced by a 24-hour circadian cycle in which 
they are highest in the early morning and drop over the course of the day (Dabbs, 1990b).  
Lastly, testosterone differentiates men’s sexual organs from those of women, and it endows men 
with secondary sex characteristics that are both physical (e.g., growth of facial hair, muscle 
mass; Weinbauer et al., 2010) and behavioural (e.g., aggression and dominance, heightened 
competitiveness, and status seeking; Burnham, 2007).  Although it is widely believed that 
testosterone becomes activated at the onset of puberty, its primary effects actually take place 
before a child is even born. 
 
2.5.2. Prenatal testosterone and ‘masculinizing’ behaviours 
 Exposure to high testosterone concentrations during fetal development can predict 
stereotypically masculinizing behaviours later in life, including a reduction in one’s empathizing 
ability (Auyeung et al., 2009a, 2009b; Knickmeyer, Baron-Cohen, Raggatt, & Taylor, 2005; 
Lutchmaya & Baron-Cohen, 2002; Udry, 2000).  For example, fetuses exposed to greater 
amounts of testosterone naturally in utero make less eye contact as infants in their first year 
(Lutchmaya & Baron-Cohen, 2002), and socialize less with their fellow kindergarten classmates 
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in their fourth year (Knickmeyer et al., 2005).  In one study, Udry (2000) analyzed data from 
adult women whose mothers’ placental testosterone had been measured during their second 
pregnancy trimester, a period when sex-typing is believed to occur.  Findings showed that 
women subjected to more testosterone during embryological development exhibited fewer 
stereotypically feminine behaviours as adults (e.g., infant care, preoccupation with feminine 
appearance) regardless of their parents’ efforts to socialize them as ‘typical’ females.  More 
recently, Auyeung et al. (2009b) obtained testosterone measures from mothers’ amniotic fluid to 
study the effects of fetal exposure to testosterone on child development.  Parents were then asked 
to assess their child’s gender role behaviour and, as expected, male and female infants’ exposure 
to higher testosterone concentrations in the womb correlated positively with male-typical 
behaviour, examples of which were the preference for toy guns and cars over dolls and jewelry, 
climbing activities and sports over playing house or taking care of babies, and rough-and-tumble 
play over games avoiding risks.   
Collectively, the above sections were meant to offer a preamble on testosterone’s 
association with competitiveness and status seeking.  Since one of the arguments made here is 
that competition and the outcomes it brings, victory and defeat, impacts one’s empathic accuracy 
and aggression, it is plausible to suspect that its effects might occur via testosterone.  We must be 
cautious, however, when making simplistic claims that a hormone like testosterone will always 
be responsible in inducing a particular behaviour.  As in most situations in which behaviour 






2.5.3. Context is key: Testosterone and the challenge hypothesis 
Some scholars portend that although testosterone’s association with dominant and 
aggressive behaviour is widely confirmed (Harris, 1999; Liening et al., 2012), the notion that 
testosterone has an effect on behaviour is not irrefutable in every situation.  One of the most 
influential models to explain this context-dependent relationship is known as the challenge 
hypothesis (Archer, 2006; Wingfield, Hegner, Dufty, & Ball, 1990; Wingfield et al., 2000).  
Originally meant to account for the relationship between testosterone and aggression in 
monogamous birds (Wingfield et al., 1990), this theory holds that increases in testosterone levels 
related to aggression are context-dependent, with levels rising at the outset of the breeding 
season to support reproductive physiology, and rise even further during challenges with other 
males.  This phenomenon is thought to facilitate aggression in both territory formation and 
maintenance, dominance clashes, and mate protection (Wingfield et al., 2000).  In bird species 
where males are expected to provide parental care for offspring, their testosterone levels decrease 
similar to those of higher-order primates, including humans (Gray, Kahlenberg, Barrett, Lipson, 
& Ellison, 2002). 
The challenge hypothesis has been recently extended to humans, and researchers have 
confirmed that human physiology and psychology interact in ways that are consistent with its 
basic tenets.  In his comprehensive review, Archer (2006) used the challenge hypothesis to 
propose that adult males would not only show testosterone sensitivity to competitive challenges 
with other males, but also experience increased aggression if provoked in a manner that is 
relevant to reproductive competition.  This can either be direct, involving a dispute over a 
woman or her reputation, or indirect involving a dispute over resources or status.  Liening et al. 
(2012) also argued that testosterone should not affect behaviour if the situation does not 
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ostensibly present either a status threat or an opportunity to increase one’s status.  In other words, 
if testosterone is the catalyst that drives aggressive behaviour, it should have no effect on such 
behaviour when there is no status to be gained.  In situations where social hierarchies are 
entrenched and there are no opportunities to acquire or lose status, any influence testosterone 
could have on behaviour will vanish.  Contrarily, situations characterized by an unstable 
hierarchy where high-status positions are obtainable through competition would more readily 






3. RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 To summarize briefly, this thesis investigates the effects of winning and losing on men’s 
testosterone and assesses whether this hormonal reactivity subsequently affects their ability to 
accurately judge others’ emotions and their propensity to aggress in two distinct ways.  It also 
explores how men’s implicit power motivation – their drive to influence other people – would 
moderate the direct relationships between the competitive outcomes of winning and losing and 
their empathic accuracy and aggression.  Figure 1 on the next page illustrates the model to be 
tested here and includes the outcomes that are expected to occur in both empathic accuracy 
(Study 1) and proactive and reactive aggression (Study 2).   
 Quantitative psychologist Andrew Hayes (2013) justifies the use of his conditional process 
model stating that all effects a) function through some kind of mechanism (mediation) and b) are 
contingent on something (moderation).  If the above are true, any analysis focusing only on 
mediation or moderation but not both is going to be incomplete in some way.  Therefore, Hayes’ 
conditional process model 5 was employed in both the empathic accuracy and reactive/proactive 










A Conditional Process Model of the Effect of Male-Male Competition  
on Empathic Accuracy and Aggression 
 
 
Variables: x = independent, y = dependent, m = mediator, w = moderator 
 
Direct effect:    x → y 
Indirect effect:   x → m → y 
Conditional direct effect: w * xw   
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3.1. Direct Effects of Competitive Outcomes on Empathic Accuracy 
Academicians (Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 2010; Kraus & Keltner, 2009) and social critics 
(Rifkin, 2009) alike have become increasingly interested in what happens to people’s empathic 
accuracy as they gain social status.  Studies have shown that an individual’s social class can 
predict how empathic he or she will be towards others.  In one experiment, Kraus and Keltner 
(2009) recruited university students from diverse socioeconomic status (SES) backgrounds and 
had them engage in a five-minute dyadic interaction with a stranger.  Two judges then viewed 
60-second video slices of these interactions and coded them for nonverbal cues of engagement 
(e.g., head nods, eyebrow raises, laughter, and gazes at the partner) and disengagement (e.g., 
turning one’s attention away, self-grooming, object manipulation, doodling).  Moreover, the 
authors assigned seven undergraduate students the role of naïve observers who viewed the videos 
and provided estimates of what they believed were participants’ SES using the MacArthur Scale 
of Subjective SES (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000).  In other words, they wanted to 
probe whether SES impacted one’s ability to decode others’ nonverbal gestures and to assess 
whether third parties could accurately guess the SES of interacting individuals simply by 
watching their gestures.  Confirming their hypotheses, Kraus and Keltner (2009) found that 
lower- and upper-SES people were associated with nonverbal behaviours of engagement and 
disengagement, respectively, and that observers’ estimates of participants’ SES corresponded 
accurately with their nonverbal behaviours.   
Another experiment showed that individuals who are associated with a group from a higher 
social class scored lower in empathic accuracy than those belonging to a group from a lower 
class.  Kraus and his colleagues (2010) measured participants’ social class using objective (e.g., 
their level of education, income and material possessions, and occupational prestige) and 
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subjective measures (e.g., their own perceptions of SES rank relative to society), and reasoned 
that, compared with higher-class individuals, those from lower classes possess fewer resources 
and thus must rely more on agents from the external social context for sustenance and, more 
generally, as a means to adapt to a precarious environment (see also Keltner et al., 2003; Kraus, 
Piff, & Keltner, 2009; Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010).  The different dependencies 
that high- and low-SES individuals have on their environments form the basis for Keltner et al.’s 
approach/inhibition theory of power (2003) which holds that lower-class individuals “tend to 
focus their attention disproportionately on the context and, in particular, on other people, relative 
to their upper-class counterparts” (Kraus et al., 2010, p. 1717).  By extension, this implies that 
lower-status individuals place a greater emphasis on the emotions of others.  Conversely, higher-
status individuals have access to bountiful resources and are thus less reliant on others for 
support, spawning patterns of social cognition and behaviour that are focused more on the self 
(see also Piff, Stancato, Côté, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012).  Across three studies, Kraus 
et al. (2010) demonstrated that lower-class individuals indeed scored higher on empathic 
accuracy tests, and gauged more accurately the emotions of a partner with whom they interacted.  
Together, these studies show that, by virtue of their independence from having to rely on 
the external environment to the same extent as lower-status individuals, those high in status may 
be less motivated to tune into others’ feelings and needs.  In all probability, such so-called high-
rollers could afford the occasional blunder when making inferences about others’ mental states 
because they would receive little, if any, castigation for doing so.  Much like social class, 
competition creates a social stratification that, on a smaller scale, could trigger similar cognitive 
processes in winners (i.e., having achieved status relative to another) and losers (i.e., having lost 
status).  Moreover, the positive affect resulting from a victory might spur winners to rely on 
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heuristic information processing, whereas the negative affect of losers might elicit them to 
engage in more careful, systematic processing (Isen, 2000; Lord & Kanfer, 2002).  Thus, the first 
hypothesis posits the following: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Compared to losers, winners will score lower in empathic accuracy. 
 
3.2. Direct Effects of Competitive Outcomes on Aggression 
 What is the theoretical rationale explaining why competition would be associated with 
aggression?  Van den Berghe (1974) and Durham (1976) applied principles of evolution to argue 
that aggression evolved from a struggle for resource competition.  Accordingly, competition 
produces aggression that is partially mediated by hierarchy and so humans maximize their 
survival and reproduction by cohabiting in social groups and by participating in collective 
aggression whenever resources are limited.  Aggressive behaviour may therefore be adaptive for 
individuals under conditions of resource competition, and this helps to partially explain the 
prevalence of warfare among human societies which, some argue, is chiefly the province of men 
(Buss, 2005; Ghiglieri, 2000; Pinker, 2002).  Buss and Shackelford (1997) added that, apart from 
coopting others’ resources, aggression also evolved to serve the particular interests of individual 
men in their mission to negotiate status and power, defend against attack, and deter rivals from 
future aggression. 
 Given its damaging effects, it is not surprising that a growing body of empirical research is 
being focused on the association between aggression and competition.  Studies on male rodents 
like the California mouse (Peromyscus californicus) have revealed that a ‘winner effect’ occurs: 
a victory against a competitor, and the androgenic and neural changes accompanying it, 
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significantly enhance the mouse’s subsequent aggression and elevate its chance to win future 
competitions (Fuxjager et al., 2010; Gleason, Fuxjager, Oyegbile, & Marler, 2009; Trainor, Bird, 
& Marler, 2004).  For example, Fuxjager et al. (2010) found that when male mice win fights, in 
addition to testosterone rises, they experience an increase in androgen receptors in the medial 
anterior bed nucleus of the stria terminalis, a brain area devoted to social aggression.   
 In humans, research on the effects of winning and losing on aggression per se has been 
surprisingly scarce with some exceptions.  Muller, Bushman, Subra, and Ceaux (2012) showed 
that people were more likely to aggress against downward comparison targets (i.e., losers whom 
they defeated) than against upward comparison targets (i.e., those against whom they lost).  The 
authors had participants compete in same-sex dyads on performance tasks and measured 
aggression and a reaction time task.  In this latter task, participants were told that they would be 
presented with a cue immediately after which they had to press a button as fast as possible, for a 
total of 25 sequential trials.  Whoever was slower would be regarded as the loser and receive a 
noise blast through headphones that would be inflicted by the winner.  Muller et al. (2012) found 
that people aggressed more against an opponent they outperformed than against someone who 
outperformed them, and cautioned that attention be paid to winners’ behaviour in light of the fact 
that losers bear the brunt of post-competitive aggressive attacks.   
 Other empirical evidence exists that demonstrates how competition in general leads to 
aggression, with studies on video game competitions (Adachi & Willoughby, 2011; Williams & 
Clippinger, 2002), European football teams at various competitive levels (i.e., national, regional, 
and departmental; Coulomb & Pfister, 1998), and even after participants have read competitive 
stories in which they imagine being implicated (Griskevicius et al., 2009).  Even early studies in 
child development show that competition among five- and six-year old children increases their 
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aggression (Nelson, Gelfand, & Hartmann, 1969; Rocha & Rogers, 1976).  These studies, 
however, were concerned solely with the effect of competition on overall aggression without 
probing further into whether the competitive outcome produced variations in aggressive 
behaviour.  One recent study on aggression did, in fact, segregate winners from losers and found 
no direct effect of competitive outcomes on aggression (Carré, Campbell, Lozoya, Goetz, & 
Welker, 2013).  It should be noted, however, that participants in this study competed against a 
fictitious opponent on an Xbox Kinect ™ video game after which they were assessed only on 
reactive aggression.  It is possible that winning or losing against a phantom player may have 
been too impersonal to spur aggression and, while they distinguished between who won and lost, 
they did not take into account proactive aggression. 
 Indeed, authors have generally neglected to differentiate between reactive and proactive 
aggression and it seems conceivable that, following a competitive bout, winners and losers might 
be driven by different motivations with the result being distinct forms of aggression.  For 
example, winners may wish to perpetuate their winning streak and, since they are free from the 
anxiety and stress engendered in a loss, they might be better equipped to harness the cognitive, 
affective, and physiological resources needed to confront future rivals.  Since proactive 
aggression is planned behaviour not typically associated with an emotionally laden response 
(Siever, 2008; van Honk, Harmon-Jones, Morgan, & Schutter, 2010), one might thus expect 
winners to be inclined to aggress in proactive ways.   
 Conversely, losing against a formidable rival and the feelings of inferiority brought on by 
the loss can be a hurtful experience because people have a tendency to strive toward a positive 
self-image and to feel competent in order to comply with society’s expectations (Muller & 
Fayant, 2010; Steele, 1988; Tesser, 1988).  In fact, competence, or one’s ability to do something 
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successfully, is a fundamental component of a person’s psychological health and regarded as one 
of the three innate human needs in self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Gagné & 
Deci, 2005).  This theory holds that social contexts and individual differences supporting these 
needs lead a person toward personal growth and intrinsic motivation, whereas those that forestall 
them result in poorer motivation and performance.  Deci and Ryan (2000) insist that these basic 
needs are so critical to a person’s overall wellbeing, self-esteem, and general health that they 
specify the conditions under which people can most fully realize their potential.  Feeling 
competent is hindered when people compare themselves to or find themselves in the presence of 
someone who is more competent than they are.  In such cases, people might become frustrated 
when this individual outperforms them and robs them of this feeling (Muller & Fayant, 2010).  
And certainly, the aggression literature has found that frustrated people seek to restore balance 
by lashing back at those who obstruct their goal-directed behaviour (Baron & Richardson, 1994; 
Berkowitz, 1965).  It is thus incumbent upon researchers to ponder about the ways in which both 
winners and losers aggress.  That said, it is posited that men will be aggressive when they are 
both better off (i.e., after a victory) and worse off (i.e., after a loss), but in different ways: 
 
Hypothesis 3a:  Winners (losers) will be more inclined to engage in proactive (reactive) 
aggression against a third party than losers (winners). 
 
3.3. Mediation by Testosterone of Win/Loss on Empathic Accuracy and Aggression  
3.3.1. Social hierarchy, competition, and men’s testosterone 
One of the most fundamental pursuits and outcomes of social life involves the attainment 
of status in the groups to which we belong (Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001; Sapolsky, 
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2004, 2005).  Social hierarchy is so pervasive that even when attempts are made to minimize it, 
via communal sharing for example, it surfaces persistently both within and between groups 
(Fiske, 1992; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  Surprisingly, in spite of it being a key feature of 
organizations and of human relations in general, there exists a paucity of research devoted to this 
topic in management.   
 Nicholson and de Waal-Andrews (2005) drew from the literatures in comparative 
anthropology and evolution to argue that status and rank constitute ‘objective’ measures of 
success, along with material success (e.g., earning capacity), social reputation (e.g., prestige), 
and knowledge and skills.  Magee and Galinsky (2008) also examined the concept of social 
hierarchy by surveying the literatures on power (Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer, 1992), inequality 
(Baron & Pfeffer, 1994; Marx, 1844/1964), influence (Cialdini, 1993), stratification 
(Stinchcombe, 1986), and social structure (Burt, 1992), among others.  They defined hierarchy as 
“an implicit or explicit rank order of individuals or groups with respect to a valued social 
dimension” (Magee & Galinsky, 2008, p. 354).  This definition comprises several interconnected 
ideas.  First, social hierarchy’s nature of being implicit or explicit insinuates that it expresses an 
awareness that people have regarding their location within a particular ranking system.  Whereas 
some hierarchies are defined according to specific rules on which everyone agrees, others are 
nuanced.  Second, a rank order indicates that at least one person within the group must be 
subordinate to one other.  Finally, a valued social dimension is any characteristic or resource that 
is generally understood to confer important benefits to the individual or group possessing it.   
 Social hierarchy serves three major functions in organizations to the extent that rank is 
established by a criterion or dimension related to organizational performance.  First, it creates 
social order by acting as a remedy for uncertainty and chaos (Durkheim, 1893/1997; Parsons, 
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1961).  Second, it eases social coordination because unclear hierarchical relations lead to work 
that is confusing and inefficient even in cases where the majority of group members are high-
status performers or “stars” (Groysberg, Polzer, & Elfenbein, 2011).  This is not to say that the 
establishment of hierarchy does not result in dysfunctional organizational consequences such as 
the institutionalization of amoral reasoning and corruption (Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, 2001; 
Leavitt, 2005; Magee & Galinsky, 2008).  Finally, social hierarchy offers incentives for 
individuals who are motivated to achieve a higher rank because they can either profit materially 
from their positions (Tannenbaum, Kavčič, Rosner, Vianello, & Wieser, 1974) or satisfy other 
needs such as autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 1987), internal control (Rotter, 1966), and power 
(McClelland, 1975; Winter, 1973, 1992a). 
 Studies have demonstrated that a man’s testosterone levels are sensitive to changes in his 
relative position within a social hierarchy (Archer, 2006; Mazur & Booth, 1998).  Moreover, this 
relationship appears to be reciprocal (Mazur, 1985).  Sociologist Allan Mazur first proposed that 
the link between social status and testosterone flows bidirectionally, with men’s rising/elevated 
testosterone levels facilitating attempts to either achieve or maintain status, and falling/depressed 
testosterone levels inhibiting such attempts.  Second, this causation is reciprocal such that 
gaining status increases testosterone, while losing it decreases testosterone.  Edwards (2006) 
lauded Mazur’s model because it specifies not only how short-term changes in men’s 
testosterone levels affect cognitive processes related to their perception of status, but also how 
their perception of status itself may influence testosterone secretion. 
 Numerous studies over the last 30 years that analyzed men’s testosterone levels across 
various status contests have shown that testosterone levels rose in victorious men and dropped in 
defeated ones in athletic competitions (Booth, Shelley, Mazur, Tharp, & Kittok, 1989; Edwards, 
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Wetzel, & Wyner, 2006; Elias, 1981; Neave & Wolfson, 2003; Salvador, Suay, Martínez-
Sanchís, Simon, & Brain, 1999), non-athletic competitive laboratory tasks (Gladue, Boechler, & 
McCaul, 1989; McCaul, Gladue, & Joppa, 1992), intellectual competitions such as chess (Mazur, 
Booth, & Dabbs, 1992), medical school graduation (Mazur & Lamb, 1980), and imprisonment, 
i.e., the ultimate status-depleting event (Thompson, Dabbs, & Frady, 1990). 
 Studies have also shown that testosterone levels fluctuate whenever individuals witness 
their own performance in a previously recorded video (elite hockey players; Carré & Putnam, 
2010), and the performance of their favourite politicians (Stanton, Beehner, Saini, Kuhn, & 
LaBar, 2009) and athletic teams seen on television (Bernhardt, Dabbs, Fielden, & Lutter, 1998).  
For example, Bernhardt and his colleagues (1998) captured the hormonal fluctuations from the 
vicarious experiences of loyal football fans at the 1994 FIFA World Cup™ final match between 
the Brazilian and Italian national teams.  They recruited 26 male fans in Atlanta (12 Brazilian 
supporters and 14 Italian supporters) gathered to watch the live match, and collected saliva 
samples from each participant roughly between 15 and 30 minutes before and after the game.  
Results showed that Brazilian fans, while basking in their winning team’s glory, exhibited 
increases in their testosterone whereas the Italian fans saw a drop in theirs, prompting the 
researchers to conclude that merely witnessing the competitive outcome of one’s heroes has 
physiological effects that go beyond simple changes in mood (for a comprehensive review of 
studies on the impact of competition on hormonal responses in men, see Salvador, 2005). 
 Some studies, however, failed to replicate these testosterone-level changes between male 
winners and losers and showed no significant changes in the hormone according to competitive 
outcome (Carré et al., 2009; González-Bono, Salvador, Serrano, & Ricarte, 1999; Mazur & 
Lamb, 1980; Mazur, Susman, & Edelbrock, 1997; Mehta & Josephs, 2006; Salvador, Simón, 
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Suay, & Llorens, 1987; Schultheiss & Rohde, 2002).  Several reasons explain why this was the 
case.  First, some of the laboratory-contrived competitive manipulations were deemed too short 
(10 minutes or less) to elicit a potent hormonal response.  Second, these competitions resulted in 
wins and losses that were neither salient to nor significant for the participants (Carré et al., 
2009).  In other words, these male participants may have perceived the experimentally induced 
contests as bearing only a “superficial resemblance to the real world” (Highhouse, 2009, p. 554), 
and thus were weak in their ability to bestow them with proper status recognition.  This belabors 
the point that beating an opponent on a task wherein the winners receive no status rewards other 
than the victory itself may simply be ineffective in generating a measurable testosterone 
response.  A third reason is that some men may differ with respect to whether they attribute the 
outcome of the competition to either internal (e.g., personal merit) or external attributions (e.g., 
errors committed by the opponents, sheer luck, and decisions made by referee officials) 
(González-Bono et al., 1999; González-Bono, Salvador, Ricarte, Serrano, & Arnedo, 2000; 
Mazur & Lamb, 1980).  For instance, Mazur and Lamb’s (1980) pioneering work on the effects 
of social contexts on testosterone changes demonstrated that male participants who won a $100 
lottery prize – simply with a luck of the draw – did not show subsequent testosterone rises 
compared with those who did not win the prize money, suggesting that achieving success with 
little or no personal effort is not likely to be met with a noteworthy change in testosterone.   
 In another study involving men’s professional basketball teams in Spain, González-Bono et 
al. (1999) reported no significant differences between mean post-game testosterone of winners 
and losers.  However, the authors found that for the winning team, the greater a player’s 
inclination to attribute the victory to chance, the lower was his testosterone after the game.  
Similarly, for losing teammates, the higher a player’s tendency to attribute the defeat to 
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deficiencies in his own performance, the lower was his testosterone.  Clearly, these results show 
that humans’ hormonal responses to competition are not in themselves linked directly to winning 
or losing, but are instead influenced by complex psychological processes (Salvador, 2005).  Such 
results are consistent with the established notion that the effects of reward on behaviour depend 
in part on whether the person perceives the reward as contingent on his own behaviour or 
independent of it (Rotter, 1966). 
 Therefore, a paradigm seeking to generate appropriate testosterone responses that are in 
line with Mazur’s bidirectional model should: 1) be easy to execute in a laboratory setting yet 
remain salient for participants; 2) leave little room for chance or luck as determining the 
competition’s outcome, i.e., men should attribute their victory or loss as a result of their own 
doing; 3) endow the winners with visible status markers, e.g., formal recognition, awards, or 
symbols; and 4) last between 20 and 30 minutes, long enough to produce an endocrine response 
(Riad-Fahmy, Read, Walker, Walker, & Griffiths, 1987).  Methodologically, such a paradigm 
would directly address the three main limitations plaguing laboratory competitions, namely the 
lack of status endowment in winners, the short length of competitive involvement between 
participants, and the chance-versus-ability of participants as determinants of the competitive 
outcomes (see also van Anders & Watson, 2006). 
Theoretically, the argument made here runs parallel to the views of scholars who propound 
that competition for status to procure resources has an evolutionary biological etiology (Liening 
et al., 2012; van Anders & Watson, 2006).  As they point out, competition assists in the 
promulgation of the fittest genes to future generations, implying that by competing for high-
status positions, the most able individuals are the ones having the greatest likelihood to 
reproduce.  By virtue of their high status, individuals who have emerged victorious in repeated 
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social competitions have better health and nutrition, and are more likely to produce offspring that 
will live long enough to reach sexual maturity and to reproduce thereafter.  In short, “high status 
yields a life style that is generally more pleasant, healthier, and more productive, and thus is 
generally more desirable than a life of low status” (Liening et al., 2012, retrieved from 
http://www.spelab.org/uploads/2/7/8/4/27842457/liening_mehta__josephs_2012.pdf).  Since 
competitions are a means by which a social hierarchy is established, and this hierarchy 
determines how limited resources are allocated throughout a group, high status should therefore 
grant an individual increased access to limited resources.   
Although the evolutionary rationale explains why winners might experience a rise in their 
testosterone levels relative to losers, the physiological process by which this occurs needs to be 
specified.  Schultheiss’s (2007) biobehavioural model of male reward/frustration outlines a 
mechanism by which winning and losing a contest would elicit a specific directional change in 
men’s testosterone.  Winning brings about a release of sympathetic catecholamines (dopamine, 
adrenaline, noradrenaline) and a diminution of glucocorticoids (cortisol) in the bloodstream.  
Dopamine is a neurotransmitter emitted by nerve cells to help them communicate with other 
nerve cells, and it is involved with the brain’s reward system to provide feelings of enjoyment 
and reinforcement that motivate a person to perform certain activities.  Adrenaline (or 
epinephrine) is a hormone manufactured by the chromaffin cells in the adrenal medulla, the 
interior portion of the adrenal gland, and is commonly known for bringing about surges in energy 
and helping to trigger the fight-or-flight response.  The effects of these two chemicals are partly 
why people use the colloquial expression “being on a high” when describing the feeling that 
persists following victory or achievement.   
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Cortisol is a hormone produced by the adrenal cortex, the outer layer of the adrenal gland, 
and is secreted during stressful events.  Its effects, among others, are blood vessel constriction 
leading to higher blood pressure, and suppression of the immune and reproductive systems.  
While dopamine and adrenaline facilitate the production of testosterone, cortisol thwarts it and, 
contrary to winning, losing produces a reduction in dopamine and adrenaline, and an increase in 
cortisol (win   adrenaline   testosterone; loss   cortisol   testosterone).  Therefore, 
acknowledging the litany of findings on the association between men’s testosterone and 
competition, one would expect that winners’ and losers’ testosterone will differ accordingly:  
 
Hypothesis 2:   Competition outcome elicits changes in testosterone, such that winners 
(losers) show testosterone increases (decreases) after a win (loss). 
 
3.3.2. Testosterone’s effect on empathic accuracy 
Researchers have only begun to unearth the relationship between testosterone and 
empathy, and preliminary evidence exists showing that, relative to low-testosterone individuals, 
those with high testosterone are more deficient in empathizing with others, and this phenomenon 
can be witnessed across settings.  Neuroscience research on autism and Asperger syndrome has 
revealed that one’s exposure to testosterone while in the womb is responsible for shaping the 
brain to preferentially ‘systemize’ rather than ‘empathize’ (Baron-Cohen, 2002; Auyeung et al., 
2009a).  According to Baron-Cohen (2002), empathizing is the drive to deduce others’ mental 
states and to respond with a suitable emotion, whereas systemizing is the drive to analyze the 
variables in a system and to construe the principal rules that govern its functioning.  The human 
brain is known to deconstruct countless systems, examples of which are technical (e.g., 
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machines, instruments), natural (e.g., weather patterns, geological arrangements), abstract (e.g., 
mathematics, computer programs), and organisable (e.g., stamp and card collections).  In light of 
these observations, Baron-Cohen (2002) developed the empathizing-systemizing (E-S) theory to 
explain how autistic children, the majority of which are boys, developed cognitive superiority in 
systemizing at the expense of empathizing (see also Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005).   
While both sexes display systemizing and empathizing skills across a spectrum, the E-S 
theory posits that, on average, males are more likely to spontaneously systemize and females are 
more likely to empathize (Baron-Cohen, Knickmeyer, & Belmonte, 2005).  Studies supporting 
this argument have shown that, compared with females, males significantly underperform in a 
host of behavioural and cognitive measures related to empathizing, such as sharing and turn-
taking (Charlesworth & Dzur, 1987), responding empathically to the distress of other people 
(Hoffman, 1977), showing sensitivity to facial expressions (Hall, 1978), and inferring what 
people might be thinking or intending (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; 
Happé, 1995).  The notion that fetal exposure to testosterone plays a role in these differences was 
shown in studies comparing archival testosterone data from amniotic fluid of mothers with their 
children’s assessment on the Childhood Autism Spectrum Test (CAST) and the Child Autism 
Spectrum Quotient (AQ-Child) (Auyeung et al., 2009a).  This study provided both psychometric 
and physiological support for the E-S theory by showing significant positive associations 
between fetal testosterone and the CAST and AQ-Child, with boys scoring higher on both.  
The argument made in this thesis is that testosterone changes triggered by outcomes in 
male-male competition will produce differences in how the men will respond to empathic cues.  
Hence, empirical evidence derived from adults is warranted to support this conjecture.  In one 
study, Harris, Rushton, Hampson, and Jackson (1996) asked 306 university students (155 males) 
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to dispense saliva samples after which they completed self-reports measuring prosocial 
personality traits, including empathy (Emotional Empathy Scale; Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) 
and nurturance (Nonverbal Personality Questionnaire; Paunonen & Jackson, 1988).  The authors 
found that men averaged five times the amount of salivary testosterone as compared to women 
(99 versus 18.5 picograms per milliliter of saliva), and rated themselves as significantly less 
empathic and nurturing.   
A comparatively smaller but burgeoning literature is emerging that describes the 
correlation between testosterone and the accuracy with which people predict others’ thoughts and 
emotions.  Ronay and Carney (2013) examined the relationship between individuals’ baseline 
testosterone and their empathic accuracy.  They randomly assigned 40 MBA students to dyads 
(28 males) and instructed them to engage in a 30-minute interaction.  Before the interaction, 
participants provided a saliva sample and were informed that they would be involved in a 
negotiation role-play exercise where one member would play the role of a salesperson and the 
other that of a buyer.  The purpose of this exercise was for both parties to agree on the sale of a 
fictional consumer goods company to a larger international company seeking global expansion, 
and for each party to obtain the best possible terms for the company they represented.  The 
authors also explicitly instructed all participants beforehand that they would have to pay close 
attention to their partner’s verbal and nonverbal cues.  Following the interaction, they measured 
the accuracy with which they were able to identify each other’s thoughts and feelings as they 
systematically unfolded over the 30-minute interaction.  Consistent with predictions, participants 
with higher baseline testosterone were found to be less attuned to their partners’ thoughts and 




Convincing evidence comes from other studies that administered exogenous (i.e., artificial) 
testosterone to adult subjects and later measured their empathic accuracy (Hermans, Putman, & 
van Honk, 2006; van Honk & Schutter, 2007; van Honk et al., 2011).  For instance, van Honk 
and Schutter (2007) investigated whether testosterone affected how individuals processed others’ 
threatening facial expressions.  Signals such as fear and anger provoke an empathic response in 
the observer which helps to modulate his or her behaviour.  The authors argued that high 
testosterone levels would impair one’s ability to consciously recognize and decode others’ 
emotional expressions.  Therefore, a high-testosterone individual might be poised to engage in 
aggression because of a deficiency in decoding ability.  To test their hypothesis, they used a 
double-blind crossover within-subjects design, where testosterone (0.5 mg) and a placebo were 
administered two days apart to 16 females ranging between 19 and 26 years of age.  The 
emotion-recognition task involved presenting the participants with a series of morphed video 
images ranging from a neutral face (0% emotion) to a full-blown expression (100% emotion) that 
changed in 10%-incremental steps.  Six different emotions were presented in total, three 
threatening (anger, disgust, fear) and three non-threatening (happiness, sadness, surprise).  For 
each emotion, participants were asked to indicate the exact moment at which they recognized the 
emotion on the screen.  Results showed that a significant difference in the morphing needed to 
recognize the emotion was found between participants in the placebo and testosterone 
conditions; when participants received the testosterone dose, they lost their sensitivity to 
recognize others’ emotions and needed to be shown more increments to decode a threatening 
facial expression.  With this experiment, van Honk and Schutter (2007) provided the first causal 




A more recent study, again by van Honk and colleagues (2011), exposed female 
participants to artificial testosterone to assess whether they would experience a reduction in their 
ability to infer others’ feelings by evaluating solely the region surrounding the eyes.  Developed 
by Baron-Cohen, Joliffe, Mortimore, and Robertson (1997), the Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
Test (RMET) measures subtle variations in one’s skill at accurately interpreting other people’s 
mental states from the region of the eyes (for a revised version, see Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).  
The RMET is presented on a computer screen as 36 pictures of the eye region from different 
faces, and participants are forced to choose one word from a list of four that best describes the 
target person’s feeling or thought.  Again, as predicted, the women’s scores on the RMET were 
significantly impaired under a single testosterone dose, thereby providing additional causal 
evidence that testosterone negatively influences an important component of social intelligence.   
Each of the studies above chose female participants because of their superiority in 
decoding facial affect, and infused the women with enough testosterone to sufficiently bring their 
levels as close to men’s average baseline testosterone levels.  In spite of this well-documented 
sex difference, the authors clearly state that there is little reason to believe that men would 
respond differently if their testosterone levels had suddenly risen.  Therefore, to the extent that 
men’s victory or loss will engender a shift in their testosterone levels, their subsequent empathic 
accuracy should also be impacted.  Hence, the next hypothesis posits that: 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Changes in testosterone negatively relate to empathic accuracy, with 





 Competition affects individuals’ testosterone which, in turn, is potentially responsible for 
influencing one’s ability to read others’ emotions.  As such, testosterone is thought to act as one 
of the mediating mechanisms by which victory and defeat lead to different levels of accuracy: 
 
Hypothesis 1c:  Testosterone change mediates the relationship between competition 
outcome and empathic accuracy.  
 
3.3.3. Testosterone’s effect on aggression 
 Evidence for the link between testosterone and human aggression has existed for over 40 
years based on samples drawn from a variety of male populations, such as college students and 
military veterans, prison inmates, healthy adolescents and adults, and hospitalized patients 
(Archer, 1991, 2006; Dabbs, 2000).  In sum, these studies found that high-testosterone 
individuals were more likely to be associated with more aggression and hostility of various sorts, 
including the infliction of electric shocks on fictitious opponents in laboratory settings (Berman, 
Gladue, & Taylor, 1993), crime convictions and violent crime records dating to adolescence 
(Dabbs, Frady, Carr, & Besch, 1987; Ehrenkranz, Bliss, & Sheard, 1974; Kreuz & Rose, 1972), 
peer ratings on aggressive traits and behaviours (Olweus, Mattsson, Schalling, & Low, 1980), 
and self-reported aggression (Dabbs & Morris, 1990; Persky, Smith, & Basu, 1971).   
 Other studies have looked at high-testosterone men when married and found that those 
with higher baseline testosterone levels were more likely to have extramarital affairs, and to 
physically abuse or abandon their spouses, all reasons conducive to higher divorce rates among 
these men (Booth & Dabbs, 1993; Mazur & Michalek, 1998; Soler, Vinayak, & Quadagno, 
2000).  More recently, Cohan, Booth, and Granger (2003) studied the concordance of newlywed 
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couples’ testosterone levels (N = 92 couples) to understand how hormone-behaviour 
relationships unfold in a marriage.  They measured husbands’ and wives’ testosterone and 
examined their problem-solving behaviours (e.g., constructiveness) and social supportive 
behaviours (e.g., offering help).  When both partners were concordant for lower testosterone 
levels, husbands exhibited adaptive behaviours that were marked by reduced aggression.  Not 
surprisingly then, being less competitive and dominant and more interpersonally sensitive serves 
to ease marital adjustment.   
 While these studies should be praised as they constitute some of the foremost empirical 
attempts connecting androgens to social behaviour, their findings are deduced primarily from 
cross-sectional designs and are largely correlational (for a review of correlations between 
testosterone and measures of aggression, see Archer, 1991).  To circumvent this limitation, 
recent experiments tried to establish a causal link between testosterone and aggression by 
administering exogenous testosterone to participants from which its effects on behaviour were 
later assessed (Hermans, Ramsey, & van Honk, 2008; Pope, Kouri, & Hudson, 2000).  Until 
now, these studies provide the most compelling evidence for androgen-behaviour causality (for a 
review, see Stanton & Schultheiss, 2009).   
 For instance, in a randomized placebo-controlled study, Pope et al. (2000) followed 53 
men aged between 20 and 50 years of age from various ethnicities over 25 weeks.  They were 
randomized to receive either testosterone or a placebo through intragluteal injections under 
double-blind conditions according to the following schedule: for weeks 1-6, they received the 
first treatment, either testosterone or sesame oil; for weeks 7-12, they received no treatment (i.e., 
first “wash-out” period); for weeks 13-18, they received the opposite treatment to the one 
received initially; and for weeks 19-25, they again received no treatment (i.e., second “wash-out” 
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period).  Throughout the 25-week observation, men were assessed using a battery of tests that 
included Buss and Perry’s Aggression Questionnaire (AQ; Buss & Perry, 1992) and asked to 
complete a 17-item daily diary covering manic and depressive symptoms experienced during the 
previous 24 hours.  Furthermore, spouses and significant others were also asked to rate the 
participants’ behaviour using an identical diary, albeit weekly.  As predicted, the authors found 
that men treated with testosterone had significant increases in aggressive and manic symptoms 
when compared to control treatments.   
 One of the major weaknesses in this study, as with the majority of studies on testosterone-
aggression relationships, lies in its use of rating scales (e.g., AQ as well as the more popular 
Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory; see Buss & Durkee, 1957).  In reviews on testosterone’s effect 
on aggressive behaviour, both Rada et al. (1976) and Archer (1991) argued that researchers 
should instead use behavioural assessments in lieu of rating scales that focus on measuring traits.  
To address this limitation, several studies published since have employed these methods.  
 For example, Hermans et al. (2008) studied how testosterone affects neural circuits that are 
commonly associated with aggression when individuals encounter cues indicating social threat.  
They administered testosterone sublingually to 12 female participants who were then exposed to 
a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scan while viewing angry and happy faces.  
Women were chosen to participate in this study because they have lower baseline testosterone 
levels than men and would therefore require a more modest dose to generate the same observable 
effects.  The other reason is that no evidence exists to support the claim that testosterone’s effect 
on affective responding to social threatening stimuli would be any different in men than in 
women.  The authors reasoned that angry facial expressions constitute an important signal of 
defiance during social exchanges, and that such expressions had always been involved in 
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structuring social hierarchies, as well as evoking affective responses in observers according to 
their social status.  The authors hypothesized that higher testosterone would enhance 
responsiveness to angry faces in the brain regions corresponding to aggression, such as the 
orbitofrontal cortex (Brodmann area 47) and subcortical regions (amygdaloid region, 
hypothalamus).  As predicted, the authors found that participants receiving exogenous 
testosterone responded to angry faces with greater activation of neural circuits implicated in 
aggression. 
 Finally, Zak et al. (2009) recruited 48 males in a double-blind cross-over experiment and 
had them apply either 10 grams of Androgel® (1% testosterone gel) or a placebo on their 
shoulders and upper back.  The men were then asked to play the ultimatum game where 
participants decide how to divide money that is awarded to them in multiple rounds of 
exchanges.  Participants were told that they would play randomly with others in pairs, and that 
they would be paid a percentage of their final earnings after completing all rounds.  In each case, 
one of the participants was assigned the role of proposer who initiated the game by making an 
offer on how to divide the $10, while the other player was the responder who either accepted or 
rejected the offer.  If accepted, the $10 would be divided as proposed; if rejected, both players 
would receive nothing.  In addition to how money was to be allocated, the authors measured the 
extent to which participants would punish their partners for making stingy offers.  Therefore, 
they asked participants to state a minimal threshold below which they would be inclined to 
punish them.  As predicted, Zak et al. (2009) found that infusing men with testosterone not only 
increased the rate of rejections when offers were given to them (i.e., aggression), but also 
decreased the amount of money that they offered to others (i.e., generosity) when their role was 
switched from responder to proposer.  Beyond these findings, the authors also discovered that the 
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punishment threshold of those receiving testosterone was significantly lower compared to that 
when receiving placebo, suggesting that high-testosterone men show a greater tendency to 
punish more severely those making ungenerous offers to them. 
 Three additional studies support the above results using behavioural measures of 
aggression, although they did not artificially imbue participants with testosterone.  First, Mehta 
and Beer (2010) tested the hypothesis that participants’ baseline testosterone would influence 
aggression through activation of the orbitofrontal cortex.  Participants’ (17 men) neural activity 
was measured using fMRI while they played the ultimatum game during which they were told 
that they would play with 40 other players in one-time interactions where they would divide $10 
each time.  Participants were also informed that they would be paid a percentage of their final 
earnings following the 40 rounds of exchanges.  In each case, the other players were the 
proposers, and the participants were the responders who either accepted or rejected the offer.  In 
reality, the other player was a computerized program designed to randomly make 20 fair offers 
($5 or $4) and 20 unfair ones ($3, $2, or $1).  Consistent with the prediction that high-
testosterone individuals would be more likely to reject low ultimatum game offers if these were 
interpreted as challenges, Mehta and Beer (2010) found that high-testosterone men and women 
rejected low offers more frequently than their lower-testosterone counterparts, an indication of 
their aggressive behaviour, and that reduced activity in the orbitofrontal cortex mediated the 
association between testosterone and aggression. 
 In a second study, Carré and McCormick (2008) had 38 male participants provide saliva 
samples before and after performing the Point Subtraction Aggression Paradigm (PSAP) used to 
measure reactive aggression in which participants interact with a virtual male player online (in 
reality, a computer program).  During the course of the PSAP, participants accumulate points in 
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exchange for money by pressing a certain button on the keyboard and, at several unexpected 
times, have some points stolen from them by their “partner.”  They can choose to either continue 
accumulating points or press another button to punish their partner by docking some of his 
points, i.e., reactive aggression in response to provocation.  In line with predictions, Carré and 
McCormick (2008) found that participants with the highest aggressive responses not only 
possessed the largest percentage increase in testosterone, but were also more likely to choose to 
compete again versus the same rival.  Their findings however, do not specify causal 
directionality: is it the rise in testosterone that causes an increase in aggression or vice versa?  
Second, as they point out, the PSAP is not a conventional form of competition and using it as a 
paradigm to both differentiate winners from losers and measure reactive aggression is 
problematic.  
 Finally, Klinesmith, Kasser, and McAndrew (2006) examined whether men who interacted 
with a handgun would experience rises in their testosterone levels and, subsequently, parallel 
increases in proactive aggression.  Using the challenge hypothesis as a framework, the authors 
conjectured that the handling of a Desert Eagle automatic handgun versus the control object (a 
children’s toy called Mouse Trap) would act as a stimulus suggestive of a competition or 
power associated with one’s status.  Using 30 male college students, the researchers measured 
proactive aggression with the Hot Sauce Paradigm, a procedure asking participants to 
anonymously pour hot sauce into a cup of lukewarm water that a third party who allegedly 
dislikes spicy food would then have to drink.  Therefore, the amount of sauce poured into the cup 
represents a valid measure of unprovoked aggression.  Consistent with their reasoning, 
Klinesmith and her colleagues (2006) found that men who interacted with the gun demonstrated 
an increase in their testosterone and added more hot sauce to the cup.  In other words, merely 
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interacting with the gun increased aggressive behaviour.  Second, the amount of sauce poured 
was positively correlated with testosterone changes.  Finally, the size of the correlation between 
the treatment (gun versus toy) and the sauce allocation dropped significantly after controlling for 
testosterone changes, suggesting that the effect of gun manipulation on aggression was mediated 
by testosterone-level changes.   
 So far, I have argued that victory and defeat engender a shift in people’s testosterone, and 
that changes in testosterone subsequently impact their aggression.  In line with the logic by 
which testosterone relates competitive outcomes to empathic accuracy, the following main 
effects and mediation are believed to be at play here: 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Changes in testosterone are positively related to aggression, with higher 
testosterone increases (decreases) being associated with more (less) aggression 
than lower testosterone increases (decreases). 
Hypothesis 3c: Testosterone-level change mediates the relationship between competition 
outcome and aggression.  
 
3.4. Personalized Power: A ‘Powerful’ Moderator 
3.4.1. Personalized power moderates the direct effects of competition on empathic accuracy 
If winning or losing status has an effect on one’s empathic accuracy, would this 
relationship change depending on one’s implicit power motivation? To answer this question, 
another body of literature has been devoted to investigating dispositional variables, in particular 
power, as important factors to consider in measuring empathic outcomes (Côté et al., 2011; 
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Ebenbach & Keltner, 1998; Keltner et al., 2003; Schultheiss, Wirth, Waugh, Stanton, Meier, & 
Reuter-Lorenz, 2008).   
In a recent study, Schultheiss et al. (2008) had 24 individuals, 12 high and 12 low in n 
Power, participate in an fMRI séance during which they viewed high-dominance (e.g., angry 
faces), low-dominance (e.g., surprised faces), and control stimuli (e.g., neutral faces).  The 
researchers rationalized that power-motivated people would be keen at detecting social cues that 
serve to signal others’ dominance because they are especially concerned with dominating the 
hierarchy and/or avoiding others’ authority.  Angry and surprise faces are valuable cues that act 
as motivational incentives for perceivers who are high in power, whereas neutral faces have no 
such effect (see also Schultheiss & Hale, 2007).  On the one hand, angry faces signal a sender’s 
dominance and high status (Tiedens, 2001) and, as such, should be perceived as a threatening 
challenge to those high in n Power.  Surprise, on the other hand, indicates that the target’s (i.e., 
the surpsisee’s) demands have been violated without notice, and the person committing the 
violation is likely the perceiver (i.e., the surprisor).  Therefore, following a social interaction, 
Schultheiss et al. (2008) argued that such a violation and the surprise it entails will be interpreted 
as a power differential between the two parties, with the perceiver having more power over the 
target.  In line with their hypothesis, the authors found that high-power individuals showed a 
greater activation of brain areas associated with emotion and motivation than their low-power 
cohort when viewing emotional faces (i.e., the insula, dorsal striatum, and orbitofrontal cortex, 
but not the amygdala and accumbens). 
Field research has also found that individuals high in power show different patterns of 
social cognition when they experience threatening emotions (Keltner et al., 2003).  A study by 
Ebenbach and Keltner (1998) examined the attitudes of gay and heterosexual Christian college 
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students embroiled in a conflict over the beating of a gay member by the religious group.  During 
this controversy, defending gay students reported higher levels of power than the Christian 
students because they received support from the student body and the school’s administration.  
As expected, the high-power gay partisans who experienced hostile and negative emotions 
judged their opponents’ attitudes more accurately than those who did not feel the same emotions. 
Finally, in three experiments, Côté et al. (2011) tried to understand whether people’s 
propensity for power influences the relationship between their prosocial orientation and their 
empathic accuracy.  Prosocially-oriented individuals focus on the needs of others and possess an 
inclination to enhance their welfare (Batson & Shaw, 1991).  Not surprisingly, they are more 
likely to attend to the emotions of others as a means of figuring out how best to help improve 
their welfare and meet their needs (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010).  Given a 
heightened awareness of others’ emotions, prosocial individuals may be more accurate in 
identifying these emotions.  Côté and his colleagues (2011) found mixed results in the literature, 
and attempted to reconcile the findings by showing that power behaves as a moderator in the 
relationship between prosocial orientation and empathic accuracy.  They argued that individuals 
high in power behave more freely and independently of others’ wishes, and possess emotional 
independence that allows them to be guided by their inherent dispositions.  Hence, they are more 
likely to concentrate their thoughts and actions in ways that are consistent with their goals and 
internal motivations.  Elevated power should therefore enable individuals who are prosocially 
oriented to focus more on their prosocial goals and, consequently, to address and identify others’ 
emotions more accurately.  After measuring key variables using both forced-choice and 
naturalistic methods, Côté et al. (2011) found that prosocial orientation indeed predicted 
empathic accuracy more strongly in high- versus low-power individuals.   
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Two limitations in the above studies need to be highlighted.  First, some of the studies used 
traditional self-report questionnaires to assess power (e.g., Capacity for Power Scale; Anderson 
& Galinsky, 2006), a choice that McClelland (1975) and Winter (1973) would highly contest 
because asking people explicitly about their power motive falls short of their true desire for 
power.  Second, none of the authors made the differentiation between socialized and 
personalized forms of the power motive (s and p Power).  Given empathy’s palpable association 
with ‘connecting with others,’ one can only suspect that its relationship with predictor variables 
would be different for s Power holders than for p Power holders. 
Following a competitive win, I hypothesized that men would score lower in empathic 
accuracy and that, conversely, they would score higher following a loss (hypothesis 1a).  
However, these conditions will not hold equally for both men high and low in the power motive.  
Let us first compare the empathic accuracy of winners who are either high or low in power 
motivation.  Following a victory, it is likely that high-power motivated men will welcome the 
chance to influence others contrary to their low-power motivated cohort, leading to a steep 
increase in empathic accuracy with increasing levels of power motivation.  This may be because 
assessing others’ emotional expressions is a motivation in its own right for these individuals.  On 
the contrary, low-power motivated men do not possess the same fervent drive to have an impact 
on others and so, following a victory, will likely perform much worse in empathic accuracy 
compared to those high in power motivation.  These individuals derive little pleasure from 
influencing others and winning may make them more indifferent toward others’ thoughts and 
feelings. 
Let us now turn to the empathic accuracy of losers.  A competitive loss sustained by men 
high in power motivation would prevent them from dominating others, the result of which would 
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lead to an increase in negative affect.  However, in their resistance to losing status and influence, 
these men might be motivated to accurately interpret others’ emotions as a means of either 
avoiding further relegations in rank or, rather optimistically, possibly “regaining” a foothold in 
the hierarchy thereby attenuating the felt negative affectivity.  For losers low in power 
motivation, missing out on the chance to influence others will not be met with nearly as much 
anxiety and, consequently, their empathic accuracy will likely not be as high as that of their 
higher-power cohort.  However, this differential in the affective reaction to loss will not be large 
between high- and low-power motivated men because even for the latter, a loss is still a negative 
outcome albeit less anxiety producing.  Therefore, I expect that the difference in empathic 
accuracy between the two loss conditions (i.e., high-power loss, low-power loss) to be small 
leading to a less pronounced increase in empathic accuracy with increasing power motivation 
among losers. 
One final point must be added that considers the distinction between personalized (p 
Power) and socialized forms of power (s Power).  Both high s- and p-Power individuals share the 
same tendency to seek their influence whenever possible.  However, compared to those high in p 
Power, those high in s Power have a greater predisposed interest in helping other people rather 
than using them as instruments to advance their goals.  This then would make the role of s Power 
less important than that of p Power because the more sincere and altruistic s Power holders 
would rely less on others’ facial cues to direct their behaviour.  These individuals are less prone 
to modifying their behaviour according to others’ cues.  Contrarily, because p Power holders rely 
heavily on personal information gained from others, including facial expressions, as vital input 
with which they can advance their agenda, it is suspected that p Power rather than s Power will 
moderate the relationship between competitive outcomes and empathic accuracy.  Thus: 
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Hypothesis 1d:  Personalized power moderates the direct effect of the relationship between 
competition outcome and men’s empathic accuracy; as personalized power 
increases, winners will show a steeper increase in empathic accuracy than 
losers. 
 
 This thesis began by chronicling the meaning of empathy.  It then journeyed through the 
effects of competition on empathic accuracy and aggressive behaviour, and the possible 
mediating mechanism that testosterone might play in these relationships.  Individuals, however, 
differ with respect to their need for power over others, and this implies that they will not respond 
to status wins and losses in the same fashion.  The question then becomes whether men with 
varying power will differentially experience androgen changes and, subsequently, different 
cognitive (empathic accuracy) and behavioural (aggression) empathic outcomes. 
 
3.4.2. Personalized power moderates the direct effects of competition on aggression 
If engaging in aggressive behaviours were an adaptive response for individuals under 
conditions of resource competition, then one would expect that individuals’ dispositional 
differences would influence this competition-aggression relationship.  It is generally understood 
in psychology that behaviour is a joint function of individuals and their environment.  In other 
words, behaviour stems not only from aspects of the external social context in which individuals 
interact, but also from the emotional states, dispositions, and experiences that they bring to these 
situations.  The prevailing zeitgeist among psychology and organizational scholars who study 
human aggression suggests that strong and direct links between personality and aggression have 
been difficult to demonstrate (for arguments, see pp. 201-244 in Baron & Richardson, 1994; 
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Neuman & Baron, 1998).  An important reason for this is because, even though people differ in 
their aggressivity proneness, situations seem to exert a stronger impact on aggression.  One such 
example is the stifling of one’s goals resulting from competition with others.   
Consider some experimental studies where participants were placed in situations in which 
they were primed for power and later assessed on various aggressive behaviours (Gruenfeld, 
Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008; Kipnis, 1972; Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010).  For 
example, Kipnis (1972) primed students with power by having them assume managerial roles, 
and found that they viewed their subordinates as objects of manipulation, devalued the worth of 
their performance, and expressed a desire to maintain a psychological distance from them (for a 
more recent example on how the priming of power leads to the objectification of people, see 
Gruenfeld et al., 2008).  In another study, Lammers et al. (2010) explored whether power 
increases moral hypocrisy, a milder form of aggression.  The authors epitomized hypocrites as 
people who demand others to follow and uphold strict moral norms even though they themselves 
violate such norms.  First, they primed students for power by having them recall an experience of 
either high power or low power, and asked half of them whether cheating was acceptable 
(judgment) while giving the other half the chance to actually cheat (behaviour).  Findings 
showed that, compared with the powerless, the powerful condemned others for cheating yet were 
more likely to cheat themselves.   
 In each of these experiments, participants were placed in situations that afforded them 
power or status, situations that were also responsible for producing more aggressive responses.  
Here, it is argued that male-male competitive outcomes leading to desirable social rewards, such 
as an elevation in one’s hierarchical position relative to others, will produce aggression and that 
the strength of this relationship will depend on the extent to which the men derive pleasure from 
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exercising their influence, particularly the personalized or egoistic and self-serving form of 
power (or p Power).  Following a loss, high-p Power men will aggress more reactively than low-
p Power men because they will feel more frustrated at being prevented from legitimizing their 
influence over others who they believe should be subservient to them, as well as foregoing the 
chance to collect highly prized status symbols.  Following a victory, however, high-p Power men 
will aggress more proactively than low-p Power men because they will experience a greater 
sense of entitlement from their elevated status and, consequently, be more likely to aggress if 
they face no repercussions for doing so.   
 This logic mirrors that of Schultheiss and Rohde (2002), who reasoned that if men high in 
p Power derive a particular reward from beating an opponent, then higher levels of power should 
be related to an increase in behaviours believed to be instrumental in maintaining the winning 
streak.  In the argument made in this thesis, aggression might very well be one such behaviour.  
This is also consistent with Keltner et al.’s (2003) approach-inhibition theory of power, which 
states that power influences behaviour by causing a change to occur between approach and 
inhibition systems.  Approach systems are the behavioural systems associated with the seeking of 
rewards (e.g., food, achievement, sex, social attachment), whereas inhibition systems are those 
associated with the avoidance of threats (e.g., heightened vigilance, anxiety, avoidance) (see 
Carver & White, 1994; Higgins, 1997, 1998).  People high in power are more likely to activate 
the approach system for two reasons.  One is because power enables them to access the rewards 
they seek, and the other is that it lessens their concern of having to encounter interference from 
others when approaching those rewards (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002).  Since the approach system 
modulates processes related to consumption, aggression, and sex, one would therefore expect the 
powerful to increase their engagement in such behaviours whenever the situation is opportune.  
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Taking these theoretical and empirical considerations into account, and adhering to a recent 
counsel by Carré et al. (2011) that future research should consider personality as a moderating 
factor in situation-behaviour relationships, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 3d:   Personalized power moderates the direct relationship between competition 
outcome and men’s aggression; as personalized power increases, winners 
(losers) show more proactive (reactive) aggression than losers (winners). 
 A summary of my research’s hypotheses are presented in Table 2 below. 
Table 2 
Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1a Compared to losers, winners will score lower in empathic accuracy. 
Hypothesis 1b Changes in testosterone negatively relate to empathic accuracy, with 
testosterone increases (decreases) being associated with less (more) 
accuracy. 
Hypothesis 1c Testosterone change mediates the relationship between competition outcome 
and empathic accuracy. 
Hypothesis 1d Personalized power moderates the direct effect of the relationship between 
competition outcome and men’s empathic accuracy; as personalized power 
increases, winners will show a steeper increase in empathic accuracy than 
losers. 
Hypothesis 2 Competition outcome elicits changes in testosterone, such that winners 
(losers) show testosterone increases (decreases) after a win (loss). 
Hypothesis 3a Winners (losers) will be more inclined to engage in proactive (reactive) 
aggression against a third party than losers (winners). 
Hypothesis 3b Changes in testosterone are positively related to aggression, with men having 
higher testosterone increases (decreases) being associated with more (less) 
aggression than those with lower testosterone increases (decreases). 
Hypothesis 3c Testosterone-level change mediates the relationship between competition 
outcome and aggression. 
Hypothesis 3d Personalized power moderates the direct relationship between competition 
outcome and men’s aggression; as personalized power increases, winners 






4. METHOD FOR THE STUDY OF EMPATHIC ACCURACY (STUDY 1) 
4.1. Participants  
 This research was approved by Concordia University’s Human Research Ethics Committee 
(dossier # UH2012-080).  Male participants were recruited from COMM 222, an organizational 
behaviour course taught at Concordia University in Montreal.  Males were chosen because men 
produce eight to ten times more testosterone than women (Kivlighan, Granger, & Booth, 2005), 
and there are sex differences in both empathy (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Hoffman, 1977; 
Rueckert & Naybar, 2008) and power motivation (Chusmir, 1986; Chusmir & Parker, 1984). 
 Several precautions were taken during the recruitment and experimental processes to 
ensure that testosterone assays were carried out under optimal conditions.  First, participants had 
to abstain from smoking at least one hour prior to experimentation as tobacco affects salivary 
testosterone concentrations (Attia, el-Dakhly, Halawa, Ragab, & Mossa, 1989).  Second, those 
reporting endocrine dysfunction and anabolic steroid use would be excluded, as were those who 
had not visited a dentist over the last 12 months or had recent dental complications and/or oral 
cavity injuries or wounds.  These exclusion measures were decided upon because performance-
enhancing steroids impair normal testosterone, and because prolonged neglect of oral hygiene 
may result in blood leaching inside the mouth from abscesses or caries that taint saliva samples.  
Third, prior to arrival, participants would be asked to dispense any chewing gum or candy, and to 
rinse their mouths with water to minimize test tube contamination.  Fourth, they would be 
required to put away mobile phones because conversations leading to a verbal argument could 
adversely affect testosterone production.  Finally, alcohol consumption was strongly discouraged 
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on the days the experiments took place because ethanol also interferes with its production 
(Lindman, Järvinen, & Vidjeskog, 1987).  
 Of the initial sample of 92 male undergraduate students who participated in this study 
(mean age of M = 22.11 years, SD = 3.46), 84 constituted the final sample from which analyses 
were conducted (mean age of M = 22.01years, SD = 3.42).  In line with recommendations from 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), four participants with missing data were discarded from the final 
sample because their item nonresponse exceeded 5%.  Outliers were tested using box-plot graphs 
and none were found.  During debriefing, four participants admitted that they had a priori 
knowledge of the research’s hypotheses because they had been informed from participants who 
had already taken part in the experiment, and were thus excluded from the final sample.  
Therefore, in total, eight participants were removed from the final analyses.  
 
4.2. Procedures and Materials 
Participants were informed that the research’s goal was to explore men’s biochemical and 
behavioural responses across various exercises played both alone and in dyads.  The competitive 
basis for the experiment was not disclosed at the outset and, to incentivize participation, students 
were told that this was a unique opportunity in which to understand how their body’s chemistry 
reacted in both solitary conditions and during interactions with others.  The ones agreeing to 
participate would have to provide three (3) saliva samples over a period of about two hours and 
would receive course credit upon the experiment’s completion.  Please consult the recruitment 
speech in Appendix A. 
All participants came to the laboratory twice and provided data on two distinct occasions.  
On Day 1, participants were placed in a quiet room where they completed a consent form 
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(Appendix B) as well as questionnaires measuring the Dark Triad of personality (Jonason & 
Webster, 2010) and the Big Five personality (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, & Lucas, 2006).  These 
are shown in Appendix C, in the order in which participants completed them, and described in 
detail in the measures section.  Once finished, they were informed that they would have to return 
on another day to complete the experiment in order to receive full course credit.  They were told 
that, on Day 2, they would be assigned to one of several experiments some of which would ask 
them to engage in solitary tasks while others would have them interact in groups on either 
cooperative or competitive exercises.  This “multiple study” ruse is often used in laboratory 
experiments to minimize the degree to which participants could conceivably connect the 
independent variable(s) with the dependent one(s) (Wilson, Aronson, & Carlsmith, 2010).  They 
were then given instructions on the competitive Number Tracking Test (NTT), explained in 
greater detail below, and were asked to play one round of the NTT in which their time would be 
recorded.  Given that the NTT is rigged, such that there is a clear winner each time, it is still 
possible for a participant in the losing condition to outperform his rival in the winning condition.  
Therefore, this problem was averted by recording a precompetitive time for each participant on 
the first trial and then pairing participants into dyads who scored similarly on this trial on Day 2 
to ensure the methodological validity of the contest outcome manipulation (O.C. Schultheiss, 
personal communication, October 24, 2012).   
On Day 2, two participants who scored similarly on the NTT during the trial run arrived to 
the laboratory in pairs at one of the following time slots: 9:55 am to 12:05 pm, 10:40 am to 12:50 
pm, 12:55 pm to 3:05 pm, 1:40 pm to 3:50 pm, and 3:45 pm to 5:55 pm.  The sequence 
describing what participants did from the time they arrived to the laboratory until the time they 









All testing took place between these times to control for diurnal variation in testosterone 
concentrations due to the body’s circadian rhythm (Dabbs, 1990b).  The room in which they sat 
was divided in half with a Japanese shōji screen to prevent participants from communicating 
with each other.  Each participant sat at a desk equipped with a computer.  Unbeknownst to 
participants, given that the outcome of the competitive game is predetermined (see below for 
details), the seating arrangements ensured randomization on the independent variable: whoever 
sat at the desk closest to the room’s entrance was assigned the ‘winner’ condition.  It is worth 
mentioning that a participant arriving first did not always select to choose the seat closest to the 
entrance.  Hence, the selection of winners and losers followed a randomized protocol. 
Once seated, they rested for 10 minutes to quell anxiety arising from anticipating an 












are ephemeral, this time lag between participants’ arrival to the laboratory and the collection of 
saliva is consistent with previous work (Carré, Gilchrist, Morrissey, & McCormick, 2010; Saad 
& Vongas, 2009).   
They then deposited their first saliva sample (T1 = 10 min) into a 5-ml sterile plastic vial, 
and completed a shortened version of the Profile of Mood States as a measure of affect (POMS-
SV; Shacham, 1983) included in Appendix C.  Although some studies have employed cotton 
swabs as aids in collecting saliva, this technique was not employed because cotton artificially 
inflates testosterone (Dabbs, 1991).  Instead, participants were asked to provide saliva through 
passive drooling, pictured in Appendix D, which has recently been shown to be the best data 
collection method for hormonal assaying (Schultheiss, 2013).  Tubes collected from each 
participant were stored on ice and, when data collection ended each day, were transferred to a 
minus-20°C conventional refrigerator freezer until assaying took place. 
Participants were then given the Picture Story Exercise (PSE) consisting of six pictures 
depicting people in various social situations and were asked to write a five-minute story about 
each (Winter, 1973, 1992a; Schultheiss & Pang, 2007).  These pictures, shown in Appendix E, 
were used from which participants’ personalized power was measured.  The PSE exercise, 
lasting roughly 25 minutes, was done on the computer using Inquisit© software licensed to 
Concordia University’s Centre for Multidisciplinary Behavioural Business Research.  While 
seated, each participant was shown the first picture for 10 seconds on a computer screen.  
Recalling what they had seen without having access to the picture any longer, participants were 
instructed to write a short story in a space indicated on the computer and given five minutes to do 
so.  They were advised to write freely whatever came to mind without exerting pressure because 
social pressure influences participants’ motives in ways that render the scores invalid (Lundy, 
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1988).  The researcher then left the room until all six stories were completed.  With Inquisit© 
software, the task was programmed to ensure picture randomization and to notify participants 
when their time was up.  Details of the PSE measure are included in the methods section.   
Following this, they were escorted inside another room and introduced to a female 
confederate who would administer a game in which they were going to compete, namely the 
number tracking test (NTT) they had seen on Day 1.  They were told that they would compete on 
12 rounds of the NTT, and that this “game” is used currently to measure people’s spatial and 
cognitive skills in the German armed forces where it was originally developed.  Specifically, 
they were made to believe that the NTT gauged their leadership potential, future earnings, and 
likelihood of career success, and that excelling in it would depend on their own merit rather than 
sheer luck.  In the real world, from what could be inferred by the NTT’s applied use, winners 
would be considered managers and losers would be their subordinates.  Winners from this 
competition would receive an official letter from the university attesting to their performance, 
and have their photos and short biographies, if they so wanted, featured in a university newsletter 
and on the electronic bulletin board in the entrance lobby of the business school.  Participants 
were advised to stay focused on the task and to do their best, and that communicating with their 
rival during the competition was prohibited and violating this rule would lead to expulsion.  
Finally, they were seated with their backs to each other because research in nonverbal 
communication has shown that sudden face-to-face interactions between two unacquainted men 
elicit confrontational mechanisms that prime them for competition (Knapp & Hall, 2002; 
Manusov, 2005).  Hence, since participants here knew that they would compete with one 
another, this seating arrangement was designed to prevent unwanted testosterone fluctuations.  
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More importantly, given that the competition was rigged, placing them with their backs to each 
other further helped conceal the winner’s unfair advantage. 
The NTT is a speed-based cognitive task requiring participants to trace a line with a pen in 
order to make a continuous path through consecutive ascending numbers (1, 2, 3, 4 …) on a grid 
filled with distractor numbers and arranged in a matrix (Carré et al., 2009; Schultheiss et al., 
1999; Schultheiss & Rohde, 2002).  Its objective is to connect numbers as fast as possible until 
participants reach a highlighted number that signals them to stop, e.g., “16” as shown in the 
example featured in Appendix F.  The competition is rigged such that two versions of the NTT 
were created with the winning condition being easier than the losing one: winners received 9 
short (i.e., easier) number sequences and 3 long (i.e., harder) ones, while losers received 3 short 
sequences and 9 long ones.  Thus, the winner is slated to win 9 out of 12 times while the loser 
wins only three times.  As mentioned above, participants who had performed similarly on the 
NTT on Day 1 were paired together and were randomly assigned to either the winning or losing 
conditions.  Competition began immediately after instructions were given.  In total, 12 rounds of 
the NTT were played in which the female moderator tracked and recorded the outcome of each 
round.  Participants who finished first in each round said “Done!” after which their opponents 
had to stop immediately, and those winning the majority of trials would be declared winners.  
This exercise took about 25 minutes to complete during which the female moderator took 
copious qualitative notes on the participants’ nonverbal behaviour (e.g., nervous twitching, foot 
tapping, and breathing frequency) and recorded the men’s individual times on each of the 12 
rounds.  
Once the competition ended, both the female confederate and I performed a ceremonial 
ritual to honor the winner.  Comments related to the loss were not mentioned to the loser, except: 
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“Good try!  Better luck next time.”  About a minute was taken to inspect the times recorded for 
each round on the NTT, and to congratulate the winner on his time.  It was then openly 
announced that the winner had recorded the fastest time among a group of 10 men in his cohort, 
and that he was eligible to have his picture, biography, and performance on the NTT featured in 
the business school’s lobby and in a university newsletter.   
Both participants were thanked for competing and taken to their original room where they 
documented their post-competitive affect.  There, they provided their second (T2 = 70 minutes) 
and third (T3 = 80 minutes) saliva samples (Figure 2).  During this time, the female moderator 
entered the room and gave each participant a mock organizational chart illustrating their position 
on the hierarchy with respect to the NTT.  Illustrated in Appendix G with fictitious names to 
conceal identities, this chart was given to each participant to clearly signal the winner’s dominant 
position relative to the loser’s.  The winner also received an officially endorsed letter attesting to 
his performance, shown in Appendix H.  
Once they recorded their post-competitive affect and provided two additional saliva 
samples, participants were asked to complete a final computer-based exercise which involved 
accurately identifying the facial expressions of male and female young adult actors.  These 
photographs were chosen from the Montreal Set of Facial Displays of Emotion (MSFDE; 
Beaupré & Hess, 2005).  Six facial expressions included happiness, anger, sadness, fear, disgust, 
and shame.  These expressions were portrayed by male and female young adults who had been 
properly instructed via a directed facial action task.  These adults represented one of the 
following three ethnicities: French Canadian, Chinese, and sub-Saharan African.  A total of 36 
stimuli (3 expresser groups or ethnicities × 6 different facial expressions × 2 gender of expresser 
× 1 actor) were presented randomly to each participant.  Each image or stimulus was presented 
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as a 7.6 × 12.6 cm digital black-and-white photograph on a 15-inch computer screen using 
Inquisit© software.  Examples of facial expressions as well as a glossary given to participants to 
help them understand what is meant by each emotion are featured in Appendix I.  This exercise 
took 30 minutes to complete.  Once done, the men provided demographic information (Appendix 
J) and completed the Inclusion of the Other in the Self Scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) that 
captures how interpersonally connected the men felt with their NTT rivals (Appendix K).  
Finally, before exiting, each of the participants was asked whether he had any questions or 
concerns about the study.  This served as a manipulation check to confirm whether participants 




4.3.1. Treatment of competition outcome 
Competitive outcome (win, loss), the independent variable (“x”) shown in Figure 1, was 
transformed into a dummy variable “win” with 0 = losers and 1 = winners.  In total, there were 
42 winners and losers alike in the study of empathic accuracy.  
 
4.3.2. Testosterone measures 
As illustrated in the experimental timeline in Figure 2, participants provided three saliva 
samples from which testosterone was measured, namely T1 = 0 minute or baseline testosterone, 
T2 = 70 minutes (or 10 minutes following the winner’s announcement), and T3 = 80 minutes (or 
10 minutes after T2).  Having participants provide several saliva samples was intended to 
maximize the likelihood of measuring testosterone’s fluctuation as it occurred following the 
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winner’s announcement, which is consistent with previous literature specifying that the ideal 
time at which concentrations appear in saliva after a manipulated social interaction is 10 to 15 
minutes (Elias, 1981; Riad-Fahmy et al., 1987; Schultheiss & Rohde, 2002; Salvador et al., 
1999).  Thus, to maximize the likelihood of capturing this optimal window of hormonal change, 
another saliva sample was collected at T3.  However, in the end, time T2 was used as the post-
competitive testosterone because it captured desired variability and is consistent with previous 
literature.  Second, the difference score T2 minus T1 was used as the unit of analysis for 
testosterone measures which is consistent with many studies of salivary testosterone and human 
behaviour (see meta-analysis by Archer, 2006; see also Bateup, Booth, Shirtcliff, & Granger, 
2002; Book, Starzyk, & Quinsey, 2001; Carré et al., 2013; Edwards et al., 2006; Mehta & 
Josephs, 2006; van Anders & Watson, 2007).  In addition to difference scores, the regressor 
variable method was used in which T1 scores were statistically controlled for in a regression as 
advocated by some statisticians (Allison, 1990; Cronbach & Furby, 1970).  My findings, 
discussed in the following chapter, were consistent using this alternative method as well.  
Third, because the sample size was above 50, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was computed 
to assess the null hypothesis that the actual distribution of testosterone change is normally 
distributed.  This test proved to be nonsignificant, D(84) = .08, p = .20, thus the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected.  Skewness (-.212) and kurtosis (2.677) values were also computed, and were 
both found to fall within acceptable ranges (for skewness, between -1 and +1; for kurtosis, 
between -3 and +3).  Finally, a two-dimensional graph was plotted and this confirmed normal 
distribution of raw T2–T1 data.  
Testosterone change represented the mediating variable in Figure 1 (“m”).  All saliva 
samples were measured in duplicate and on the same day.  Of the original total of 276 saliva 
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samples collected, analyses included those from 84 participants or 252 samples.  Frozen samples 
were first warmed to room temperature and then centrifuged (3000 rpm) for 15 minutes.  
Duplicate 100 μL aliquots of saliva were assayed according to DRG International’s kit 
instructions, and optical densities were determined using a Biotek Synergy™ plate reader at 450 
nm.  The intra-assay coefficient of variation for the current sample was 7.17%. 
 
4.3.3. Assessment of implicit power motivation 
To measure personalized power, the moderator (“w”) shown in Figure 1, the revised n 
Power scoring system was used (Winter, 1994).  This system was originally developed within the 
McClelland-Atkinson tradition of motives and described in Winter’s (1994) manual for scoring 
motive imagery in running text.  The power motive is a relatively stable disposition that drives 
individuals to exercise influence over others, and which is assessed through thematic content 
analysis of verbal material using the Picture Story Exercise or PSE (McClelland, 1975; Winter, 
1973, 1992a).  Previous studies have established the validity and reliability of the PSE (for a 
review, see Schultheiss & Pang 2007), which in this case consisted of the following six pictures 
which are shown in Appendix E along with sample instructions on how to elicit thematic 
apperception stories: 1) ship captain; 2) bicycle race; 3) hooligan attack; 4) women in laboratory; 
5) boxer; and 6) woman and man arguing.   
These pictures were chosen for a number of reasons highlighted by Schultheiss and Pang 
(2007).  First, six pictures were used because this number corresponds to the recommended range 
that scholars ought to use (i.e., between 5 and 8).  Having more than eight pictures reduces 
validity due to fatigue setting in from test length (Reitman & Atkinson, 1958).  More 
importantly, administering up to six pictures increases the PSE’s reliability and hence its validity 
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(O.C. Schultheiss, personal communication, June 11, 2012).  The point is to use as many pictures 
as participants are willing to write stories about in a session, while not sacrificing validity.  On 
the other hand, having too few is suboptimal because variance of scores is affected as the number 
of pictures drops to zero, i.e., degree of dispersion of scores within a population increases 
proportionally with the number of PSE pictures used in a test. 
Second, these pictures were chosen due to their sufficiently high cue strength for the power 
motive (Pang, 2010; Schultheiss & Pang, 2007).  Pictures differ considerably in their ability to 
elicit motive imagery.  While some are able to entice respondents to write about one kind of 
imagery (e.g., power), others are more appropriate for assessing two or more motives (e.g., 
power and affiliation, power and achievement).  Furthermore, some pictures represent a 
motivational theme so obvious that participants will permeate their stories with only one kind of 
motivational imagery, making the picture unsuitable in its purpose to differentiate low- versus 
high-motive individuals.  For instance, a picture featuring a boxer landing an upper cut against 
another boxer will generate stories infused with high power because respondents will all write a 
story about the fighter dominating his weaker opponent.  However, a picture portraying a boxer 
who is gazing thoughtlessly into space would induce participants to write different stories.  High-
power individuals may choose to write about the fighter pondering his last knockout that won 
him a title championship, whereas low-power individuals might write about the boxer taking a 
break from his routine training to think about possible retirement.  Others may even shy away 
from the power motive entirely, and write about the fighter looking forward to spending a 
romantic evening with his companion (e.g., individuals lower in power and higher in affiliation).  
Thus, the PSE’s validity can be increased if one carefully chooses pictures that encompass a 
range of situations in which the motive can be expressed (Pang, 2010). 
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A final consideration for the selection of the six pictures is that they are related to the 
situation in which the dependent variables are assessed.  In the research here, male participants 
having different power motives will compete in dyads from which their androgen levels, 
empathic accuracy, and reactive and proactive aggression will be measured.  According to 
studies reporting on the cue strength of commonly used PSE pictures, the majority of the chosen 
pictures focus on power (for a summary, see Table 5.2 in Pang, 2010, p. 127).  The PSE was 
chosen because implicit motives are more likely to be aroused by and respond to nonverbal cues 
than to verbal stimuli (McClelland, 1975; Schultheiss, 2001).  Power was scored each time that a 
story character showed concern about exercising impact or influence over others or even society-
at-large (Winter, 1994), with two independent coders verifying for one or more of the following 
power subcategories, from P1 to P6: Strong and forceful actions, e.g., hitting, shooting, shouting 
at, insulting someone (P1); control or regulation, e.g., checking up on others (P2); influencing, 
persuading, and convincing others, e.g., arguing for or against (P3); unsolicited help or advice, 
e.g., what you endure from family (P4); impressing others, e.g., concern with fame and prestige 
(P5); and eliciting strong emotional responses in others, e.g., surprising, startling others (P6). 
As one might expect from coding analysis, the validity of the PSE is based on interrater 
agreement scores.  To be able to code, an undergraduate student and I undertook extensive PSE 
training after which practice tests were taken individually and which were compared with 
Winter’s (1994) expert scores.  An agreement level of .85 (or 85% agreement) was achieved by 
each individual coder, and the agreement score between coders was also high, as demonstrated 
by an overall intercoder reliability of .90.  Any discrepancies between coders were resolved 
through discussion.  Since participants varied with respect to story length, some would show 
inflated power motive scores simply by virtue of writing longer stories.  To address this issue, 
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this difference in word count was controlled for by regressing total personalized power on the 
total number of words and using the standardized residuals as a measure of personalized power, 
as has been previously recommended (Pang & Schultheiss, 2005).  In total, 1,008 picture stories 
were coded for Study 1 (84 participants × 6 stories each × 2 raters), each taking between five and 
seven minutes to code. 
 
4.3.4. Treatment of empathic accuracy 
Emotion recognition accuracy, the dependent measure (“y”) in Figure 1, followed the 
approach of Beaupré and Hess (2005) who calculated it from the intensity scales such that when 
the target scale received the highest score, the judgment was considered accurate and Inquisit© 
automatically gave a score of one (1); otherwise, it gave a score of zero (0).  Put simply, 
participants were presented with a series of Likert-type scales ranging from 0 to 100 next to 
which each of the names of the emotions were written.  When a facial expression disappeared 
from the screen, they indicated on these scales how much of the emotion was present; the 
emotion receiving the highest score that matched with the actual emotion was given a value of 
one (1).  If not, it was given a value of zero (0).  Again, skewness (-.182) and kurtosis (-.454) 
values were obtained, both of which fell within acceptable ranges.  Finally, a two-dimensional 
graph was plotted and confirmed normal distribution.  Thus, statistical analyses were done using 
the raw measures of empathic accuracy. 
 
4.3.5. Controls 
 Three potentially confounding variables were controlled for in this study: extraversion, 
Machiavellianism, and anxiety. 
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 Extraversion.  Extraverts are friendly, gregarious, and assertive individuals who have had 
many more social opportunities than their quieter introverted counterparts to develop their 
emotion recognition capability.  Therefore, one might expect extraverts to be better able than 
introverts to accurately interpret others’ emotional expressions.  Extant studies in leadership have 
found that extraversion indeed allows leaders to utilize their emotion recognition ability more 
effectively (Rubin et al., 2005).  As such, a subscale of Donnellan et al.’s (2006) Mini-IPIP was 
used to measure extraversion.  The Mini-IPIP is a 20-item short version of the larger 50-item 
International Personality Item Pool ̶ Five-Factor Model (Goldberg, 1999) that comprises four 
items per Big Five trait.  Participants indicated whether they agreed or disagreed with statements 
about their level of extraversion using a five-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree).  Sample items included “I talk to a lot of different people at parties” and “I keep in the 
background” (reverse scored item).  Cronbach’s alpha for the extraversion subscale of four items 
was found to be .75. 
 Machiavellianism.  Individuals who score high on Machiavellianism, i.e., high Machs, are 
skilled at manipulating, exploiting, and deceiving others.  Due to this ability, one can assume that 
high Machs would be particularly good at understanding others in social situations.  Recent 
nonclinical studies, however, have found significant negative correlations between 
Machiavellianism and one’s ability to infer others’ emotions in both adults (Ali & Chamorro-
Premuzic, 2010) and children (Barlow, Qualter, & Stylianou, 2010).  As such, I controlled for 
the effect of this trait on emotion recognition.  Therefore, a subscale of Jonason and Webster’s 
(2010) 12-item ‘Dirty Dozen’ scale was used to measure Machiavellianism, one of the three 
components of the Dark Triad.  Using a five-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much), 
participants were asked to judge the extent to which a series of statements applied to themselves.  
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Sample items for Machiavellianism included “I have used flattery to get my way” and “I tend to 
exploit others towards my own ends.”  Cronbach’s alpha for the Machiavellianism subscale of 
four items was found to be .79.  
 Anxiety.  Unlike the above two control measures which are trait-like, this one was intended 
to capture a state believed to adversely affect empathic accuracy.  Anxiety is an aversive 
affective state that individuals might experience following a threatening situation like a 
competition and, as such, temporarily disrupt their ability to effectively execute some tasks that 
require even a modicum of cognitive effort.  In fact, psychologists have theorized that anxiety 
impairs processing efficiency because it reduces attentional control which, in turn, increases the 
likelihood that whatever resources are used in processing tasks will be diverted elsewhere 
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007).  Here, anxiety was measured using a subscale of 
the shortened version of the Profile of Mood States (SV-POMS; Shacham, 1983), in which 
participants rated their felt tension/anxiety following the competition with a five-point scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  Sample items included adjectives such 
as “on edge,” “restless,” and “nervous.”  Cronbach’s alpha for the anxiety subscale comprised of 
six items was found to be .85.  
 
4.3.6. General statistical approach 
Given that the two experiments are identical with the exception of the dependent variables, 
this section highlights the general statistical approach used for both studies.  There exist several 
ways to test the hypotheses made herein.  Optimally, one would employ structural equation 
modeling with bootstrapping, which would take into account errors associated with the inter-
rater reliability of the personalized power measure, as well as the reliability and non-normality of 
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other measures and their respective interactions, e.g., competitive outcome, a dichotomous 
variable that is not normally distributed.  However, due to sampling limitations (N < 100 
participants), conditional process analysis (Hayes, 2013) was used for both studies (version 2.12) 
which can be freely added to SPSS software.  This feature makes the simultaneous calculation of 
all links possible, solving partly the non-normality of interaction terms with the use of 
bootstrapping through repeated sampling with replacement.  The model developed here, shown 
in Figure 1 at the outset of Chapter 3, is mirrored in Hayes’s (2013) Model 5 with the 
independent variable being the competitive outcome, the dependent variable being empathic 
accuracy, the mediator being the change in testosterone levels from before to after the 
competition, and the moderator being personalized power. 
 
4.3.7. Descriptive statistics 
Shown on the next page, Table 3a presents means, standard deviations, and 
intercorrelations for testosterone change, empathic accuracy and its respective control variables, 
and standardized residuals for personalized power.  Tables 3b and 3c present similar descriptive 
statistics for the reactive and proactive aggression study described in detail in Chapter 61.   
  
                                                          
1 Note to reader:  To minimize the number of tables throughout this thesis, it was decided that data from both studies 







Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations 
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3. Empathic Accuracy 
 
 14.21 (6.31)  0.16  0.35***    
 
   
4. Personalized Power 
 
0.00 (1.00) 0.42***  -0.09  0.17     
5. Extraversion 
 
3.40 (0.79) -0.17  0.20  0.14 -0.07    
6. Machiavellianism 
 
2.67 (0.83) -0.19  0.01  0.06  0.2 0.29**   
7. Anxiety 2.50 (0.86) -0.18  0.1 -0.08 -0.07 0.12 0.24     
















   
 








    
3. Proactive Aggression 
 
27.33 (14.25) 0.05 0.22      
4. Personalized Power 
 
0.00 (1.00) -0.07 0.21  0.47***     
5. Anger 
 
1.90 (0.77) -0.21 0.02  -0.22 -0.17   
6. Psychopathy 3.06 (0.82) 0.17 -0.07 -0.15 -0.22 0.02  
















   
 








    
3. Reactive Aggression 35.97 (41.87) -0.10 0.09     
 















1.90 (0.77) -0.21 0.02 -0.05 -0.17   
6. Psychopathy 3.06 (0.82) 0.18 -0.07 -0.21 -0.22 0.02  




5. RESULTS FOR THE EMPATHIC ACCURACY STUDY (STUDY 1) 
5.1. Tests of Hypotheses 
All hypotheses were tested controlling for extraversion, Machiavellianism, and anxiety.  
The first step involved testing the direct effect of competitive outcomes on empathic accuracy. 
Hypothesis 1a predicted that compared to losers, winners will score lower in empathic accuracy.  
As shown from the process output in Table 4a on the next page, although the link was significant 
(b = 3.21, p < .05), its direction was opposite to expected indicating that winners (coded as 1) 
actually scored higher on accuracy than losers (coded as 0).  Therefore, H1a was not supported.  
[Please note that data for Study 2 is also included in this table from parsimony.  This table is 
















Dependent Variable Model, (a) Mediator Variable Model (b), and Mediation (c) 
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Effect -.92 (.61) (-2.5299, -.0642) † -.66 (1.01) (-3.1150, 1.1241) -2.2 (3.27) (-10.3224, 3.3084) 
† Bootstrap 95% confidence interval does not include zero (LL = Lower level, UL = Upper level)  




Testing for the unconditional indirect effect was then carried out to determine whether 
testosterone change acts as a mediator of the relationship between competitive outcomes and 
empathic accuracy (i.e., win/loss → testosterone change → empathic accuracy).  Prior to doing 
so, however, the above two linkages were more closely inspected.   
Hypothesis 2 predicted an increase in testosterone after a win and a decrease after a loss.  
Contrary to expectations, winners’ mean testosterone levels decreased from T1 to T2 (for winners 
= -8.11) while losers’ testosterone increased following competition (for losers = 4.41) (t = 2.35, p 
< .05).  As shown in Table 4b, there was a significant regression coefficient between competitive 
outcome and testosterone change but in the opposite direction (b = -11.62, p < .05).   
Hypothesis 1b further predicted that testosterone change will be negatively related to 
empathic accuracy.  Here, a significant relationship between testosterone change and empathic 
accuracy was found but also in the opposite direction (b = .08, p < .01) (Table 4a).  This signifies 
that increases in post-competitive testosterone are accompanied by increases in empathic 
accuracy.   
Hypothesis 1c predicted that testosterone change would mediate the relationship between 
competitive outcomes and accuracy. Table 4c illustrates that the bootstrap indirect effect 
produced an effect of -.92 and a 95% confidence interval void of zero (C.I. = -2.5299, -.0642). 
Therefore, testosterone change indeed mediated the relationship between competitive outcomes 
and accuracy, confirming H1c.  However, this indicates that the lower testosterone levels 
triggered by winning significantly reduced the direct effect of winning on accuracy. 
Finally, the conditional direct effect was tested to better understand the moderating role of 
personalized power on the direct link between win/loss and empathic accuracy.  Hypothesis 1d 
stated that personalized power would moderate this relationship such that, as personalized power 
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increases, winners will show a sharper increase in accuracy as power increases compared to 
losers. As predicted, a significant positive interaction was found (b = 3.66, p < .05) (Table 4a). 
Table 5 elucidates the nature of the moderation. The conditional direct effect at -1 standard 
deviation (SD) shows that losers are more empathically accurate than winners at a low power 
motive, but the difference (EAwin–EAloss) is small and nonsignificant (-.4330, p = .84).  Winners’ 
accuracy becomes larger than that of losers and this difference in accuracy becomes increasingly 
positive and significant from medium (mean) to high power motivation (+1 SD) (3.2077,  p < 
.05, and 6.8484, p < .05 respectively).    
Table 5 
 
Conditional Direct Effect of Competitive Outcomes on Empathic Accuracy, Proactive Aggression, 
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In other words, personalized power moderates the positive direct effect of winning on 
empathic accuracy. Losers, on the other hand, showed decreases in accuracy with increasing 





6. METHOD FOR THE AGGRESSION STUDY (STUDY 2) 
6.1. Participants 
 As in Study 1, this research received approval from Concordia University’s Human 
Research Ethics Committee (dossier # UH2012-080).  Male participants were recruited from the 
same organizational behaviour course, underwent the same screening process (e.g., endocrine 
health check including anabolic steroid use, dental hygiene) and were given the same guidelines 
prior to their arrival to the laboratory (e.g., no cigarette or food at least one hour prior; no alcohol 
consumption on the day of the study).  An additional screening measure was implemented in 
Study 2 which involved potentially excluding participants prone to having allergic reactions to 
spicy food given that one exercise exposes participants to a taste sensitivity test.  None of the 
candidates in Study 2, however, reported such a food allergy.  
From the 90 male undergraduate students who were recruited for this study (mean age of 
21.39 years, SD = 2.66), 72 were included in the final sample (mean age of 21.28 years, SD = 
2.63).  Again, and in line with recommendations from Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), 12 
participants with missing data were discarded from the final sample because their item 
nonresponse exceeded 5%.  Moreover, four participants from two dyads wished to be excluded 
from the study for unknown reasons and, as such, were removed.  Next, outliers were tested 
using box-plot graphs and two more participants grouped in a dyad were removed.  One of them 
pressed the steal button B (reactive aggression) every six seconds and never pressed the 
protection button C once, while the other never pressed the aggression button B and pressed the 
protection button C only once.  These participants either did not understand how the game 
worked or were conspiring throughout this portion of the study.  Some borderline outliers were 
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interpreted as representing natural tendencies of aggression and these participants were kept; 
they seemed to have understood the game as evidenced by their use of all three button options 
albeit deciding to be aggressive out of free will.  All in all, for the above reasons, 18 participants 
were removed from the final analyses in Study 2. 
 
6.2. Procedures and Materials 
Participants in Study 2 followed the same trajectory as those in Study 1 until the 80-minute 
mark (Figure 2) at which point they participated, instead, in two tasks each evaluating a different 
aggressive behaviour.  These were chosen instead of standard self-report questionnaires such as 
Buss and Perry’s Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992) and the Buss-Durkee Hostility 
Inventory (Buss & Durkee, 1957) because a recent meta-analysis found that, compared to 
standard questionnaires, observations yield higher correlations with behaviours (Polman, Orobio 
de Castro, Koops, van Boxtel, & Merk, 2007).  These two paradigms are described in detail 
below. 
 
6.2.1. Proactive aggression 
 The Hot Sauce Paradigm was used to measure proactive aggression based on the work of 
Lieberman, Solomon, Greenberg, and McGregor (1999).  This paradigm was designed “to 
provide a quantitative method of capturing intent to harm without provocation” (J.D. Lieberman, 
personal communication, June 5, 2012).  In recent years, experimental research has employed 
this exercise to measure participants’ unprovoked aggression against another person, usually a 
participant whom they do not know (e.g., Klinesmith et al., 2006).  Here, to mask the 
procedure’s true nature, participants were told that they would have to perform a taste sensitivity 
 84 
 
test.  Each was given a cup filled with 85 grams of water and a single drop of hot sauce.  He was 
told that the sample had been prepared by another participant who was not their previous 
competitor, was instructed to take a sip, and then rate it on a scale from 1 (not hot at all) to 5 
(very hot).  In reality, there was no hot sauce deposited in the cup, only water.  The experimenter 
left the room and then returned with a tray containing two sets of the following items, one set for 
each participant: another cup of warm water with a lid, a pre-weighed jar of sriracha hot chili 
sauce from Huy Fong Foods, and two plastic teaspoons.  Using one teaspoon to transfer the 
sauce into the cup and the other to taste the preparation if needed, participants were asked to 
prepare a sample mixture for another participant with whom they would never come into contact 
– not their NTT competitor nor the person who had prepared their cup to taste.  Participants were 
told that all quantities of hot sauce were useable and that they could pour as much or as little as 
they wanted, even though the participant was not very fond of spicy foods.  They were also 
assured that neither the person tasting it nor anyone else would know how much hot sauce they 
had added to the water because of the fastened lid.  They were then left alone for a few minutes 
until they were done adding the sauce.  The two cups containing the hot sauce were finally 
removed and weighed again to gauge the amount of sauce each had added using a Starfrit 
electronic kitchen scale.  It should be noted that, throughout this experiment, the mock 
hierarchical chart signaling the participant’s rank was left casually on the table of both 
participants (Appendix G), as was also the letter attesting to the winner’s NTT performance (but 
only for the winner; Appendix H).  This exercise took approximately 10 minutes.  
 
6.2.2. Reactive aggression 
The Point Subtraction Aggression Paradigm (PSAP) is a computer-based behavioural task 
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used to measure reactive aggression.  It was originally designed by Cherek (1981) to measure 
aggressive behaviour of people provoked in a controlled environment, and numerous findings 
support the validity of the PSAP as an aggressive behavioural measure (Cherek, Schnapp, 
Moeller, & Dougherty, 1996; Cherek, Moeller, Schnapp, & Dougherty, 1997; Gerra et al., 2001, 
2007; Golomb, Cortez-Perez, Jaworski, Mednick, & Dimsdale, 2007).  Although the original 
PSAP lasts approximately three hours, similar results have been obtained with shorter versions 
(Golomb et al., 2007).  Here, a 32-minute version was programmed using Inquisit© software (see 
www.millisecond.com).  Participants were tested individually, and each was told that he would 
have the chance to win play money based on his performance on a computer game with another 
male participant, again a different one from his NTT opponent.  This game was played on the 
computer so that both players never actually saw one another.  In reality, this other participant 
was a computerized program.  Seated in front of a computer, each participant had three button 
options from which to press: option 1, corresponding to letter A on the keyboard, was the 
‘reward’ button (reward response); option 2 was the ‘steal’ button represented by keyboard letter 
B (aggressive response); and option 3 was the ‘defense’ button represented by keyboard letter C 
(protective response).  Participants were told that they could earn money by pressing letter A, 
steal money from their partner by pressing letter B, or protect their money by pressing letter C.   
The game’s objective is to gain as many points as possible in exchange for play money.  
Participants were given extra course credit, and so no money was provided as compensation for 
participation.  To help them keep track of their earnings, their point total would be displayed on 
the computer screen throughout the game.  To earn points, each player would have to hit the 
letter A 100 consecutive times.  By doing so, their point counter would momentarily appear 
larger on the screen and would flash numerous positive signs around it.  When this happened, 
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their counter would increase by 1, indicating that they had gained 1 point.  As well, they were 
warned that their point counter might turn red at times, with negative signs flashing around it.  
When this happened, it was their partner, in reality the computer program, who had stolen 1 
point from them, thereby causing their counter to decrease by 1 and, conversely, inflating their 
partner’s counter by 1.  They were equally free to choose option 2 (letter B).  By hitting this 
letter 10 times (not 100), they were able to steal a point from their partner.  However, players 
were told that they were not able to keep points stolen from their partner.  Since they did not 
benefit financially from stealing, any act of theft was interpreted as a form of punishment to 
one’s partner, and represented the primary measure of reactive aggression.  As pointed out by 
Carré and McCormick (2008), the harm need not be physical.  As long as it is considered to be 
an aversive stimulus by the one on the receiving end, it is qualified as an aggressive act (see also 
Baron & Richardson, 1994).  Finally, participants were also able to select option 3 (letter C), the 
protective response, and by pressing this letter 10 times they would protect their counter from 
point subtractions for a period of time, thereby giving them a defensive or nonaggressive option. 
The computer program was designed to provoke (or steal from) participants every six to 60 
seconds in the absence of option 2 (letter B) or option 3 (letter C) selections.  Cherek’s (1981) 
original PSAP provoked participants every six to 120 seconds.  However, following Carré and 
McCormick (2008), a shorter interval of provocations was used here due the PSAP’s abbreviated 
nature.  If participants completed 10 presses on letters B or C (i.e., options 2 or 3), this would 
initiate a provocation-free interval (PFI).  Participants were explicitly made aware that pressing 
button number 3 (protection) initiated a PFI, but were not told that pressing button number 2 
(aggression) would also initiate a PFI.  When a PFI was initiated, the program held off from 
provoking participants for a minimum of 60 seconds and a maximum of 120 seconds, after which 
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the random point subtractions would continue to occur every six to 60 seconds. Another 
parameter was the fixed ratios according to which participants had to obey: 100 presses for letter 
A, and 10 presses each for letters B and C.  In other words, if participants first selected letter A 
(reward), they had to complete the 100 presses before being able to select another option.  If they 
selected either letter B (aggression) or C (protection), they had to complete at least 10 presses in 
either case prior to selecting another option.  Finally, the computer program prevented 
participants from pressing a button more than once within a 170-millisecond interval.  To 
recapitulate, five measures were obtained from the PSAP: 1) point reward responses; 2) 
aggressive responses; 3) protective responses; and 4) provocations received, all of which 
determined 5) points earned.  For this study, only the aggressive responses were used.  
 
6.3. Measures 
6.3.1. Treatment of competition outcome 
Competitive outcomes were treated in the same manner as in Study 1, with win being 
coded “1” and loss being coded “0.”  In total, there were 36 winners and losers alike. 
 
6.3.2. Testosterone measures 
Of the original total of 270 saliva samples collected, analyses included those from 72 
participants or 216 samples.  All saliva samples were measured in duplicate and on the same day 
employing the same assaying procedure as in Study 1.  The intra-assay coefficient of variation 
for Study 2’s sample was below 10%, at 8.23%.  A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was conducted to 
assess data normality in testosterone change (T2–T1), the mediating variable (“m”) in Figure 1, 
and it proved to be nonsignificant, D(72) = .68, p = .20.  Thus, the null hypothesis of the data 
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normality of testosterone change cannot be rejected.  Both values of skewness (-.524) and 
kurtosis (2.086) were again computed and fell within acceptable ranges.  Finally, a two-
dimensional graph was plotted and this confirmed normal distribution of raw values for 
testosterone change.  In addition to testosterone difference scores, the regressor variable method 
was used (Allison, 1990) and Study 2’s findings held up in much the same manner irrespective 
of the treatment of hormonal change. 
 
6.3.3. Assessment of implicit power motivation 
The moderator (“w”) personalized power was assessed using the same scoring system as in 
Study 1 (Winter, 1994) by having the same two coders identify power images in participants’ 
stories from the Picture Story Exercise (or PSE), and controlling for story length by regressing 
total personalized power on the number of words and using the standardized residuals (Pang & 
Schultheiss, 2005).  In total, 864 picture stories were coded for Study 2 (72 participants × 6 
picture stories each × 2 coders), again each taking between five and seven minutes to code. 
 
6.3.4. Treatment of proactive and reactive aggression 
 Proactive aggression was calculated by the raw difference, in grams, between the hot sauce 
cup before and after the experiment, which is consistent with what is prescribed in the literature 
(Lieberman et al., 1999).  Tests of normality were also carried out on this variable, termed 
B_A_ss.  Both values of skewness (-.331) and kurtosis (-1.119) were computed and fell within 
acceptable ranges.  Finally, a two-dimensional graph was plotted and this confirmed normal 
distribution of the B_A_ss measure.  Reactive aggression was calculated using the total number 
of aggressive hits (button B) that a participant accrued at the end of the PSAP, in line with Carré 
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(2010).  Normality tests were also carried out on this variable, termed nmbr_hits, and values of 
skewness (2.205) and kurtosis (5.747) were computed and fell outside acceptable ranges.  A two-
dimensional graph was plotted and illustrated a distribution of the nmbr_hits measure that was 
skewed to the left.  However, as will be discussed in more details in the limitations section, the 




Anger and psychopathy were two potential confounds which were controlled for here. 
 Anger.  Anger is a negative affective state that has traditionally been conceptualized as a 
precursor to aggression, with scholars now believing that it plays many causal roles in aggression 
including reducing inhibition and interfering with moral reasoning and judgment, among others 
(for a detailed review, see Anderson & Bushman, 2002).  Here, anger was measured using a 
subscale of the shortened version of the Profile of Mood States (SV-POMS; Shacham, 1983), in 
which participants rated their felt anger following the competition with a five-point scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  Sample items included adjectives such as 
“angry,” “resentful,” and “bitter.”  Cronbach’s alpha for the anger subscale of seven items was 
found to be .91.  
 Psychopathy.  Individuals having psychopathic traits are impervious to distress signals in 
others and often resort to both instrumental (or proactive) aggression and retaliatory (or reactive) 
aggression as a means to either benefit materially or exact revenge (Glenn & Raine, 2009). 
Research has indeed found a strong association between psychopathy and aggression across a 
wide sample of individuals including adult offenders, antisocial children and adolescents, and 
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psychiatric patients (Porter & Woodworth, 2006).  Like Machiavellianism in Study 1, 
psychopathy was measured using a subscale of Jonason and Webster’s (2010) 12-item ‘Dirty 
Dozen’ scale.  Using the same five-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very much), participants 
indicated the degree to which they agreed with a series of statements.  Sample items for 
psychopathy included “I tend to be unconcerned with the morality of my actions” and “I tend to 
be callous or insensitive.”  Cronbach’s alpha for the psychopathy subscale of four items was 
found to be .61.  
 
6.3.6. Statistical approach for Study 2 
 Again, Hayes’s (2013) Model 5 was employed with the independent variable being 
competitive outcome, the dependent variables being proactive and reactive aggression, the 
mediator being testosterone change, and the moderator being personalized power. 
 
6.3.7. Descriptive statistics  
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for the study’s measures are shown for 
competitive outcome, testosterone change, proactive aggression (Table 3b), reactive aggression 
(Table 3c), and standardized residuals for personalized power2.   
  
                                                          
2 Again, readers should note that tables are reproduced as in Study 1 and include the empathic accuracy data as well.  






Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations 
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3. Empathic Accuracy 
 
 14.21 (6.31)  0.16  0.35***    
 
   
4. Personalized Power 
 
0.00 (1.00) 0.42***  -0.09  0.17     
5. Extraversion 
 
3.40 (0.79) -0.17  0.20  0.14 -0.07    
6. Machiavellianism 
 
2.67 (0.83) -0.19  0.01  0.06  0.2 0.29**   
7. Anxiety 2.50 (0.86) -0.18  0.1 -0.08 -0.07 0.12 0.24     
















   
 








    
3. Proactive Aggression 
 
27.33 (14.25) 0.05 0.22      
4. Personalized Power 
 
0.00 (1.00) -0.07 0.21  0.47***     
5. Anger 
 
1.90 (0.77) -0.21 0.02  -0.22 -0.17   
6. Psychopathy 3.06 (0.82) 0.17 -0.07 -0.15 -0.22 0.02  
















   
 








    
3. Reactive Aggression 35.97 (41.87) -0.10 0.09     
 















1.90 (0.77) -0.21 0.02 -0.05 -0.17   
6. Psychopathy 3.06 (0.82) 0.18 -0.07 -0.21 -0.22 0.02  




7. RESULTS FOR THE AGGRESSION STUDY (STUDY 2) 
7.1. Tests of Hypotheses 
All hypotheses in this study were tested controlling for anger and psychopathy.  First, 
addressing the direct effect of win/loss on proactive and reactive aggression, it was predicted that 
winners would be more inclined to engage in unprovoked or proactive aggression than losers, 
while losers would be more inclined to engage in provoked or reactive aggression than winners.  
As illustrated in Table 4a on the next page, respectively, winners did not significantly aggress 
more proactively than losers (b = 2.51, nonsignificant), nor did losers significantly aggress more 
reactively than winners (b = -1.64, nonsignificant).  However, the hypothesized direction was 
correct: winners did, on average, manifest more proactive aggression than losers (mean of 28.03g 
of hot sauce added versus mean of 26.64g), and losers aggressed more reactively than winners 
(mean of 40.19 steal button presses versus mean of 31.75).  Nevertheless, these findings fail to 







Dependent Variable Model, (a) Mediator Variable Model (b), and Mediation (c) 
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Effect -.92 (.61) (-2.5299, -.0642) † -.66 (1.01) (-3.1150, 1.1241) -2.2 (3.27) (-10.3224, 3.3084) 
† Bootstrap 95% confidence interval does not include zero (LL = Lower level, UL = Upper level)  





The unconditional indirect effect was also tested to determine whether testosterone 
change acts as a mediator of the relationship between competitive outcomes and proactive and 
reactive aggression.  To do this, a first test of the relationship between competitive outcomes and 
testosterone change was carried out; this was found to be significant and negative, corroborating 
the results of Study 1 (b = -22.41, p < .01) shown in Table 4b.  Again, contrary to predictions, 
winners’ testosterone levels decreased from T1 to T2 while those of losers increased (for winners 
= -16.69; for losers = 5.14) (t = 2.77, p < .05).  Hypothesis 3b predicted that changes in 
testosterone would be related to both types of aggression, with men having higher testosterone 
rises aggressing more than those having lower testosterone rises.  Findings showed that the 
relationships between testosterone change and both proactive aggression (b = .03, p = .5296) and 
reactive aggression (b = .09, p = .4559) were in the correct direction but were nonsignificant, 
thus failing to support this prediction (Table 4a).  As in Study 1, it was also suggested that 
testosterone-level change would mediate the relationships between competitive outcomes and 
each of the two types of aggression (hypothesis 3c).  In the case of reactive aggression, the 
bootstrapped indirect effect had a coefficient of -2.1988 and a confidence interval which 
included zero (C.I. = -10.3224, 3.3084).  In proactive aggression, the bootstrapped indirect effect 
had a coefficient of -.6570 and a confidence interval which also included zero (C.I. = -3.1150, 
1.1241).  Together, these findings suggest that changes in testosterone concentration did not 
mediate the relationships between the competitive outcomes and both aggression types thereby 
not offering any support for hypothesis 3c (Table 4c). 
Lastly, assessing the conditional direct effect (or moderating effect) of personalized 
power on the direct relationship between win/loss and each form of aggression, hypothesis 3d 
posited that personalized power would moderate these relationships in the following manner: as 
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personalized power rises, winners should experience more proactive aggression compared to 
losers, while losers should experience more reactive aggression compared to winners.  Findings 
confirmed that, with increasing levels of personalized power, winners showed more proactive 
aggression than losers (b = 8.25, p < .01), whereas losers showed more reactive aggression than 
winners (b = -30.20, p < .001).  Hence, hypothesis 3d was supported as can be seen by the 
significant effect sizes that were in the predicted direction (Table 4a).   
Again, Table 5 clarifies the nature of the moderations.  The conditional direct effects of 
competitive outcome on proactive aggression at both -1 SD and mean value of the power motive 
show no significant difference between winners’ and losers’ proactive aggression although losers 
were relatively more proactively aggressive at low levels of the power motive than winners.  At 
+1 SD, winners show significantly more proactive aggression than losers (10.6965, p < .05) 
(Table 5b).  On the other hand, the conditional direct effect of competitive outcome on reactive 
aggression at the mean value of the power motive shows no significant difference between 
winners’ and losers’ reactive aggression. Winners were significantly more reactively aggressive 
than losers at low power motive levels (28.3403, p < .05), while losers were more aggressive 
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8.1. Overview of Studies 
 The overarching purpose of the two experimental studies presented here was to 
understand how an important social context, such as a status competition, can impact several 
facets of a man’s empathy and that these relationships are influenced by his psychobiology, 
namely his thirst for power and his testosterone reactivity.  While the first study focused on an 
empathic construct that was cognitively based, the second focused on two behaviours.  To my 
knowledge, this is the first work to investigate how competitive outcomes interact with 
personalized power to affect a man’s empathic accuracy, as well as his proactive and reactive 
aggression. 
 
8.2. Major Findings and Theoretical Implications for Empathic Accuracy 
8.2.1. Winning, losing, and empathic accuracy 
 A prediction made here was that competitors would differ in their ability to accurately 
identify others’ emotions following a status contest, with winners scoring lower in accuracy than 
losers.  This was guided by Keltner et al.’s (2003) approach/inhibition theory of power which 
posits that people with low status, compared to their high-status counterparts, rely to a greater 
extent on their external environment for resources.  As such, these individuals must be vigilant of 
others’ intentions and emotional states because their peers have presumably some say in their 
wellbeing, affect, and succor.  High-status individuals, however, have accrued more resources as 
a result of their own accomplishments that they could afford being less attentive vis-à-vis others’ 
emotional states.  It was further reasoned that a competition having a clear outcome will 
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artificially create a momentary social stratification based on status, with winners ostensibly 
having more status than losers and, as such, scoring poorer on empathic accuracy.  However, in 
the very few studies that analyzed the relationship between socioeconomic status (SES) and 
empathic accuracy, status was either primed (e.g., “Imagine yourself having a high SES”) or 
operationalized objectively (e.g., “Please identify your family’s social class”) without ever being 
manipulated directly with actual wins and losses.  Asking a participant to either imagine himself 
having high status or reporting his social status at a finite point in time is a far cry from creating 
a context in which his status is being determined in vivo.  Individuals who gain status through 
competition may also experience the thrill of winning and a boost in positive affect.  Since Isen’s 
(2000) work has demonstrated that people having positive affect engage in heuristic processing, 
it would not be altogether unreasonable to suspect that winners would do the same.  Extending 
this logic, losers suffering a crushing defeat can be expected to experience negative affect and, 
conversely, engage in systematic processing which is more cognitively taxing than the former.   
 The opposite was observed, however, namely that winners’ empathic accuracy increased 
while that of losers decreased, and a closer inspection of the studies involving affect in service of 
cognition can help to explain this unexpected finding.  For example, in a similar win/lose 
scenario involving competitive squash, Cox and Kerr (1990) found that losers demonstrated a 
heightened level of neuroticism following defeat compared to winners.  More recent work has 
found that those exhibiting more neuroticism tend to engage in more self-diagnosis at the 
expense of other cognitive tasks (McCrae & Löckenhoff, 2010).  Such an elevated and 
presumably negative self-rumination might explain why losers scored lower in empathic 
accuracy – itself an important cognitive component of empathy – than winners.  To put it another 
way, losers failed to decipher others’ emotions because their cognition was reflected inwards 
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thereby depleting their reservoir of cognitive ability.  This phenomenon can be as explained by 
ego depletion theory (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998), which specifies that the 
self is a limited resource and pursuing one activity, perhaps self-diagnosis in this case, will leave 
fewer resources for other pursuits.  Winners, free from this rumination, thus have more cognitive 
ability to focus toward accurately identifying others’ emotional expressions.   
 
8.2.2. Winning, losing, and testosterone: Explaining mixed findings 
 Probing into how wins and losses affect testosterone change, it was hypothesized that 
winning would lead to a rise in men’s post-competitive testosterone levels while losing would 
lead to a drop.  The rationale employed here was consistent with Mazur’s biosocial model (1985) 
of testosterone which states that elevations in men’s status should be accompanied by elevations 
in their testosterone levels, and vice versa in the case of status relegations. While several studies 
have shown this positive effect, the opposite has also been reported, i.e., either winners’ 
testosterone dropped and/or losers’ testosterone rose (see meta-analysis by Archer, 2006; for 
recent studies, see Carré et al., 2009).  One shortcoming of the studies used in Archer’s (2006) 
meta-analysis is the employment of small sample sizes, ranging from a mere eight participants 
(González-Bono et al., 1999) to 66 (Schultheiss & Rohde, 2002), with the latter showing no 
significant effect in testosterone change between winners and losers.  Since these studies showed 
the difficulty in detecting hormonal effects, one obvious strategy employed here was to increase 
the number of participants. 
 Second, extant studies using contrived experiments were more concerned with the 
competitive outcome itself rather than with subtle contextual features of the research design.  
Here, particular emphasis was placed on features that would stoke participants’ competitive fire 
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and, by the same token, accentuate any ensuing cognitive, emotional, and physiological 
differences between rivals.  For instance, pairing men who had previously scored similarly on the 
NTT on Day 1 ensured a more heated competition.  As well, employing a female confederate of 
the same age group who administered the NTT and declared the victor in the loser’s presence 
was intended to trigger a more pronounced testosterone change as shown by studies 
demonstrating how men’s brief interactions with women affect their androgen levels (Roney, 
Mahler, & Maestripieri, 2003; Saad & Vongas, 2009).  Moreover, after stating that the NTT is a 
valid predictor of future earnings and overall career success, numerous rewards were promised to 
winners such as the chance to have their biography, photograph, and victory publicized in 
various media throughout the campus; these extrinsic rewards were openly announced to both 
players at the competition’s outset.  Finally, the female confederate gave each winner an 
“official” JMSB-endorsed letter congratulating them on their performance in the presence of the 
losers.  
 Although the finding was significant but in the opposite direction to what was originally 
predicted, there is nevertheless some degree of confidence in these results because of the large 
sample sizes employed relative to existing studies, the intricate experimental designs with proper 
controls, and most importantly, the replication of the win/loss effect on testosterone levels in 
both studies.  Archer’s (2006) challenge hypothesis can be used to explain these contrary 
findings, in particular.  This theory was originally formulated to predict the physiology and 
behaviour of bird species during mating season but has since been applied to humans.  According 
to it, men whose status is threatened by other men in the presence of women should show 
corresponding rises in their testosterone levels.  A study by Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, and 
Schwarz (1996) found that men coming from a “culture of honor” who were insulted believed 
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their social status was at threat and responded with rises in their testosterone.  More recently, 
researchers (Zilioli, Mehta, & Watson, 2014) studying testosterone responses in competing 
women introduced the status instability hypothesis which lends further support for why this 
finding turned out so.  This theory predicts that experiencing an unstable low-status position, 
such a being defeated in a close match, should enhance testosterone in order to motivate 
behaviours that will help the loser to seek and attain status.  In contrast, securing a high-status 
position in a situation in which status is up for grabs, such a winning a close contest, should 
prompt winners to avoid further status contests.  In their paper, Zilioli et al. (2014) found that 
losers most likely felt a status threat following competition, whereas winners did not, possibly 
justifying why the former’s testosterone increased while the latter’s decreased.  While these 
findings were documented exclusively in female samples, the status instability hypothesis 
remains to be shown in men. 
 
8.2.3. Testosterone changes and empathic accuracy  
 It was then hypothesized that men having an increase in testosterone would experience a 
decrease in empathic accuracy, whereas those having a testosterone decrease would show an 
increase in accuracy.  This prediction was initially guided by Baron-Cohen’s (2002) systemizing-
empathizing theory developed originally in clinical settings on autistic patients.  Affecting 
primarily boys who had been exposed to high fetal testosterone concentrations, this theory helps 
to explain how testosterone shaped boys’ systemizing ability (e.g., concern with mechanical 
processes) to the detriment of their empathizing ability (e.g., concern with others’ feelings).  
Along with his colleagues, Baron-Cohen indeed found support that exposure to high 
concentrations of placental testosterone impaired boys’ emotional recognition capabilities across 
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the life span (Chapman, Baron-Cohen, Auyeung, Knickmeyer, Taylor, & Hackett, 2006; 
Lutchmaya, Baron-Cohen, & Raggatt, 2002a, 2002b).  Finally, more recent research based on 
adult populations found similar results.  For example, in studies where adult participants were 
injected with exogenous testosterone, researchers found that one’s ability to recognize facial 
emotions from static photographs declined significantly following androgen infusion (Hermans 
et al., 2006; van Honk & Schutter, 2007; van Honk et al., 2011).  In a more recent example in 
which real social interactions took place between people in dyads, Ronay and Carney (2013) 
found that those having high naturally occurring testosterone levels were more erroneous in 
inferring the thoughts and feelings of others.   
 Together, these studies seem to point to the overall idea of testosterone’s debilitating effect 
on empathic accuracy.  Then what explains why the opposite was found?  First, it appears that 
the algorithm ‘high testosterone–low empathic accuracy’ might not be as straightforward as 
previously thought.  For example, an individual’s exposure to androgens in the womb may have 
an impact on his or her empathic ability later on in life, but this does not mean that another 
situation in which testosterone levels are increased, especially a social one such as a status 
competition, could produce the same outcome.   
 Second, many of the reported studies above that artificially administered testosterone to 
participants used women exclusively in their sample and, more importantly, increased their 
testosterone levels between five- and eight-fold to temporarily elevate them to approximate those 
of men.  One could even argue that raising women’s testosterone levels to such extraordinary 
levels in order to generalize about the hormone’s effect on a particular ability is pointless 
because those levels were never meant to reach such heights in the first place.  Male participants’ 
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testosterone never rose to this level of change in the studies reported here, but rather fluctuated in 
ways that appear to be more natural.   
 Third, and most importantly, previous causal evidence demonstrating testosterone’s 
reduction of facial expression recognition was found solely for threatening expressions, not for 
non-threatening or ‘positive’ ones like happiness.  For instance, van Honk and Schutter (2007) 
observed that participants having surges in testosterone had trouble recognizing social threats, in 
particular anger, whereas they actually did better when identifying non-threatening emotions like 
happiness.  The design herein used an emotional recognition paradigm that featured more non-
threatening emotions than threatening ones, possibly skewing the high-testosterone men’s 
accuracy scores.  This is an important consideration which could explain why the initial 
hypothesis failed to materialize.  The coefficient of the testosterone-to-empathic accuracy link 
was significant albeit small, suggesting that participants whose testosterone levels increased may 
have performed well in identifying non-threatening emotions and poorly in identifying 
threatening emotions.  Such a finding raises questions, therefore, on the specificity of emotions 
that testosterone might be preferentially “able” to influence decision making.  In other words, 
since testosterone appears to be involved in one’s ability to identify another’s emotions 
accurately, could this ability be more pronounced for certain emotions over others? 
 
8.2.4. Winning, losing, and empathic accuracy: Is testosterone a mediating mechanism?  
 Changes in testosterone were hypothesized to play a mediating role in the effect of winning 
and losing on empathic accuracy.  This mediation was supported.  What is interesting, however, 
is that this indirect effect was negative.  This negative relationship had been originally in mind 
when predicting that, for example, the win → testosterone path would be positive, followed by a 
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testosterone → empathic accuracy path that would be negative, with the opposite valence for the 
loss condition.  As such, the original reasoning predicted a negative overall effect if one would 
consider the cross-product of both paths.  It turned out, however, that although the reasoning was 
sound, namely that the indirect effect of competitive outcomes on empathic accuracy was 
correctly predicted, the direction of the individual path components was incorrectly 
hypothesized.  Another important point to consider is that, while this indirect effect through 
testosterone was negative, the direct non-mediated path was positive (i.e., win → empathic 
accuracy) even though the opposite was predicted.  This makes the inclusion of testosterone of 
particular importance when considering how the phenomenon of winning and losing relates to 
empathic accuracy for one simple reason. If one simply calculates the correlation or the 
regression coefficient between competitive outcomes and empathic accuracy, one will 
undoubtedly produce distorted values due to the dampening effect of one path on the other.  
Stated otherwise, we cannot fully understand and appreciate the operating variables at play 
between winning and losing and empathic accuracy in their entirety if we fail to consider the 
biological mechanism acting on the hypothalamic-pituitary-gonadal axis (HPG) to stimulate 
testosterone release.  Although finding significant results in the opposite direction can be 
frustrating, the fact remains that it is through these conflicting findings and ensuing theorizing 
that a field advances.  
 
8.2.5. Personalized power: How winners differ from losers in empathic accuracy  
Finally, in the study featuring empathic accuracy, personalized power was introduced as a 
moderator of the direct link between competitive outcomes and empathic accuracy.  Specifically, 
it was stipulated that high-personalized power men will score higher in empathic accuracy than 
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low-personalized power men irrespective of whether they win or lose because power motivation 
is what inclines them to exercise influence over others, thereby developing their experience in 
being particularly good at detecting facial expressions that serve as important social cues.  
However, this prediction turned out to be true only for winners.  Thus, as power increased, 
winners’ empathic accuracy increased whereas that of losers declined.  One reason explaining 
why losers’ accuracy dropped as personalized power rose may lie in the fact that a defeat will 
direct a loser’s cognitive effort inwards as he ruminates about the causes of his loss, and what 
this signifies to his status among peers.  As his need for power grows fueling his desire to have 
more control and influence over others, any post-competitive rumination and ‘analysis paralysis’ 
resulting from defeat becomes more cognitively taxing.  Such a predicament would leave him 
with fewer cognitive abilities to direct toward deciphering the emotional cues in people’s faces.  
This helps to explain why individuals who experience ostracism from their peer groups, what 
many consider to be a devastating social loss (Baumeister & Tice, 1990; Baumeister, Twenge, & 
Nuss, 2002), respond with decreased prosociality (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & 
Bartels, 2007) and decreased interpersonal empathy (DeWall & Baumeister, 2006).   
A final point to consider is that the moderating effect of personalized power on the 
relationship between competitive outcomes and empathic accuracy seems to operate at medium-
to-high levels of personalized power.  This could be due to the fact that men low in personalized 
power care less about their status such that brooding or negative self-scrutiny is at a minimum 
compared with high-personalized power men.  Thus, no differentiation in empathic accuracy 
between winners and losers should be seen at low personalized power, but a great deal of 
differentiation at high levels which is what is observed.  Another possibility, this one relying 
more on statistical methodology, is that the sample of male participants in this study exhibited a 
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range restriction on personalized power which is discussed in greater detail in the limitations 
section.  Nevertheless, when considering how accurate men are at inferring what others are 
thinking and feeling following a contest in which status is either won or lost, this finding 
underscores the importance of personalized power’s moderation effect: high personalized power 
accentuates winners’ ability at facial emotion recognition, while it weakens this ability among 
losers.  
To recapitulate, the essence of this study can be summarized in three major points.  First, 
gaining and losing status significantly affect men’s empathic accuracy.  Second, testosterone 
plays a mediating role in a negative indirect relationship between competitive outcomes and 
empathic accuracy and, thus, should be measured whenever possible because it constitutes a 
separate mechanism through which wins and losses impact accuracy.  Lastly, assessing 
personalized power is critical because we can better understand the predictable levels of 
empathic accuracy that occur not only between winners and losers, but also among men 
experiencing the same outcome.  By assessing personalized power, we can better estimate the 
levels of empathic accuracy between any two winners (or losers) who are seemingly equal on 
other aspects, such as their number of wins or losses, androgen levels, and demographic 
composition. 
 
8.3. Major Findings and Theoretical Implications for Proactive and Reactive Aggression 
8.3.1. Winning, losing, and both aggression types 
I initially set out to test whether victorious men who gained status would be more likely 
than their losing counterparts to engage in proactive aggression, whereas losing men would be 
more predisposed to engage in reactive aggression.  These predictions were guided partially by 
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biological principles which propound that aggression evolved from a struggle for resource 
competition (van den Berghe, 1974; Durham, 1976).  After competing, winners might wish to 
perpetuate their streak and, not experiencing anxiety from a loss, would be more willing than 
losers to aggress against harmless rivals.  I also drew from self-determination theory which 
posits that competence is a fundamental component of a person’s psychological health and 
wellbeing (Deci & Ryan, 2000).  After losing, losers’ need for competence gets stifled by those 
who outperform them and, by retaliating against them, they restore balance. 
Although this general direction was correctly predicted, namely that winners would be 
more ‘cold-blooded’ than losers, and that losers would be more ‘hot-blooded’ than winners, 
these differences were not significant.  First, and perhaps the most obvious reason, is that the 
competition and by extension, the promise of rewards received by winners and denied to losers, 
failed to translate into specific forms of aggression.  It could have been the case that the men did 
not consider the competition to be heated enough, its rewards as being worthy enough, or the 
resulting temporary status stratification not severe enough to generate any aggression.  Second, 
actual measures of aggression were taken roughly 20-30 minutes and 50-60 minutes following 
competition for proactive and reactive aggression, respectively.  These gaps in time, although 
necessary for logistic reasons, might have produced the unwanted effect of participants ‘cooling 
off’ thereby reducing their aggression.  Third, in realistic settings such as the workplace, winners 
and losers of status not only compete for high-stakes resources (e.g., career mobility), but also 
know each other intimately and must endure each other’s presence for much lengthier periods of 
time long after rivalry is over (Kilduff, Elfenbein, & Staw, 2010).  However, in this study, 
participants spent between 20-25 minutes competing and another hour or so afterwards in each 
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other’s presence possibly never seeing each other again.  Nonetheless, the fact that hypotheses 
ran parallel to what was originally expected is encouraging, as we will see later.  
 
8.3.2. Testosterone and aggression: Duality, permissive effect, or reverse causality? 
Following this, I replicated the first link of the indirect effect which suggested that there 
would be a difference in men’s androgen responses to winning and losing.  As in the first study, 
following competition, winners’ testosterone levels dropped while those of losers rose 
significantly.  Moreover, I tested the second link of the indirect effect, namely that rises in 
testosterone will then lead to rises in both proactive and reactive aggression.  Despite common 
beliefs that testosterone is a necessary precursor to aggression, studies correlating testosterone 
with aggressive behaviour (e.g., Berman et al., 1993), and those claiming that testosterone 
changes cause aggression (e.g., only among losers; Carré et al., 2009), I did not find any 
empirical evidence supporting causality.  We need to be cognizant, however, that findings 
linking testosterone to aggression in humans have yielded mixed results, with other studies 
showing null effects (for a meta-analysis, see Archer, 2006; see also Archer, Birring, & Wu, 
1998).  A perusal of the social endocrinological literatures (Archer, 2006; Mehta & Josephs, 
2011) revealed why findings did not come out as expected.  One explanation is that many 
different measures of aggression have been used, from self-reports designed to tap more stable 
aggressive traits to laboratory paradigms developed to capture the more momentary aggressive 
behaviours.  Another is the very small sample sizes employed by studies making the claim that 
testosterone change causes aggression (e.g., 14 losing men in total in the study by Carré et al., 
2009).  Yet another reason is that several hormones may interact in order to channel behaviour 
rather than a single hormone being solely responsible for eliciting behaviour as is typically 
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believed (e.g., ‘duality’ between cortisol and testosterone; Carré & Mehta, 2011; Mehta & 
Josephs, 2010, 2011; see also Vongas & Al Hajj, 2015).   
A third reason why testosterone failed to manifest aggression is based on a tenet of 
neuroendocrinology known as a hormone’s ‘permissive effect’ (Sapolsky, 1997, p. 153).  
According to this idea, some amount of baseline testosterone is needed for aggressive behaviour, 
and this amount ranges from 20 percent of normal to twice normal.  In other words, a man needs 
to have his resting testosterone level quadrupled or quintupled – reaching levels akin to 
bodybuilders abusing anabolic steroids – for him to appreciably aggress.  Therefore, a surge is 
testosterone will not necessarily translate to aggression unless it is substantial and, although 
men’s testosterone changed significantly from pre- to post-competition, the change was not 
abnormally inflated to trigger aggression. 
Changes in testosterone were expected to play a mediating role in the effect of winning and 
losing on aggression.  However, no such mediation was found.  One explanation comes again 
from neuroendocrinology which clarifies the confusion surrounding the relationship between 
testosterone and aggression by asking the basic question, “does testosterone elevate aggression?” 
or “does aggression elevate testosterone secretion?” (Sapolsky, 1997).  Many researchers, 
including myself, are biased in favour of answering affirmatively to the first question whereas I 
should have considered the second and measured testosterone following the aggression tasks.  
Sapolsky (1997) warns that this bias plagues our understanding of how hormones relate to 
behaviour because we suffer from ‘physics envy’ (p. 152), namely the false belief that hormones 
must be responsible for regulating behaviour because they are much more tangible and fixed in 
comparison to the transient quality of behaviour.  Indeed, this bias is so deeply embedded in us 
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that we overlooked the possibility of a reverse causality, namely that aggressive behaviour might 
have in fact been responsible for changes in testosterone levels. 
 
8.3.3. Personalized power: Witnessing how status wins and losses relate to aggression 
Finally, personalized power was once more introduced as a moderator of the direct link 
between competitive outcomes and both proactive and reactive aggression.  As personalized 
power increases, the expectation was that winners would have a greater increase in proactive 
aggression than losers, while losers would have a greater increase in reactive aggression than 
winners.  Both predictions were supported, with winners showing a steeper increase in proactive 
aggression than losers, and with losers showing a steeper increase in reactive aggression than 
winners.  Here, several points are worth mentioning.  
First, although no relationship was found between competitive outcomes and both types of 
aggression initially (i.e., direct effect or direct link), introducing personalized power as a 
moderator permitted a clearer understanding of what the relationship is truly like.  Again, this 
emphasizes the importance of taking personalized power into account when testing the direct 
effect of competitive outcomes on a given outcome variable, and the danger of being led by 
faulty or biased findings if this is not done.   
A second noteworthy finding relates to the different levels of personalized power at which 
moderation occurs for each type of aggression.  For example, winners and losers differ 
significantly in proactive aggression at high personalized power but not at low-to-moderate 
levels, with high-personalized power winners aggressing more proactively than high-
personalized power losers.  A possible explanation is that proactive aggression involves 
aggressing against an “innocent” individual and trying to extract resources from the interaction 
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(e.g., money, points in a game, or reputation among peers).  This type of aggression might come 
easier to a person high in the power motive which is what was observed with increases in 
proactive aggression for both winners and losers.   
But what explains the difference between the two groups?  High-personalized power 
winners might feel as though they have free reign in exploiting others because they are 
unencumbered by rivals, further solidifying their ascension in the social hierarchy.  High-
personalized power losers, however, might feel that a status loss curbs their sense of being in 
control.  In addition, since the decision to proactively aggress relies on less consequential 
information (e.g., unknown punishment that a competitor can inflict), losers become 
apprehensive in committing to this decision out of fear of losing additional resources and status.   
A more interesting moderation takes place with reactive aggression.  At high personalized 
power, both winners and losers aggress more reactively than their low-personalized power 
conspecifics.  This time, high-personalized power losers displayed more of this form of 
aggression possibly to re-establish their status by retaliating against a less ambiguous opponent, 
whereas high-power winners retaliated less because their status was improved by the win, and 
hence was more secure.  In other words, one can easily imagine that winners were basking in 
glory from a status elevation and this acted as a buffer for episodic bouts of provoked aggression, 
which explains why winners often maintain their calm temperament following a victory in spite 
of the malevolent actions of jealous and frustrated rivals.  At the low end of the personalized 
power spectrum, winners are in fact more reactively aggressive than losers.  This seems odd at 
first but, when one considers the gains that come from winning, one quickly realizes that 
victorious low-personalized power individuals experience a boost in their self-esteem and their 
belief in a potential status improvement thereby fueling more aggression.  Low-personalized 
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power losers, on the other hand, have neither the internal drive nor this short-term burst of 
energy that winners enjoy and might be less likely to aggress. 
The core of this study can be embodied in two key points.  First, unlike in the study on 
empathic accuracy, testosterone changes emerging from gaining and losing status have no 
significant effect on men’s aggression types.  Perhaps this may be because testosterone and 
androgens in general have a more obvious effect on the cognitive abilities that operate ‘beneath 
the surface’ than they do on the more self-aware behaviours.  This may also suggest that the 
causal mechanism works in the reverse direction, namely that it is aggressive behaviour that 
brings about testosterone rises.  Second, and more critically, it is by ushering in personalized 
power that the true effect of a status victory or loss on both types of aggression can be seen.  
Without understanding power’s influence, we would have never been able to tell that winners 
and losers aggress differently and in important ways.  These and other theoretical implications 
are framed in a broader discussion of my thesis’s practical implications for managers, a section 
to which I turn to next. 
 
8.4. Managerial Implications 
While scholars have made a fervent and widely publicized case against competition in 
favour of cooperation (Kohn, 1992), and while this well-intended prescription is meant for us to 
create a better society, the fact remains that competition is a daily reality for many working 
people.  More importantly, competition forms the basis for how rewards and status are often 
bestowed on employees, from entry-level workers to members of executive teams.  At present, 
we know little about what happens to our empathy and aggression when we win and lose and, 
moreover, which individual differences are involved in making these responses differ from one 
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person to another.  In the workplace, understanding these issues is important because this is 
where we value fierce competitiveness on one hand yet, paradoxically, it is also where we stress 
empathy and cooperation on the other.  I begin by outlining practical implications of my research 
involving empathic accuracy before exploring what we have learned from findings related to 
power motivation, aggression, and testosterone.  Given that we know more about aggression in 
the workplace than what we do about empathic accuracy, my emphasis in this section will be 
targeted on the latter. 
Empathic accuracy is one facet of the broader concept of empathy, and identifying the 
intentions, thoughts, and feelings of another person is something we do every day without much 
self-awareness.  As a result, we fail to appreciate its importance especially at work.  This neglect 
is also partly due to the fact that the study of emotions in the workplace has traditionally focused 
on the expression of emotions, such as emotional labor and display rules.  Management scholars 
are now beginning to shift their attention toward the perception of emotions, an essential skill for 
managers wishing to be responsive in fast-paced and diverse environments.  As a result, a 
growing body of work is emerging which points to the importance of emotion recognition for 
practitioners (Ashkanasy & Humphrey, 2011; see also DePaulo, 1992; Elfenbein & Ambady, 
2002; Hooijberg, Hunt, & Dodge, 1997; Jordan, Ashkanasy, & Härtel, 2002; Snodgrass, 1992).  
So why is the skill of empathic accuracy important at work?  
First, recognizing emotions accurately has been shown to be related to goal-oriented 
performance (Elfenbein et al., 2007).  In a recent meta-analysis combining 18 studies with 1,232 
participants in total, Elfenbein and her colleagues found a positive correlation between empathic 
accuracy and performance consistently across many jobs requiring high levels of face-to-face 
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interaction, including physicians, medical interns, foreign service workers, public service interns, 
business executives, managers, therapists, elementary school principals, and school teachers.  
Second, empirical evidence has also shown that male managers’ accuracy in perceiving 
others’ emotions was positively associated with subordinate ratings on transformational 
leadership behaviour (Rubin et al., 2005).  Transformational leaders are those who decisively 
change their followers’ attitudes and beliefs toward a new vision, one that invigorates them to 
attain unprecedented performance (Bass, 1985).  Among the behaviours characterizing such 
leaders is individualized consideration, which involves attending to followers’ needs and 
personal development.  This focused attention as mentors and coaches signals the respect that 
leaders have for their followers’ feelings which enhances the latter’s sense of self-worth and 
confidence leading to the potential development of new and creative ideas.  Leaders who fail to 
pick up on their followers’ emotional cues will miss out on the opportunity to motivate them to 
surpass performance expectations.  This may be even more critical in organizational cultures 
having low power distances where the relationship between followers and leaders is 
interdependent (Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010) and where leaders are increasingly being 
typified as “managers of group emotions” (Pescosolido, 2002, p. 583; see also George, 2000). 
Another related domain within leadership in which empathic accuracy is believed to play a 
fundamental role is emotional intelligence, a concept that resonates well with practicing 
managers but has generated heated debates among academics (for a brief summary, see 
Antonakis, Ashkanasy, & Dasborough, 2009; Walter, Cole, & Humphrey, 2011).  Emotional 
intelligence was originally defined as “the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ feelings and 
emotions, to discriminate among them, and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and 
actions” (Salovey & Mayer, 1990, p. 18).  Therefore, any person aspiring to have it must manage 
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not only one’s own emotions but also others’ emotions in order to achieve specific goals.  
Several organizational behaviour scholars have found positive correlations between emotional 
intelligence and job performance (e.g., Sedamar, Robins, & Ferris, 2006; Wong & Law, 2002).  
According to the most recent conceptualization of emotional intelligence, there are four distinct 
skills that one needs to master successfully, each one representing a unique and sequential step in 
a hierarchy (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004).  These are, in order: 1) perceiving emotions, 2) 
using emotions to facilitate thought, 3) understanding emotions, and 4) managing emotions.  In 
other words, the ability to perceive emotions accurately in oneself and in others is the most 
fundamental level of emotional intelligence and, without this important step, none of the 
remaining three can be fulfilled.  Therefore, if status losses cause a significant decrease in one’s 
empathic accuracy as demonstrated here, then this change could adversely affect one’s job 
performance and leadership in two related respects, namely transformational leadership and 
emotional intelligence.   
Finally, two other areas in which empathic accuracy is important for organizational 
behaviour involve nonverbal communication and negotiation.  Nonverbal communication occurs 
whenever senders and receivers transmit messages between themselves using media other than 
speech or writing, such as facial expressions, gestures, and bodily movements and positions.  At 
work, there are two types of important messages.  One is the sender’s assessment of his or her 
status relative to the receiver’s and the other is the degree to which a sender likes the receiver or 
is interested in what he or she is saying (Goman, 2008).  Consider the case in which an employee 
misinterprets his supervisor’s contemptuous grimace and oversteps his boundary during a 
meeting or one where a seller fails to pick up on his potential client’s surprised look during a 
contract agreement.  Without empathic accuracy, these messages will go undetected and lead to 
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unwanted outcomes for both parties.  In his classic work, Mehrabian (1972) noted that, when 
there are incongruent verbal and nonverbal messages, most people rely disproportionately on the 
nonverbal ones for the source of meaning.   
Wrongfully interpreting a target’s expressions, however, can also damage the perceiver’s 
reputation and negotiating ability.  For instance, Byron (2007) found that male managers who 
were poor at deciphering facial expressions were deemed to be less persuasive by their 
subordinates than managers who were more accurate.  In a related study, Byron, Terranova, and 
Nowicki (2007) found that salespersons from distinct industries who were deficient at emotion 
recognition sold fewer products per month and earned lower annual salary increases than their 
more accurate cohort.  The authors, therefore, provided some evidence indicating that empathic 
accuracy is critical in negotiation, and concluded that people who correctly interpret others’ 
emotions are able to be more persuasive because they can incrementally gauge receivers’ 
feedback.  Should receivers’ feedback indicate irritation, anger, or any other negative emotion, 
they might be prompted to change tactics, otherwise they will carry on if feedback is positive.  
Senders are also more persuasive when their messages match the moods and emotions of 
receivers (DeSteno, Petty, Rucker, Wegener, & Braverman, 2004; Rucker & Petty, 2004).  
Hence, a persuasive message could be “tailored to resonate with the emotions of those being 
persuaded” (Rucker & Petty, 2004, p. 17), and tailoring such a message requires that senders 
accurately evaluate their receivers’ present emotional states (see also Byron, 2007). 
In sum, managers are advised to take empathic accuracy seriously because, as some have 
pointed out (e.g., Hooijberg et al., 1997), most activities within organizational life are 
emotionally loaded.  For example, leadership, managerial decision-making, employee 
motivation, conflict resolution, and negotiation all occur in the context of social relationships.  
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From what this thesis’s research suggests, we become more accurate at identifying others’ 
emotional facial expressions when we gain status than when we lose it.  Moreover, we also know 
that changes in status need not be as drastic as one might imagine for empathic accuracy to differ 
considerably between winners and losers.  While these changes can be very significant in some 
situations (e.g., going from law student to corporate tax lawyer), the workplace is nonetheless 
replete with examples of “mini battles” taking place daily between competitors.  Examples 
include professors vying for the same government research grant, partners in an accounting firm 
striving to outcompete one another in new accounts, and entry-level bank tellers each determined 
to earn the “Teller-of-the-Year” award.  In every case, loss of perceived status to a rival will be 
likely met with a decrease in empathic accuracy.  The professor having been outshined by his 
faculty colleague may become unresponsive to his doctoral students’ distressful signals, whereas 
the ‘winning’ professor might do the opposite and become vigilant to the same pleas.  Similarly, 
the junior bank teller who lost the annual coveted recognition award to his fellow coworker 
might fail to respond appropriately to a client in need, while the winner may show even more 
focus in this regard.  While these claims need to be proven with empirical data collected in their 
respective field settings, the message is clear: winning status enables one to perform better at 
interpreting facial expressions of emotion, while losing it detracts from this ability, with the end 
result being that one’s social astuteness at work may become affected. 
The research conducted here also shows that people’s empathic accuracy following a status 
contest will vary according to the extent to which they are motivated by personalized power.  
Individuals who gain status will do better at emotion recognition with increasing levels of 
personalized power, whereas those who lose status do poorer.  Managers and leaders are widely 
known to be power-motivated individuals who enjoy having impact on others and their 
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surroundings (McClelland & Burnham, 1976).  Managers with high personalized power who 
sustain a social defeat must beware that their perception of others’ emotions will suffer in the 
aftermath of the loss.  Knowing what fate lies ahead can help them plan ahead because the 
consequences of a loss could be worse than the antecedents that have led to it – at least for those 
whose lives are affected by the losers.   
Human resource departments may find it worthwhile to administer the Picture Story 
Exercise (PSE), provided they have the training, as a means of assessing the personalized power 
motive of their employees.  Contrary to other dispositional measures used frequently in 
recruitment and selection, the PSE offers several advantages.  First, because it measures implicit 
motives which are based on affect rather than cognition, it is less prone to self-report biases that 
often limit the validity of explicit motive measurement.  Second, implicit motives interact with 
motive-specific incentives from a given situation whereas explicit motives are criticized for 
failing to do so.  In the current studies, men’s personalized power interacted with winning and 
losing to give rise to different degrees of empathic accuracy and aggression.  This finding might 
have gone entirely unnoticed had I used an explicit measure for power motivation (e.g., a self-
report questionnaire) because participants might have been weary to express their predilection 
for power given our society’s normative stance on or perception of power-seeking people.  Given 
that power has long been thought to corrupt those who possess it (Kipnis, 1972), it is reasonable 
to expect that asking participants to provide self-assessments themselves on power would yield 
questionable outcomes.  Third, unlike self-report questionnaires that predict short-term behaviour 
and deliberate cognitive choices, the PSE predicts long-term behaviour and behavioural trends 
(Schultheiss, 2007).  By considering the implicit power motive of job candidates as a practical 
piece of information, recruiters may find it useful to understand whether a given employee might 
 119 
 
be suited for a managerial, leadership, or any other role in which decision making will impact 
other people.  It is nonetheless recommended that recruiters also measure the power motive 
through self-report questionnaires because a mismatch between implicit and explicit motives can 
produce disastrous outcomes for an individual.  For example, consider the case when someone 
explicitly indicates in a survey that he enjoys having influence over other teammates presumably 
because his environment values leadership, but then fails to show this desire for social 
dominance when given the opportunity to express himself in a more subtle way through the PSE.  
Such a mismatch could be catastrophic because it means that what this individual says may not 
be what he truly prefers.  Indeed, studies have shown that motive incongruence leads to a 
number of negative outcomes including less flow (Schüler, 2010), goal attainment (Brunstein, 
Schultheiss, & Grässmann, 1998; Vongas et al., 2014), and reduced wellbeing and positive affect 
(Schattke, Koestner, & Kehr, 2011).  Lastly, the PSE enables one to capture not only the motive 
power, but also the achievement and affiliation motives that are powerful motivators in their own 
right to the extent that the workplace permits employees to satisfy each of them.  In fact, the PSE 
is currently used by management consulting firms, an example being the Hay Group which is a 
prestigious Philadelphia-based firm that operates in 49 countries and uses the PSE as a 
“benchmark tool for assessing, coaching, and developing successful, high-performing leaders” 
(www.haygroup.com, accessed October 12, 2014).   
This research also provides insight regarding when competitive outcomes trigger two 
distinct types of aggressive behaviour, namely proactive (unprovoked) and reactive (provoked).  
To my knowledge, these are among the first studies to distinguish the type of aggression that 
winners and losers are prone to following a competition.  Aggression comes in different degrees 
as well and, unlike empathic accuracy, it is a behaviour that we are fully conscious of even when 
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we allow emotions to get in the way of our restraint.  In the workplace, aggression involves “any 
act in which one individual intentionally attempts to harm another” (Neuman & Baron, 1998, p. 
395) and, as such, often disguises itself in the most subtle ways: hostile expressions like ‘dirty 
looks,’ belittlement and condescension, rumor spreading, interrupting others while they speak, 
and giving someone the silent treatment.   
Although neither winning nor losing was strong enough alone to spur aggression of either 
type, personalized power predicted who would be the most aggressive individual for each type of 
aggression.  Since overt aggression measured here may be less prevalent in organizations than 
the softer and more elusive forms mentioned above, one needs to observe implicit power 
motivation to better understand winners’ and losers’ behavioural tendencies.  Given that 
managers and leaders are high-power people, this work becomes especially relevant for 
management practice.  In particular, it advises that high-power individuals who lose status will 
be more prone to aggress reactively following a provocation, whereas those who win status will 
be more likely to aggress proactively.  The bottom line is that high-power people desire social 
recognition which drives them to aggress in different ways depending on whether they win or 
lose status.  High-power winners might feel more entitled than losers to exploit others when 
unprovoked, and this is important because proactive aggression can promote a cascade of 
reactive aggression manifestations.  Thus, knowing what situational and individual variables 
affect proactive aggression can help practitioners potentially reduce the occurrence of both 
aggression types.  High-power losers, on the other hand, might be worried about suffering more 
losses in the future should they proactively aggress against someone whom they have not sized 
up properly.  Therefore, they will resort to aggressing reactively against someone whom they 
have a history with and, as such, could evaluate more easily the risk in doing so.  In light of these 
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findings, managers need to be careful when placing certain individuals in competitive situations 
and, more so, must monitor the environments in which winners and losers function to ensure that 
no foul play surfaces.  A winner who belittles an innocent and unsuspecting underperformer at a 
meeting could be just as damaging to a firm as a loser who causes others to delay action on 
critical matters. 
This leaves us to a final implication for managers. Are practitioners better off knowing that 
a status-induced testosterone change affects a person’s empathic response?  I believe the answer 
to be yes.  First, it was demonstrated how a social interaction among complete strangers 
competing with one another could have immediate effects on a man’s neuroendocrine system, 
and maybe even longer since testosterone changes that ensue from competition persist from 
several hours to weeks (Mehta et al., 2008).  If different levels of empathic accuracy can be 
detected from testosterone reactivity following a status contest in which rewards are extremely 
trivial compared to those in real life, then it is wholly plausible that the findings here will 
replicate in naturalistic settings.  Knowing that competitive environments affect human 
physiology and empathic ability equips us with knowledge to rethink how we structure work.  
Simply put, once we realize the extent to which our social interactions strongly affect our body 
chemistry, only then shall we begin looking at these interactions in a more appreciative way and 
think through implications we had never imagined before. For example, some managers may 
wish to frame competitions as challenges – not as threats of status losses – while others might 
articulate goals using a win-win lens instead of the more traditional win-lose approach where 
someone must lose in order for another to get ahead.  Second, physiological measures, like those 
of implicit motives, have the benefit of being immune from self-report biases (Akinola, 2010).  
The social context explored in this thesis altered men’s testosterone and, subsequently, affected 
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their empathic accuracy but not their aggression suggesting that androgens might be more 
important in acting directly on perceptual abilities than on cognitively controlled behaviours.  
This is important because our perceptions influence our decision making far beyond recruitment 
and selection, employment interviews, and performance appraisals.  Finally, with the exception 
of health and wellness issues, how the human body and its physiology affect the workplace 
rarely evokes any serious thought in management.  As Heaphy and Dutton (2008) noted in a 
recent theoretical piece in the Academy of Management Review, economies are increasingly 
based in service as opposed to manufacturing industries which implies that social interactions 
account for the largest proportion of individuals’ work time (see also Waldron, 2000).  Let us not 
forget that humans are just as much social beings as they are biological beings.  It is therefore my 
hope that this thesis will raise a number of questions and pave the way for future 
interdisciplinary research with studies incorporating biology and, therefore, putting an end to 
viewing workers as being bodiless. 
 
8.5. Research Limitations 
As with any research, there are limitations to this work.  First, a manipulation check 
immediately after the competition could have been employed to be certain that both rivals 
‘bought in’ to the rigged outcome.  This was not a realistic possibility for reasons mentioned 
below and, more importantly, behavioural researchers who use deception in experimental studies 
assert that withholding full disclosure is warranted in some cases as long as participants agree to 
be debriefed later in the study (Kimmel, 2012).  Had a manipulation check been included at such 
an early moment would have risked jeopardizing the experiments’ internal validity by making 
participants suspect of the hypotheses and, consequently, they might have acted differently 
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thereby affecting results (i.e., subject effect).  This would have also raised suspicion about the 
competition being rigged and, therefore, the true effect of competitive outcomes on ensuing 
measures (e.g., hormonal, aggressive, and empathic responses) would have been compromised 
further exacerbating the research’s validity.  Related to this idea, all participants were enrolled in 
the same class making it difficult to control information dispersion regarding the experiment 
after debrief, thus potentially contaminating results.  While it is known that some participants 
will act altruistically and try to help the researcher by responding in a manner they believe will 
be favourable to the research, there are others who wish to do the opposite by harming the 
research.  In fact, some participants were removed because they revealed that they had developed 
some knowledge of the experiment in which they participated.  Others that remained silent might 
have successfully gone through this screening without detection to eventually affect results.  
However, to reduce this bias, a single-item interpersonal closeness or intimacy measure (Aron et 
al., 1992) was used just before debriefing to assess how “close” each individual felt toward his 
rival.  Using this information in a qualitative manner, participants who rated their opponent as 
being particularly close received some added scrutiny in order to identify possible outliers on any 
of the measures.  Moreover, upon debriefing, participants who demonstrated non-engagement or 
a lack of understanding of what they were expected to do were removed unless the outlying data 
reflected measures bearing no direct relation to the study.   
On a positive note, participants in each of the two studies here matched, in terms of 
demographics, those of several published sources that used student samples from much smaller 
class sizes compared to the COMM 222 class at Concordia University that has over 1500 
enrolled students.  This gives some assurance that the above threats to validity, if they occurred, 
were not in some way critical to the experiments.  Lastly, as they departed the laboratory 
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premises, an unduly number of winners proudly clung to their hierarchical charts and signed 
letters, with many asking about when they would be contacted to set up the photo shoot for the 
lobby exhibition (with short biographical sketch and NTT performance).  Equally excessive was 
the number of losers who left behind the mock chart.  Together, these two independent 
observations point to the fact that the competition manipulation, however mundane it appeared at 
first glance, was sufficiently convincing and had the effect for which it was designed.  
Nevertheless, a proper statistical computation must be carried out to demonstrate whether there is 
a significant difference between winners hoarding the charts and losers leaving them behind. 
Another possible limitation involved time constraints.  Due to the fact that there was an 
allocated time constraint in which to carry out the experiments, the second day of 
experimentation (or Day 2) ran at roughly two hours which might raise the issue of participant 
fatigue.  However, many studies involving saliva collection in between which participants are 
exposed to various treatments assured us that such time durations are de rigueur and that fatigue 
is usually not found to be a major issue (e.g., Carré, 2010; Saad & Vongas, 2009). 
A third limitation related in part to the number of candidates who were willing and able to 
participate in these studies, i.e., males who volunteered to have their saliva sampled, including 
those reporting no endocrine abnormalities and oral cavity problems, as well as those who were 
not taking hormone-altering medication (e.g., antidepressants).  Given that these restrictions 
limited the sample’s potential size, there was little choice but to measure both proactive and 
reactive aggression in the same experimental séance.  To minimize carry-over effects, however, 
proactive aggression was measured first followed by reactive aggression.  Recall that the former 
is unprovoked aggression, whereas the latter is provoked or reactionary.  Since proactive 
aggression involves presumably less affect and frustration than the more heated reactive 
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aggression, all participants were first exposed to the proactive aggression paradigm before 
engaging in the reactive aggression one.  Hence, this singular order was adhered to as a means of 
getting around the likelihood that provocation-induced aggression would be carried over to 
contaminate the unprovoked measures. 
A fourth limitation which some might find problematic is the use of single-item measures 
to quantify some of the variables.  Proactive aggression was measured by the amount of spicy 
hot sauce added to a glass of water, for example.  Such a measure precludes the calculation and 
reporting of a reliability index and thus affects the judgment of a given score’s quality.  Two 
main reasons explain these choices.  First, as mentioned, the fear that participants would be 
fatigued prevented the inclusion of other measures.  For instance, the empathic accuracy task 
involving the Montreal Set of Facial Displays of Emotion alone took about 30 minutes to 
complete.  Second, these same measures have received rigorous validity testing and, as a result, 
have been used in isolation in many top-tier publications within psychology. 
A fifth limitation involves the question of language barriers that may have impeded some 
participants’ comprehension of the activities they were asked to accomplish.  For some, English 
is neither their maternal nor second language.  This issue would have been especially 
problematic during the emotional identification test where the names of a number of emotions 
might have been unknown to some participants or, worse, have had a different meaning in their 
culture (e.g., serenity, shame, contempt).  Care was taken, however, to reduce the level of 
instructional complexity when designing the studies.  For example, all participants were given a 
glossary of the 10 emotions they were asked to recognize in the photographs.  This glossary 
contained enough information to explain the word but not too much so as to guide the 
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participant’s response by having him focus on the facial features that characterize a particular 
emotion.  
Another limitation hinged on the decision to retain a dyad if one of the participants either 
decided to opt out of a study or was determined to be an outlier.  In cases like these, both 
individuals in the dyad were removed even if other sources kept lone participants.  The reason 
behind this decision is that useful qualitative data was also collected (not used per se in this 
thesis) that proved to be instrumental in providing a clearer picture of the variety of responses 
that both winners and losers experienced from the competition outcome, ranging from being 
elated and beaming with joy to seeming detached and sulking.  This rich mix of reactions made 
the measures of one dyadic partner (e.g., testosterone boost or blow) relatively dependent on the 
behaviours and attitudes of the other, even if for brief period of time.  Because of this dynamic 
process taking place between the two competing participants, it was best left to exclude the dyad 
altogether when one participant’s data suggested that it be removed.  In any case, additional 
analyses with the removed individuals included yielded the same results. 
A seventh limitation surrounded the application of what some might consider to be a 
‘passive’ competitive task (i.e., the NTT).  From a sympathetic nervous system perspective, 
passive versus active stress tasks have very different effects which might account for the 
testosterone findings in this thesis (S. Bacon, personal communication, May 16, 2015).  Had the 
competition task included a component of direct confrontation or conflict, might there have been 
a different testosterone response?  I believe so.  According to Archer’s meta-analysis (2006), 
changes in testosterone following sport competitions (i.e., active task) are significantly greater 
than those for contrived competitive situations involving a monetary reward (i.e., passive task).  
This is not hard to imagine since direct and intense confrontations are expected to kick in more 
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adrenaline and cortisol that, in turn, will modulate testosterone production (Schultheiss, 2007).  
Therefore, having participants engage in a more head-to-head confrontation would have elicited 
bigger changes in post-competitive hormonal fluctuations.  That being said, there is little reason 
to suspect that the observed measures of empathic accuracy and aggression would be any 
different. 
An eight limitation concerns the use of a female moderator throughout the studies.  This 
may prompt some critics to claim that my results were due partly to arousal emanating from the 
brief social interaction between the male participants and the female moderator.  Employing a 
female moderator was indeed used to maximize the effect of the experimental manipulation 
(O.C. Schultheiss, personal communication, June 11, 2012).  To understand the extent to which 
this impacted my findings, one would have to carry out a parallel study using a male moderator 
and then compare the results between the two groups.  This opens up yet another question that 
remains to be tackled, namely whether male intrasexual competitions differ substantially in the 
presence of females versus when they take place with an all-male cast.  In other words, does 
having a female audience witnessing a male-male competition affect in some particular way how 
victories and losses translate into rivals’ downstream behaviours and cognitions?  Researchers 
have shown that men experience testosterone changes during brief interactions with women 
(Roney et al., 2003; Saad & Vongas, 2009), with these hormonal reactions being stronger for 
aggressively dominant men (van der Meij, Buunk, van de Sande, & Salvador, 2008).  In each of 
the above studies, the women never competed with the men but were instead bystanders in 
various social interactions – some of which involved only men competing with their same-sex 
partner.  Proponents of evolutionary biological theory have found that the ratio of males to 
females in a given population is an important determinant of animal behaviour because it 
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increases the intensity of same-sex competition for mates (Kvarnemo & Ahnesjö, 1996).  This 
idea appears to apply to humans as well.  For example, some scholars have found that when the 
sex ratio represents a scarcity of women, the men become more economically impulsive: they 
have a greater number of credit cards, higher debt, fewer intentions to save money, and a 
preference for quick and smaller financial gains rather than potentially larger future gains 
(Griskevicius et al., 2012).  In my thesis, both the ratio of men-to-women (2:1) and the same 
female moderator remained constant throughout each of the two studies.  However, neither the 
males’ physical attraction toward the female moderator nor the extent to which the moderator 
believed the participants were trying to impress her was controlled for as in other studies (e.g., 
Roney et al., 2003).  In today’s workplace, women work alongside men in increasing proportions 
and some scholars, notably in sociology, have raised the issue of how the sex ratio of a team’s 
composition may influence the onset of sexual harassment, clearly an aggressive behaviour 
(McLaughlin, Uggen, & Blackstone, 2012).  Therefore, future research ought to appreciate both 
the subtle and blatant nuances of the effects of mixing men and women together in competitive 
settings.  
A ninth and final potential limitation involved the way in which data normality was 
handled on the basis of values obtained from skewness and kurtosis tests.  Although raw 
testosterone measures were skewed, this was not the case for the difference in raw testosterone 
levels (i.e., pre- and post-competition).  Skewness and kurtosis were also within the limits for 
proactive aggression and empathic accuracy.  Reactive aggression, however, was negatively 
skewed with the majority of participants aggressing few times compared with a majority which 
aggressed much more.  A decision had to be made about whether or not to transform this 
measure.  It appears that scholars have done both, with some transforming this measure while 
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others not.  Rex Kline (personal communication, May 14, 2014) advised that values having a 
concrete meaning such as blood sugar levels or testosterone concentrations should not be 
transformed if statistical methods used are robust enough to handle non-normality.  Another 
personal communication with Andrew Hayes (October 16, 2014), the author of conditional 
process analysis used here, assured us that the procedure is very robust to non-normality in the 
dependent variable and that he is, in general, against transformations unless they are absolutely 
necessary.  For the above reasons, and consistent with many mentioned published studies on 
hormonal changes, raw measures were used.  
 
8.6. Future Research  
Future scholars should first attend to the conflicting results surrounding the relationship 
between competitive outcomes and testosterone-level change.  In two studies employing an 
identical experimental design with above average sample sizes, winners’ testosterone dropped 
while that of losers rose.  While these findings are not novel, the opposite has been documented 
(Archer, 2006).  To make sense of my findings, therefore, several critical issues need to be 
addressed.  First, the independent variable needs some clarification: a competition is not 
synonymous with a decisive competitive outcome.  Testosterone measures taken in the midst of 
competition should be expected to differ from measures taken after winners and losers are 
announced.  While competing, winners bear the responsibility of maintaining their status and 
losers have the chance to reverse the tide.  One could assume that, in the case where rivals are 
still competing, the mechanisms controlling hormonal concentrations and the resulting cognitive 
and behavioural responses are in flux compared to those when the proverbial chequered flag is 
displayed and there is an uncontested winner.  During competition, one’s testosterone might rise 
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in an effort to defend a temporary status gain and following a victory, when status is established 
and no longer appears to be threatened, having lower testosterone might serve winners better by 
making them abandon further challenges as a way to protect their status.  On the contrary, after a 
status loss, losers’ higher testosterone acts as a catalyst for them to compete again and possibly 
regain the status.  The take-home message here is that comparing testosterone changes during 
competition to those following competition fails to appreciate context complexity (Johns, 2006).  
What happens to testosterone levels during competitive events is different from what happens to 
them following the competition, and this should be made clear. 
Future researchers therefore must take this into account and craft their studies in such a 
way that data collection truly reflects the organizational phenomenon they are studying.  For 
example, if one wishes to investigate how hormones interact with predispositions to affect 
performance among sales representatives who are competing daily for sales, then tracking 
testosterone fluctuations throughout the working day would be the best option.  However, if one 
wants to understand how a promotion (i.e., an elevation in employee status) that cannot be easily 
reversed once announced affects downstream behaviours and attitudes, then measuring 
testosterone concentrations after the promotee’s ‘crowning’ would be the right strategy. 
Researchers may also look into livelier competitive paradigms that reflect team 
competitions as a way of mimicking what often occurs in the workplace: teams competing with 
one another on competitions that involve some level of corporal activity rather than being based 
solely on highly cognitive tasks such as the one used here (e.g., persuasive pitches to prospective 
clients).  In the studies reported here, a number tracking exercise was used in which participants 
competed one-on-one in what was a first and only encounter and whose physical involvement 
was minimal.  Compare this, for example, to a team negotiation activity where the goal is to try 
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to obtain more for your team at the expense of the rival team (e.g., a distributive or win-lose 
negotiation).  In such a scenario, there is more vigorous activity among team members which is 
something that would likely interfere with hormonal mechanisms like testosterone because pre-
competitive baseline or resting states can be expected to be very different from post-competitive 
ones given the influence of mood and other hormones acting on team members (e.g., adrenaline).  
Such a group context can either escalate negative feelings associated with a status loss because 
few people like to be seen as losers by fellow teammates or, on the contrary, dilute the effects of 
winning and losing because teammates share this glory and burden, respectively. 
Another thing to consider is that, when competition occurs in an activity one is already 
familiar with, the effect of winning and losing might be different from that which occurs when 
competition takes place on a novel activity.  Losing on a competitive task or game we know very 
well could induce shame because our sense of self is heavily involved due to our prior 
knowledge and identification with the activity such as an experienced salesperson failing to close 
a major sale or a professional tennis player losing an important championship match.  Losing in a 
contest we are completely unfamiliar with might instead induce guilt because responsibility is 
removed from the self and we could easily justify the loss by saying, “It’s my first time.”  These 
are merely examples of two distinct affective experiences that might differentially affect 
hormonal mechanisms and resultant participant responses when other types of paradigms are 
used.  This then opens the floor to an array of questions for future research.  For example, how 
does self-efficacy influence post-competitive testosterone levels?  Or, are hormonal changes 
different during individual versus group competitions?  This latter question might be even more 
critical now that we are moving toward a more team-based approach to management. 
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Third comes the prospect of using a more diverse set of participants.  While most 
experimental work that studies basic phenomena uses undergraduate samples, some have used 
older participants having managerial work experience (e.g., MBAs in works by Ronay & Carney, 
2013 and White, Thornhill, & Hampson, 2006).  Unless replication takes place, there is no 
reason to assume that results would or should match.  For example, as males age, their baseline 
testosterone progressively declines.  As baseline testosterone levels differ, so might testosterone 
changes not taking into account covariates like experience with the competition.  One could also 
assume that the same testosterone change (x in pictograms per milliliter of saliva) between males 
having different baseline testosterone levels will have a different effect on outcomes (e.g., 
empathic accuracy).  Researchers should engage in field experiments involving older participants 
than rely on convenience sampling with students given that the mean age of workers in the 
developed world is increasing and is expected to be over 40 in the near future (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2010).  
Fourth, many of the published articles that relate to the work here are frustratingly void 
when it comes to important information regarding experimental design.  As such, it becomes 
difficult to determine why some researchers found one effect while others found the opposite 
(e.g., the difference in findings from studies on testosterone changes following competition).  
Thus, critical information remains elusive for valid experimental replications and many 
researchers must resort to personally contacting those having executed the studies to better 
understand what took place in the laboratory.  Some of these questions have been mentioned 
earlier in this thesis but are nonetheless lacking in the current literature, and they often involve 
very subtle information that could potentially make a significant difference in findings.  For 
example, what were the age and sex of confederates or research assistants that participants were 
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exposed to and interacted with?  How were rivals positioned during the competition, head to 
head or apart with their backs facing each other?  Were competitors given some time to interact 
informally and establish a brief and possibly cordial connection before the competition took 
place?  Most, if not all, of the current studies involving hormonal assessments are grossly lacking 
in qualitative data.  In fact, not a single published source was found that delves into this level of 
detail, and this is surprising because most studies have a low sample size thereby rendering the 
analysis of such data ever more important.  Rich qualitative information was collected in both 
studies reported here with the intention of reporting it in future research. 
Other avenues for future research involve extending the present studies to include, for 
example, some empathy-related constructs that fall under the purview of cognitions (e.g., 
perspective taking), behaviours (e.g., altruism and helping), and emotions (e.g., personal 
distress).  Another avenue is to address the lack of consensus on what constitutes a validated 
measure of trait empathy.  Compared to aggression, much less research has gone into developing 
measures of dispositional empathy.  Since differences in trait empathy can play an important role 
in understanding the effect of a situational context (e.g., competitive environment) on any one of 
these dimensions of empathy, this takes on a special significance.  How could one validly 
explain the effect of any independent variable on a person’s empathic response if he or she 
cannot measure where that person stands on that response and control for it?  As the importance 
of empathy in the workplace is made a little more obvious with this research, I invite future 
researchers to develop a validated measure of trait empathy and for researchers interested in the 
construct to include it in their research.  
Finally, the two studies presented here have shown that personalized power plays a critical 
role in the relationship between competitive outcomes and empathy, and disregarding its 
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influence can bias findings.  As such, future researchers are advised to consider two points.  
First, since the role of implicit motives in influencing human behaviour has proven to be 
instrumental, researchers need to keep these motives in mind when investigating constructs that 
involve any aspect of social interaction.  The work here focused on implicit power and, in 
particular, only one dimension namely personalized power.  Other implicit motives such as 
affiliation and achievement play an important role in countless other human endeavors and 
ignoring them would be unwise.  For example, a man’s need for achievement might very well 
positively affect his ability in recognizing others’ emotional cues by pushing him to focus on the 
task and see it through to successful completion.  Similarly, his need for affiliation might ward 
off aggressive outbreaks because having such a need would instead endear him to others.  In 
addition, distinguishing between personalized and socialized power would add to the small but 
important literature showing how people who vary in these two respects will pursue different 
courses of action (e.g., Chusmir, 1986; Chusmir & Parker, 1984; Magee & Langner, 2008; 
Schultheiss et al., 1999). For instance, women are similar to men in personalized power but 
superior in socialized power (Chusmir, 1986). Across cultures, women are seen as the more 
altruistic and empathic sex, demonstrating communal behaviours (e.g., affection) over the more 
masculine agentic ones (e.g., dominance) (Eagly, 1987).  When it comes to testosterone, 
although it is higher in men, its bearing on the psychology and behaviour of both sexes is 
equivalent (Udry, 2000; Zyphur, Narayanan, Koh, & Koh, 2009).  Therefore, gender influences 
how these motives impact empathic accuracy and aggression (for details, see Vongas & Al Hajj, 
2015). 
The second is to look for other moderators and mediators when pondering the effect of 
winning and losing on social outcomes.  We have seen that a hormonal mediational mechanism 
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exists in empathic accuracy but not in aggression.  This finding was surprising given the widely 
held belief that testosterone is intimately associated with aggression.  Another reason explaining 
why the hypothesized mediation failed to emerge is the likelihood of the existence of competing 
mediators.  Other than testosterone, there are countless other mechanisms through which 
competitive outcomes may produce aggression.  For instance, scholars interested in 
psychophysiological biomarkers of workplace stressors have shown that interactional unfairness 
triggers the release of cortisol, the principal stress hormone, into the bloodstream which then 
stimulates deviant behaviour (Yang, Bauer, Johnson, Groer, & Salomon, 2014).  It is entirely 
conceivable to suspect that people whose thwarted efforts to gain rewards like status might feel 
some form of injustice which then translates to stress and a subsequent decrease in empathy and 
a rise in retaliatory aggression. 
On the moderation side, a possible candidate could be core self-evaluations, which is a 
broad personality concept consisting of specific traits that reflect evaluations people hold about 
their self-worth and competence (Judge & Bono, 2001).  As a person’s core self-evaluation 
increases, the temporary status stratification which the experimental manipulation attempts to 
enhance might not be as effective in causing a change in testosterone.  The fundamental issue 
here is that conflicting results, null findings, and findings that run opposite to predicted 
directions should be seen as opportunities for future work rather than problematic areas to shy 
away from.   
Finally, a more obvious future research area that seems ripe for investigation involves the 
psychophysiological systems that are at play during competitive interactions between women.  
At the moment, how these mechanisms operate in women remains a mystery although a recent 
theoretical paper sheds light on the matter (Vongas & Al Hajj, 2015).  Before answering this 
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question, we need to understand not only whether men and women compete in the same way, but 
also whether they interpret victory and defeat similarly.  Although the two sexes compete 
routinely in the workplace today, this does not mean that they compete indistinguishably.  For 
example, Bronson and Merryman (2013) showed that men are more eager to embark into 
competitions quickly, have exaggerated beliefs in their ability to win against overwhelming odds, 
and are more likely to abort future competitions when faced with an obstacle.  Women, however, 
are more strategic in selecting to compete when their odds of winning are greater, have more 
sensible expectations about outcomes, and persist more after suffering a defeat.  Despite these 
differences, men and women compete instinctively with same-sex members in competitions that 
are equally intense (Barash, 2006; Cashdan, 1998).  In fact, Schultheiss, Wirth, Torges, Pang, 
Villacorta, and Welsh (2005) affirmed that the power incentive arising from victory over a same-
sex opponent is as attractive for women as it is for men, and the loss of power after a defeat is 
just as aversive to both sexes.   
In a nutshell, although men and women approach competition differently, victory tastes 
just as sweet, and loss just as bitter.  Other recent reviews on gender differences in motive 
distribution have found that women express higher levels of implicit power motivation than men 
(Pang & Schultheiss, 2005), suggesting that the notion of power being attributed overwhelmingly 
to men may be an arcane one.  This poses an interesting intellectual puzzle given that women are 
believed to possess more empathy, in general, than men (Vongas, 2009).  They also have such 
low baseline testosterone levels that even a modicum of hormonal change can show a greater 
effect on empathic outcomes compared with their male counterparts.  While some empirical 
work has been carried out in this area, these efforts have been dwarfed by research focusing on 
men.  Researchers are thus invited to abandon this misconceived notion that testosterone is 
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primarily a male hormone, and become open to the idea that testosterone changes in women 
warrant just as much attention especially in the context of winning and losing.  It is also hoped 
that this research will lead us to study testosterone beyond the restrictions of intrasexual 
competition and into that of intersexual competition (i.e., competition between members of the 
opposite sex).  With increasing numbers of women in the global workplace and at all levels of 
the organizational hierarchy, intersexual competition will become inevitable and a topic that we 







The 10 Most Cited Definitions of Empathy in the Biological and Social Sciences (1949-2011)  
Author(s) Definition Focus 
Dymond 
(1949) 
“…transposing of oneself into the thinking, feeling and acting of another 
and so structuring the world as he does.” (p. 127) 
Cognitive 
Hogan (1969) “…constructing for oneself another person’s mental state” (p. 308) Cognitive 
Stotland (1969) “…reacting emotionally because he perceives that another is experiencing 




“…responsiveness to another’s emotional experience.” (p. 526) Affective 
Hoffman 
(1981) 
“…affective response appropriate to someone else’s situation rather than 




“…emotional matching and the vicarious experiencing of a range of 
emotions consistent with those of others.” (p. 91) 
Affective 
Batson et al. 
(1995) 
“…other-oriented feelings congruent with the perceived welfare of 
another individual.” (p. 621) 
Affective 
Davis (1994) “…include the processes taking place within the observer and the 





“…ability to identify what someone else is thinking or feeling and to 
respond to their thoughts and feelings with an appropriate emotion.” (p. 
16) 
Both 
de Waal (2008) “…the capacity to be affected by and share the emotional state of another, 
assess the reasons for the other’s state, and identify with the other, adopting 





Table 2  
Summary of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1a Compared to losers, winners will score lower in empathic accuracy. 
Hypothesis 1b Changes in testosterone negatively relate to empathic accuracy, with 
testosterone increases (decreases) being associated with less (more) 
accuracy. 
Hypothesis 1c Testosterone change mediates the relationship between competition outcome 
and empathic accuracy. 
Hypothesis 1d Personalized power moderates the direct effect of the relationship between 
competition outcome and men’s empathic accuracy; as personalized power 
increases, winners will show a steeper increase in empathic accuracy than 
losers. 
Hypothesis 2 Competition outcome elicits changes in testosterone, such that winners 
(losers) show testosterone increases (decreases) after a win (loss). 
Hypothesis 3a Winners (losers) will be more inclined to engage in proactive (reactive) 
aggression against a third party than losers (winners). 
Hypothesis 3b Changes in testosterone are positively related to aggression, with men having 
higher testosterone increases (decreases) being associated with more (less) 
aggression than those with lower testosterone increases (decreases). 
Hypothesis 3c Testosterone-level change mediates the relationship between competition 
outcome and aggression. 
Hypothesis 3d Personalized power moderates the direct relationship between competition 
outcome and men’s aggression; as personalized power increases, winners 









Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations 
 









0.50 (0.50)        
 






      
3. Empathic Accuracy 
 
 14.21 (6.31)  0.16  0.35***    
 
   
4. Personalized Power 
 
0.00 (1.00) 0.42***  -0.09  0.17     
5. Extraversion 
 
3.40 (0.79) -0.17  0.20  0.14 -0.07    
6. Machiavellianism 
 
2.67 (0.83) -0.19  0.01  0.06  0.2 0.29**   
7. Anxiety 2.50 (0.86) -0.18  0.1 -0.08 -0.07 0.12 0.24     
















   
 








    
3. Proactive Aggression 
 
27.33 (14.25) 0.05 0.22      
4. Personalized Power 
 
0.00 (1.00) -0.07 0.21  0.47***     
5. Anger 
 
1.90 (0.77) -0.21 0.02  -0.22 -0.17   
6. Psychopathy 3.06 (0.82) 0.17 -0.07 -0.15 -0.22 0.02  
















   
 








    
3. Reactive Aggression 35.97 (41.87) -0.10 0.09     
 















1.90 (0.77) -0.21 0.02 -0.05 -0.17   
6. Psychopathy 3.06 (0.82) 0.18 -0.07 -0.21 -0.22 0.02  





Dependent Variable Model, (a) Mediator Variable Model (b), and Mediation (c) 
 
 
a) Dependent Variable Model  
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Effect -.92 (.61) (-2.5299, -.0642) † -.66 (1.01) (-3.1150, 1.1241) -2.2 (3.27) (-10.3224, 3.3084) 
† Bootstrap 95% confidence interval does not include zero (LL = Lower level, UL = Upper level)  








Conditional Direct Effect of Competitive Outcomes on Empathic Accuracy, Proactive Aggression, 















Bootstrap 95%  
Confidence Interval  



















































































































A Conditional Process Model of the Effect of Male-Male Competition  




Variables: x = independent, y = dependent, m = mediator, w = moderator 
 
Direct effect:    x → y 
Indirect effect:   x → m → y 
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“Hello everyone.  My name is John Vongas and I am a PhD candidate at Concordia’s John Molson 
School of Business under the supervision of Dr. Marylène Gagné.  For my thesis, I am exploring 
men’s physiological changes and behaviours across various games played both alone and in pairs.  
These games include brief competitive and cooperative interactions, viewing still pictures and 
videos on a computer screen, and even taking part in a taste test.   
 
Therefore, I am running several experiments and I am looking for male participants only because 
men’s psychological and biological responses differ from those of women in certain contexts.  
Participation is voluntary, and whoever participates will be asked to visit my lab, located at the 
John Molson (MB) building, on two separate occasions and lasting approximately 2 hours.  You 
will be asked to fill out some basic personality questionnaires, and provide us with three saliva 
samples after engaging in the various games just described from which we will then do a 
biochemical analysis.   
 
All of the data that we collect will be confidential, with no names or other identifying markers 
appearing on test tubes and forms.  For the taste sensitivity exercise, this requires that participants 
taste some spicy foods containing the ingredient capsaicin – the active component in chili peppers.  
So, anyone who might be allergic to or not tolerate capsaicin well should not participate in this 
one particular experiment; please note, however, that this is not the case for the other experiments.  
 
Finally, for participating, you will receive two course credits toward your final grade in COMM 
222.  Please note that you must complete the full study which involves coming to the lab on two 
occasions, as stated above, and fulfilling the study’s task requirements.  All in all, this is a unique 
opportunity to see how your body chemistry changes under different conditions.  I would be more 
than happy to share with you your individual results as well as the general findings from all of the 
experiments at a later time. 
 







Consent Form to Participate in a Testosterone Study  
 
I, ________________________, understand that I have been asked to participate in a program of 
research being conducted by John Vongas and Dr. Marylène Gagné from the Department of 
Management of Concordia University’s John Molson School of Business (John’s telephone: 514-
880-7012; and email: j_vongas@jmsb.concordia.ca). 
 
A. PURPOSE 
I have been informed that the purpose of the research is to explore men’s hormone changes across 
various exercises played either alone or in groups of other people, and to understand how these 
social interactions affect their behaviours in the short term.   
 
B. PROCEDURES 
I will meet the researcher at Concordia University’s John Molson School of Business (MB 
building, room MB 13-266).  I will write short stories after being shown six (6) pictures, and will 
complete some basic questionnaires.  I will also provide 3 saliva samples over the course of 2 
hours during which time I will participate in exercises both on my own and with others in pairs.  
These exercises may involve a competition against another person, a taste sensitivity test, and 
various exercises done on the computer. 
Confidentiality. All information that I provide (saliva, questionnaires) is confidential.  I have been 
told that my name will not be associated in any way with the data collected in the study, and that 
I will not be identified individually in any way in written reports of this research.  I also have been 
told that data collected during this study will be stored in a locked file cabinet at the John Molson 
School of Business (MB) building, and that it will be kept for six (6) years after which time all 
data will be shredded and disposed.  Access to this data will be restricted to John Vongas, the 
doctoral student conducting the study. 
 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
I understand that I may be able to earn course credit for participating in this research.  On a broader 
note, my participation will benefit the scientific community by helping to grow our knowledge of 




(Cont.)  Consent Form 
 
D. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
• I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue my participation at any 
time during the experiment without negative consequences.   
•  Should I complete an experiment and then decide that I wish to withdraw my data and 
information, I will have up to one (1) week of the date of the experiment to do so. 
• I understand that my participation in this study is:  
 
CONFIDENTIAL (i.e., the researcher will know, but will not disclose my identity) 
 
 • I understand that the data from this study may be published.  
 
I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED THE ABOVE AND UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT.  
I FREELY CONSENT AND VOLUNTARILY AGREE TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY. 
 
NAME (please print) __________________________________________________________ 
 
SIGNATURE  _______________________________________________________________ 
 
If at any time you have questions about the proposed research, please contact the study’s 
Principal Investigator, Dr. Marylène Gagné, Department of Management, (514) 848-2424 ext. 
2775, email: mgagne@jmsb.concordia.ca 
 
If at any time you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the 








1. The Dirty Dozen (Jonason & Webster, 2010) 
The following statements describe ways that people sometimes use to meet their needs. You are 
asked to judge how these statements apply to you. You might feel that some of these traits are not 
socially desirable. Do not worry about how you are presenting yourself to others. Remember, this 
is an anonymous survey. What is important here is to be honest. There are no right or wrong 
answers. 
 






I tend to manipulate others to get 
my way. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I have used deceit or lied to get 
my way. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I have used flattery to get my 
way. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I tend to exploit others towards 
my own ends. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I tend to lack remorse. 1 2 3 4 5 
I tend to be unconcerned with 
the morality of my actions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I tend to be callous or 
insensitive. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I tend to be cynical. 1 2 3 4 5 
I tend to want others to admire 
me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I tend to want others to pay 
attention to me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I tend to seek prestige or status. 1 2 3 4 5 
I tend to expect special favours 
from others. 




2. Mini-International Personality Item Pool (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, & Lucas, 2006) 
For each of the following statements, please indicate whether you agree or disagree using a five-




Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
I am the life of the party. 1 2 3 4 5 
I sympathize with others’ feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 
I get chores done right away. 1 2 3 4 5 
I have frequent mood swings. 1 2 3 4 5 
I have a vivid imagination. 1 2 3 4 5 
I don’t talk a lot. 1 2 3 4 5 
I am not interested in other people’s 
problems. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I often forget to put things back in their 
proper place. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I am relaxed most of the time. 1 2 3 4 5 
I am not interested in abstract ideas. 1 2 3 4 5 
I talk to a lot of different people at 
parties. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I feel others’ emotions. 1 2 3 4 5 
I like order. 1 2 3 4 5 
I get upset easily. 1 2 3 4 5 
I have difficulty understanding abstract 
ideas. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I keep in the background. 1 2 3 4 5 
I am not really interested in others. 1 2 3 4 5 
I make a mess of things. 1 2 3 4 5 
I seldom feel blue. 1 2 3 4 5 




3. Shortened Version of the Profile of Mood States (SV-POMS; Shacham, 1983) 
For each of the following adjectives, please indicate the extent to which you feel like this right 
now (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree). 
 
Right now, I am: Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Unhappy 1 2 3 4 5 
Sad 1 2 3 4 5 
Blue 1 2 3 4 5 
Hopeless 1 2 3 4 5 
Discouraged 1 2 3 4 5 
Miserable 1 2 3 4 5 
Helpless 1 2 3 4 5 
Worthless 1 2 3 4 5 
Lively 1 2 3 4 5 
Active 1 2 3 4 5 
Energetic 1 2 3 4 5 
Cheerful 1 2 3 4 5 
Full of pep 1 2 3 4 5 
Vigorous 1 2 3 4 5 
Confused 1 2 3 4 5 
Unable to concentrate 1 2 3 4 5 
Bewildered 1 2 3 4 5 





(Cont.) Shortened Version of the Profile of Mood States (SV-POMS; Shacham, 1983) 
Right now, I am: Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Uncertain about things 1 2 3 4 5 
Tense 1 2 3 4 5 
On edge 1 2 3 4 5 
Uneasy 1 2 3 4 5 
Restless 1 2 3 4 5 
Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
Anxious 1 2 3 4 5 
Angry 1 2 3 4 5 
Peeved 1 2 3 4 5 
Grovely 1 2 3 4 5 
Annoyed 1 2 3 4 5 
Resentful 1 2 3 4 5 
Bitter 1 2 3 4 5 
Furious 1 2 3 4 5 
Worn-out 1 2 3 4 5 
Fatigued 1 2 3 4 5 
Exhausted 1 2 3 4 5 
Weary 1 2 3 4 5 
















Cues to Elicit Stories for the Picture Story Exercise (Smith, 1992)  
   
    Ship captain      Bicycle race 
   
       Hooligan attack       Women in laboratory 
 
    






Abridged Version of the Number Tracking Test  
(Taken with permission from Oliver Schultheiss) 
 
This test requires you to connect consecutive numbers with lines as fast as possible.  The next consecutive 
number is ALWAYS ADJACENT to the number you have currently arrived at.  It may be located above, 
below, to the right of, to the left of, or diagonally to the current number.  Sometimes you may have to cross 












15 1 3 6 10 
14 2 9 7 12 
16 13 8 10 13 
15 12 11 13 15 
 
Locate the start number (number 1, boxed) and the final number (number 16, boxed and 
highlighted).  You always start at the boxed number 1 and work your way through the numbers 
with one uninterrupted line.  If you have taken a wrong turn somewhere, trace the line back to the 
last correct number and continue from there.  The task is made more difficult (a) by distractor 
numbers surrounding consecutive numbers and (b) by boxed distractor numbers that look like final 
numbers.  However, there is only one possible path from the starting number to the final number 
and only one valid final number.  
 
Try to track the numbers with your pen in the above exercise.  Hold the pen closer to its rear end 
so your hand doesn’t block your sight on the neighboring numbers.  Make sure that you cross each 




















* All names herein are fictitious. The winner is clearly shown to occupy the dominant position. Below him are the names of 10 male 
participants who also completed the NTT and who performed worse. Note in bold the names of the winner and loser who competed in 





























Sample Letter Attesting to the Winner’s Performance 
 
Monday, April 1, 2013. 
 
Dear Mr. John Smith, 
 
Congratulations on completing the Number Tracking Test while recording the fastest average time 
by a man in all 8 groups (N=300)!  Here is your performance, in time lapsed, compared to the 
groups’ average time: 








Please allow us to acknowledge your performance by having your name and short biography 






John G. Vongas 
PhD Candidate & Faculty Lecturer 
John Molson School of Business 




Examples of Facial Expression Cues 
 
Samples from the Montreal Set of Facial Displays of Emotion (Beaupré & Hess, 2005) 
(Taken with permission from Ursula Hess) 
   
  Shame                  Fear 
 
   




Glossary of Emotions* 
Emotion Meaning 
Happiness A state of wellbeing and contentment; a pleasurable or satisfying 
experience 
Contempt A feeling that someone or something is not worthy of any respect 
or approval 
Shame A feeling of regret or sadness that one has because the self has 
been humiliated or disgraced 
Embarrassment The state of feeling foolish in front of others; something or 
someone that causes a person or group to look or feel foolish 
Serenity The quality or state of being calm and peaceful 
Anger A strong feeling of being upset or annoyed because of something 
wrong or bad; the feeling that makes someone want to hurt other 
people, to shout, etc. 
Sadness Feelings associated with grief or unhappiness 
Fear  An unpleasant emotion caused by being aware of danger; a feeling 
of being afraid 
Surprise The feeling caused by something that is unexpected or unusual 
Disgust  
 
A strong feeling of dislike for something that has a very 
unpleasant appearance, taste, smell, etc.; annoyance that you feel 
toward something because it is not good, fair, appropriate 
 
 
* Taken from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Although six emotions were portrayed by actors 
in the Montreal Set of Facial Displays of Emotion, the glossary included four additional 






Participant Demographic Information 
1) What is your age? _____ 
2)  What is the highest education level that you have completed? (Circle one)  
a. Some College (CEGEP) 
b. College (CEGEP) degree completed  
c. Some Bachelor’s 
d. Bachelor’s degree completed 
e. Some Master’s  
f. Master degree completed 
g. Some PhD 
h. PhD degree completed 
 
3)  Choose the social class label below that you identify yourself with the most? (Circle one): 
a. Lower class 
b. Lower-middle class 
c. Middle class 
d. Upper-middle class 
e. Upper class 
 
4)  What is your family’s approximate annual income (Circle one)? 






g. above $100,000  
 
5)  What is your parents’ highest education level completed? (Circle one for each parent) 
Father Mother 
a. Some College (or CEGEP) a. Some College (CEGEP) 
b. College degree completed  b. College degree completed 
c. Some Bachelor’s c. Some Bachelor’s 
d. Bachelor’s degree completed d. Bachelor’s degree completed 
e. Some Master’s  e. Some Master’s 
f. Master degree completed f. Master degree completed 
g. Some PhD g. Some PhD 
h. PhD degree completed h. PhD degree completed 
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(Cont.) Demographic Information 
 
6) If you have one or more brothers and sisters, how many of them are: 
 Older than you:   ____    Younger than you:  ____ 
 
* If you are the only child, place an “X” here: ____ 
 
7) 2D:  4D: 
8) Height: 
9) People in Canada come from many racial or cultural groups. You may belong to more than 1 
group on the following list, taken from Statistics Canada. Place an check “X” on the group you 
identify with the most: 
 
a. ___ Aboriginal (e.g., North American Indian, Métis or Inuit) 
b. ___ East Asian (e.g., Chinese, Korean, Japanese, etc.) 
c. ___ South Asian (e.g., East Indian, Sri Lankan, etc.) 
d. ___ Black (e.g., Caribbean, African, etc.)  
e. ___ White (e.g., European, North American, etc.) 
f. ___ Latin American (e.g., Central American, South American, etc.) 
g. ___ Southeast Asian (e.g., Vietnamese, Cambodian, etc.) 
h. ___ Arab (e.g., North African, Middle Eastern, etc.) 
i. ___ West Asian (e.g., Iranian, Afghan, etc.) 
j. Other group (please specify): ______________________ 









Inclusion of the Other in the Self scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) 
 
Please circle the picture below that best describes your relationship with your competitor on the 
number tracking test.  The more the circles overlap, the “closer” you feel to him. 
 
 
